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The general theme of this study is the nature of the exiatence and
stability of explicit compromises between national representatives of
workers and firms in developed capitalist democraciea. 'Material'
conditions behind such compromises are the object of analyais; ideological
motivations behind consent do not play e major role. By sketching my own
experience of structuring the problem, I want to elucidate this general
theme.
The background of the study stems from a major problem in Marxist
theory: why should classes compromise in a capitalist democracy? This
question particularly concerns the strategic attitudes of the working-
class: why do workers consent to a system that provides the other class
the means to exploit them? Explicitly, this problem was entangled in an
article of Przeworski and ~lallersietn (1982)1. This article can be
considered as the basis of my study below. In chapter 2, I will comment on
their type of analysis more explicitly. In general their (for Marxists)
provocative proposition is that the working-clasa compromises with
capitalists out of self-interest: consenting to the capitalist system is
sometimes a very wise thing to do for workers who acknowledge their 'real'
interests. For me, this seemed to be the proper way to analyze the
problem, instead of using the escape route of ascribing to workera a
distorted view on the mechanisms of the capitalist system and especially
in their own interests. It often appeared to me as if Marxists had to deny
any 'real' working-class interest in a capitalist-type society, as
otherwise their main normative proposition - workers are exploited by
capitalists and had therefore better abolish the system - would loose
(some of) its power.
z
First, I tried to address the problem using the dichotomy
capitalism - democracy. A large number of scholars, both right- and left-
wing, have pointed to the potentially revolutionary character of a
democratic political system based on one-person-one-vote in a capitalist
system. Right-wing theorists have frequently asserted that democracy can
be used by the 'loosers' in the market: they form a coalition that
enforces a redistribution of market incomes (see e.g. Brittan (1975).
Buchanan, 1Lllock (1962), Usher (1981))2. In general, such theorista
emphasize negative effects of current democratic institutions on the
capitalist (or free-market) economy. Democracy distorts the operation of
market processes. As a result, there exists a tension between capitalism
and democracy. Left-wing theorists (see e.g. Bernstein (1981)) have
atressed that workers are the majority of the population, and thus given
universal suffrage, the majority of the electorate3. By plainly using
their feet (votes), they would be able to abolish the exploitative
character of the system. Thus, although workers are (by definition) the
lesa powerful actors in the capitalist economy, they have no authority
with respect to the use of the means of production, they command the
majority of the 'political power resources' in a capitalist democracy.
Again both social institutions, capitalism and democracy, are not
considered to match. Both assertions however, do not aeem to have become
effective up until now. Revolutionary movements striving for socialism
explicitly have been mainly successful in capitalist countries with an
authoritative or even dictatorial political regime. Political
organizations of workers in parliamentary democracies hardly used the
political system to change the basic rules of the capitalist system. This
political stylized fact also contradicts the right-wing claim: although
some redistribution of market incomes occurs, most redistributional
efforts are nothing like the dramatic shifts the theorists mentioned above
have predicted.
Numerous grounds have been offered to explain this 'anomaly', the
apparently reasonably successful marriage between capitalism and
parliamentary democracy~. There seems to exist an (implicit) compromise
between workers and capitalists. The latter consent to the democratíc
political system on the condition that the former accept the rules of the
capitalist economy. My main motivation of not trying to add arguments to
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the democracy vs. capitalism debate is that apart from the political
system, forms of class-compromise seem to take place frequently on the
economic level. If compromises between (organizations of) classes occur
without intermediation of the democratic system, it may well be that the
'enomaly' mentioned above is not 'anomalistic' at all. This brought me to
examine theories that structure strategical attitudes of firms and workera
in game-theoretic economic models. These analyzes establiah theoretical
conditions for compromising, or cooperative behaviour. Almost inevitably,
I encountered e large literature on 'corporatism' which conceptualized a
politico-economic system where interest organizationa of firms and workera
and atate agents collectively decide on a large number of economic
variables in a cooperative manner. In 'corporatist countries' classes seem
to have buried their endemic class conflicts.
The type of class compromise I chose to examine is that on the
national level. The main argument for not treating supra-national class
compromises is that in my opinion they do not exist, since there are no
actors on the working-class side at this level that are able to negotiate
with (organizations of) firms. Lower level class compromises are not taken
into consideration as I do not think that organizations involved in e.g.
industry level bargaining represent a'class' interest. Only national
federations of workers' organizations and employera' sssociations pretend
to represent the interests of all workers and firms, respectively, in
their country. This makes this level most suited for analyzing class
compromises.
I will not deviate from the habit of making methodological commenta
in an introductory chapter. To comfort readers not interested much in such
discussions: I will not dwell on them. The most outstanding methodological
aspect of the study is its eclective character. Both pragmatic and
principal arguments are at the base of this eclecticism. A pragmatic
reason for switching between several methods is that a specific method may
be suited for adding some explanatory power for a particular argument
while for another argument it is largely irrelevant. For example, although
the problem stems from Marxist thought, I aeldom use typical Marxiat
theories or methods, like the labour theory of value or dialectical
reasoning, as they do not give much insights into the topic under
consideration. A principal ground for switching between methoda is that
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otherwise the method often rules the research object; which, at least in
my view, is not appropriate. This point becomes explicitly clear in
appendix ~ 4.5.II: here, I reject the use of several bargaining theories
as they are, according to my view, not suited to treat the problem at
hand. This dcea not mean that the methods used in these bargaining
theories are irrelevant or worse as such, on the contrary. Hut emphasis on
puristic use of inethod would sometimes imply redefinition of the problem
at hand5. At this point, I also have to admit that the border between
empirical and theoretical arguments used to reject or accept a certain
analyais may not be always clear. Although one tries to comment on
theoretical studies with theoretical arguments, sometimes empirical
criticism is needed to assess the basic assumptions of such studies. The
lack of inethodological purity may well be influenced by the
postmodernistic 'Zeitgeist': rigidity in practical, cultural, political,
but also in 'acientific' reasoning is severely criticized by postmodern
philosophers (see e.g. Lyotard (1984)). It would seem arrogant to claim
that I am not influenced by ideas developed during the last decade
concerning the declining value of 'grand narratives' or 'global world-
views'.
Methodological discussions are often used to indicate the status of
the theory and to label it, especially in non-mainstream circles. Given
the remarks above, I think I wholly agree with general considerations on
the status of 'political economy' compared with 'economics' of Kurt
Rothschild (1989). His most important criteria for a theory to be labelled
as 'political economy' (p. 11) include the adagium "Political Economy must
be interdisciplinary". Together with other requirementa, I hope that in
this sense this study is of genuine political economic character.
Important as it may be, I do not pretend (nor am I able) to offer an
elaborated critique on the methodology of mainstream economics. In fact,
non-neoclassical economists often spend (too) much of their time
criticizing methodological and axiomatic aspects of neoclassicism, instead
of just doing their own thing6.
The study is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 lays the ground
for the other chapters. I will start with examining the origin of the
problem at hand and point to some Marxist-type explanations of the
existence of class compromises in caPitalism. These explanations rest for
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a major part on a specific use of the concept 'conaenaus'. In order to
criticize the Marxist-type explanations (~ 2.3), I first try to
distinguish between consensus and compromise conceptuelly, usíng Lukes'
(1973) three-dimensional notion of power (~ 2.2). In section 2.4, the
'modern' approach to class conflict in capitalism is discusaed. Although
many critical remarks are raised, this approach forma the basis for the
subsequent discussions.
Chapter 3 elaborates a number of problems that are often neglected
by the theoriea discussed in g 2.4. First, some aspecta of the nature of
the actors that are said to represent national class interests are looked
into: the centralized federations of trade unions and employers'
associations (g 3.1). Then (~ 3.2), a number of analyses are reviewed that
examine the economic consequences of explicit class compromisea on the
national level. Most of these theories do not include the capitaliat state
as an actor in its own right with respect to these compromisea. In fact,
the theories in ~ 2.4 alao minimalized the role of the state. Therefore in
~ 3.3. I discuss a specific notion of the concept of 'corporatiam' and
start with indicating the importance of corporatist institutions with
respect to class compromises.
In chapter 4, a concise growth model is introduced (~ 4.1), without
any explicit class compromises on the national, centralized level. It ia
argued that a stable below-full-employment steady state growth path is
possible and likely to result from the model. The existence of a
considerable, stable level of unemployment will be seen to be the major
incentive for classes to bargain centrally on wages, i.e. to install
compromises. Besides some other conditions behind the occurrence of
compromises, characteristics of the growth path in an economy with
explicit compromises are indicated (~ 4.2). Hoth sections did not include
the role of the state. Therefore, the state is introduced in the model (~
4.3) and it is examined whether some types of economic policy are feasible
to decrease unemployment rates in the absence of class compromises. It
appears that lasting substantive positive results with respect to the
unemployment rate are not to be expected. g 4.4 first starts a diacussion
on the interesta of state agents with respect to reducing unemployment.
Then, interference of the state with class compromises is anelyzed. It
appears that some types of state policy may now be succesafull. The first
6
appendix contains the consequences of a small complication in the basic
model. g 4.5.II is already mentioned above and elaborates the non-use of
fashionable bargaining theories in the main text.
Chapter 4 gives a very rosy picture of class compromises in
capitalism: all actors involved seem to be very happy with the
consequences of these compromises. Chapter 5 however looks into the
atability of class compromises. It appears that these compromises are not
very stable, mainly because of collective action problems. g 5.1 is
devoted to an introduction and discussion of the theory of collective
action. Besides this, it examines some consequences of the existence of
corporatist institutions on collective action problems on the 'individusl'
level. Next, the main reasons of instability of class compromises are
analyzed; especially working-class organizations face strong incentives to
'cheat'. Although state interference (g 5.3) may counteract this tendency
to cheat, it is concluded that class compromises do have risk breaking
down. ~ 5.4 concludes the most important findings of the theoretical part.
While the major part of the study is of theoretical nature up to
chapter 5, the final chapter is devoted to empirical evaluation of the
theory at hand. Fírst, a number of comparative studies on the consequences
of centralized bargaining and corporatism is commented upon (~ 6.1). Then,
in section 6.2, some political-economic developments in three OECD-
countriea (Sweden, Austria, the Netherlands) are analyzed in the light of
the existence and stability of explicit centralized class compromises. By
doing so, I hope to provide the theoretical part with more explanatory
'body'.
Notea
1 Przeworski (1986) is a collection of rewritten papers all addressing
this issue in general.
2 This notion towards the detrimental effects of a democracy based on
universal suffrage can be traced to 19th century liberal scholars like
J.S. Mill (19~~). In his 'Considerations on Representative Government', he
pleads for a qualified franchise: people who do not pay taxea should not
decide upon the financial aspects of state policy and, in general, those
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better educated and working in 'higher' positiona should obtain a stronger
voting power than the 'lower classes'. According to Mill, such measures
are needed to prevent the masses using democratic power to reach myopic
goals. See especislly chapters 6 and 8 of Mill (197~).
3 Przeworski (i986, ch. I) provides an extensive account of the hiatory
of the Marxist view with regard to the revolutionary perapective of
parliamentary democracy.
4 From the Marxist point of view, Jessop (19~8) provides a uaeful
overview. Right-wing authors like Brittan (19~5) and Hayek (1978) often
point to the role of culturally given norms that prevent unbounded use of
the democratic system to redistribute income.
5 The content of these remarks must not be exaggerated. Even if one uaea
a method only for a part of the research, conclusiona with respect to this
part are restricted by the method used. Limitations sa a result of inethods
used will always exist.
6 A recent example is Hodgson's (1988) book which provides numerous
well-documented and elaborated criticiams on the neoclassical neglect of
the role of inatitutions in their theories. However, he gives only little
room to a'positive' theory of institutional economics.
CHAPTER 2
CLASS CONFLICTS, COMPROMISES AND
CONSENSUS: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS
2.1 Marxiet theories on clase compromiaes in capitaliss
A general theme in Marxist theory is the all-pervading significance
of class struggle in capitalist societies. The very existence of at least
two classes points to their antagonistic relationship: both the capitalist
and the working classes exist by definition that the former exploit the
latter. Marxists do not perceive capitalism as a amooth Punctioning system
that can merely be disturbed by occasional conflicts between economic
interest groups. On the contrary, their view upon aociety is characterized
by conflicts between classes. Agreements on the distribution oP income or
harmonious labour relations are regarded as random or superficiel
incidents. Developed capitalism however, dces not seem infected by
numerous outbursts of class conflicts. In this section, some Marxist views
on the absence of large scale overt class conflicta over income
distribution in capitalist societies are traced.
Marx's views (e.g. Marx (1984), pp. ~90-~91) in particular on the
effects of class conflicts in the long run are famous. Cless conflicta
between exploiters and exploited are considered to be fundamental for the
system dynamics: if there were no clasa conflicta, no auccesaions of modes
of production would be possible. More specifically, a mode of production
ie defined by a typical relation between exploitere and exploited. Next to
essentisl characteristics as a free market, existence of credit money,
enduring technical change etc., the fundemental feature of capitalis~ is
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exploitation of workers by capitalists. However, analysis of long run
successions of society-types (or, for that matter modes of production) are
not subject to discuasion here.
Form, content and consequences of class conflicts in the medium and
short run are alao of substantive importance in the Marxist understanding
of the dynamica of capitalist society. As was noted above, every aspect of
capitalist society can only be understood in a Marxian sense if one
departs from antagonistic relationships between classea. Production and
diatribution processes in particular form the core of the Marxiat emphasis
on conflicts and atruggle.
By definition, production and work procesaes in capitalism are of
capitalist nature. To grasp the non-triviel nature of such a claim, one
has to acknowledge the difference between labour power and labour
performed. Capitalists (or their agents: employers, managers,
representatives of firms, entrepeneurs, etc) buy labour power on the
labour market. The price of this labour power, the wage, should cover
reproduction expenses of the labour power. If the contract is settled, the
capitalist is able to make use of this labour power for the contractually
agreed amount of time. In order to maximize the production value of this
labour power, the capitalist has to force and motivate her workers, shel
has to use the carrot and~or the stick to make workers perform well, both
quantitatively and qualitatively. Workers do not, by definition, own the
means of production or the products at the end of the production line. In
principal, they therefore are inclined to perform as bad as possible,
assuming they evaluate efforts as costs2. The ultimate hierarchical
means the capitalist possesses, is to fire the worker. Therefore,
according to the Marxist point of view, the tension and conflicts inside
the capitalist firms occur especislly if the worker does not fear the
sack, e.g. if unemployment is low and there are ample well-paid joba
available3. On the Contrary, if unemployment is high, workers face an
obvious incentive to keep their jobs and to perform well. Thus, by
pointing to the (often potential) class conflict inside the firm, a first
major function of unemployment, the reserve army of workera, is
introduced.
Class struggle is not limited to the production process inaide the
firm. The distribution of income between profits and wages is also subject
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to conflicts between capitalists and workers. The classical Marxian view
emphasized conflicts inside the firms since wagea were considered to be
determined by the necessary reproduction costs of workers. In such a view
capitalists and workers do not struggle on income4. But then Marx
((1984), ch. 23) makes an exception: during periods of rapid accumulation
of capital, labour (power) demand rises fast, and the reserve army of
workers is being depleted. As a result, mainly for competitive reasons,
wages temporarily rise above their reproduction level. Such wage riaea
however tend to disappear in time since capítalists react on thia by
retarding accumulation, speedening up the rate of technological (labour
saving) change, replacing production to locations where a large reserve
army still exists, or attracting workers from auch areas. The clasaical
Marxian (or Ricardian) view on the distribution of income may be
reconstructed as a(non-cooperative) zero-sum game5: gains for one clasa
(e.g. a wage-rise) means losses for the opponent class (a fall in
profits). But the societal conjecture Marx faced writing 'Capital' was not
characterized by a'player' working-class and its opponent capitalist
clasa. The game had hardly any strategical flavour since at least one of
the players, the working-class, was hardly organized and could
subsequently not be considered as a decision-making unit.
Since the mid 19th century the organizational power of the working-
class has risen enormously in most countriea that constitute the core of
capitalism, both via trade union organization and via political partiea
representing the interests of workers. This development made the view of
distribution as a game, i.e. strategic interaction between players, more
plausible. Not surprisingly, the upsurgement of working-class
organizations was regarded as a major threat by capitalists and
subsequently fiercely opposed by them. The zero-sum game perspective on
income distribution was not abandoned, indeed it became more realistic
since both classes could now be considered to be actual players.
As is already said, a zero-sum game seems hardly suitable as an
environment for compromises. However, in actual capitalism explicit or
implicit compromises between capitalists and workersó seem to be a
normal feature. In fact, most 'mainstream' social science theoriea seem
more occupied by explaining the 'anomaly' of industrial conflicta like
strikes in capitalism than finding an answer to the question: why are
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compromises prevalent? In section 2.4, I will review theories which attack
the supposedly zero-sum character of income distribution processes in
capitalism. But first, another line of Marxist reasoning explaining
compromises in cap3talism will be discussed.
The observation of the lack of continuously large-scale overt class
conflict in the core capitalist countriea (OECD) after World War II
brought Marxist theorists to the question of legitimacy: why is capitalism
in the eyes of an absolute majority of the population legitimate or
rather, why does the majority of the people (the exploited) not revolt
against the system, be it via revolutionary or plainly via electoral
processes? Even in the developed capitalist countries characterized by
political plural3sm and universal suffrage no socialist or communist party
was ever elected that seriously attacked the fundaments of capitalist
society (see, Przeworski (1985), pp. 103-104). The major answers of
Marxists to this 'puzzle' run along concepts of legitimacy and hegemony.
According to this solution7, the institutional structure of
capital3st society distorts the perception of the interests of the workers
and other exploited groups. The omnipresence of basic traits of capitalist
socíety as private accumulation of wealth, a free market and the division
between capitalists and workers, combined with a reasonable level of both
private and public consumption (including social security) provides a
certain temporary level of legitimacy to the system. This legitimacy is
temporary and limited since the 'real' interests of the exploited classes
are not satisfied (otherwise they would not be exploited). The capitalist
state has the important function to impose this legitimacy. It has to
provide a satisfactory level of public consumption and it muat spread the
ideology of normality of all major capitalist institutions. In Marxist
state theory, the reasoning behind such state functioning is the most
important subject of discussion8. The omnipresence and normality of
capitalist institutions in spite of enduring explo3tation constitute their
hegemonic character. The most important consequence of this hegemony is
its distorting effect on the perception of the real, 'objective',
interests of the working class. Workers have to organíze themselves
according to roles assigned by the capitalist system, their organizations
have to deal with economic 'necessities' and the state cannot deviate much
13
from capitalist demands since otherwise the economy would run into
trouble.
Thus, compromises result from a definite legitimacy of the system:
There seems to be a consensus with respect to the basic institutions of
capitalism. In this view, increasing manifestations of class conflict are
therefore signs for a gradual breakdown of such a consensus. But the
concepts of consensus and compromise are frequently intermingled in
theories. Therefore, the next section is devoted to an attempt to
distinguish between these concepts more precisely. This enables me to
clarify the concept of hegemony and its relation to class compromíses.
2.2 Consensus and compromise
A very direct way of assessing the definitional difference between the
concepts of compromise and consensus is by consulting a dictionary9.
Here the following descriptions are given:
Consensus: "General agreement or accord"
Compromise: "A settlement of differences tn mhich each side makes
concessfons"
These descriptions are of little conceptual help. Is the consensuel
'accord' not a'settlement of differences'? Does a'general agreement'
requíre 'concessions' or not? Before giving some provisional definitions
of both compromise and consensus of my own, I will first indicate the
difficulty of interpreting the meaning of 'agreement', since a notion of
agreement enters both concepts.
A classic example of a bargaining situation is the division of a
cake or pie between two actors, A and B. In fact, the majority of the
currently fashionable bargaining theories10 seems to consider this
process, and its outcome, as a fundamental problem. Suppose that both
actors 'agree' on splitting the cake into two equal parts. Basically, I
would label such an 'agreement' as a compromise. It may be a consensus on
the division too, but such an assertion would demand a psychological
analysis of the actors involved. One cannot deduce from the mere
observation that actors accept a certain division (even if it is fifty-
fifty) that they are satisfied with this division or consider it as
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legitimate or justified. Suppose that both actors represent a group; each
group has to be nourished from this cake. Assume further that actor A
repreaents a group of twenty people and B a group of thirty people and
that they both brought along an equal amount of inputa in order to produce
the cake. Again a symmetric Nash bargaining solution would imply a fifty-
fifty partition of the cake. Is there still consensus about the partition?
Assume now that A and B only represent themselves, but A posaesses a large
stock of frozen cakes and B is only hungry. During the bargaining process,
which 3s retarded by A, they finally settle a compromise, an agreement on
the following partition: A gets three quarters of the cake while B starts
eating his quarterll. Without expressing any sympathy with A or B, it can
hardly be imagined that particularly B feels a consensus towards this
partition.
Therefore, one may conclude from this example that non-consensual
agreement is possible. On the other hand, as the definitions in the
dictionary suggest, consensus does not seem to exist without agreement.
Now, some provisional definitions of consensus and compromise may be
given:
Consensus: An agreement on the joint preferabílfty of a particular
outcome of a soctal process betmeen at least troo actors
Compromise: An agreement on a particular outcome of a soc{al process
betmeen at least ti.w actors, r~hose acttons resuZt jrom pursuing
their omn interests
Again, both concepts have something to do with agreements. A compromise
refers to the agreement as such, and consensus means an agreement on the
collective preference of the actors involved towards a particular outcome.
In order to be more precise, I will introduce some game theoretic concepts
and discuss with respect to the role of power.
The example above on cutting the cake into two unequal parts
insinuated a notion of power. The actor who can afford to be more patient
during the bargaining process, has an advantage. This is reflected in the
outcome of the process. Thus, the ability to wait provides a player with
some power, in the sense that she is able to force her opponent to act
(accepting an unequal partition) in a way she otherwise would not do. But
as the sociologist Lukes (19~4) notes, this is only a limited side of
power. He distinguishes three kinds of power:
i5
- T~o actors (A and B) interact (work, negotiate, bargain, etc). If A
is able to force B to perform actions B would otherwise not do, A
ia said to have (first dimensional) power over B.
- If A sets the agenda of interaction, A has more (second
dimensional) power than B.
- If A has more impact on B's internal evaluation of posaible
outcomes of interaction than vice versa, A has more (third
dimensional) power than B.
Although thís typology of power is elaborated below, I will use an example
to illustrate these different types of power. Consider a'domestíc' socisl
problem. In Dutch marital culture, men ahould earn the household income
while women should do the housework and raise children. Suppose that in
such a typical Dutch household, a wife wants to get a job to become more
independent. Not surprisingly we assume that her Dutch husband dcea not
like this development of her preferences and tries to force her to atick
to her actual position. Re has several possibilities to do so. Following
Lukes' typology, he may try to 'forbid' her looking for a job which is e
particular type of first dimensional power. A more aubtle way of
exercising first dimensional power is to point out the rationality of him
keeping his job while she looks after the children: after all she would
probably end up with a lower-paid job than he has. A form of second
dimensional power would be to exclude his wife from posaibilities of
searching for a job or to follow courses in order to obtain the necessary
skills. Effectively, he excludes the available strategies for his wife.
The third dimension of power is most subtle: he tries to convince his wife
of the undesirability of having a job: work is boring, ahe will not
aucceed in having a reasonable career after all, the children will miss
their mother etc. If this works, his wife will once again be content with
her position.
The notion of 'power' is little used, if not outright rejected, in
(mainstream) economic theory. Undoubtedly, a major cause for this
rejection is ideological: economists emphasize the characteristíca of
individuals and their organizations as rational, striving for efficient
contracts on production and rewards. Real power cannot occur in a more or
lesa competitive market: if someone is trying to force me to accept an
exchange under bad terms, I will refuse and start negotiating with someone
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else. Not surprisingly, the state (government) is the only actor that is
normally thought to be capable of exercising power. A more practical
problem of the use of the concept power in economic theory is its
vagueness: 'power' cannot be quantified and hardly (if at all?) be
formalised. But the undeniable importance of power by the examination of
compromise and consensus is due to this contribution to provide 'power' a
more precise formulation.
Concepts of game theory12 seem to be best suited for capturing
Lukes' typology of power. A 'game' is another word for 'social
interaction'13. A game consists of a number of players or actors.
Although game theorists often adhere to methodological individualism,
actors need not be individuals. A convenient way to interpret a player is
a'decision-making unit'1~. Players must command about at least two
strategies; a strategy is to perform a particular action. The result of a
particular action does not only have consequences for the acting player,
but also for her opponent(s): the outcome of a game is the end result of
the different actions that are chosen by all players involved.
The introduction of Lukes' typology of power contained the term
'agenda', a frequently used concept in both sociology and political
science. To give a game-theoretic translation of 'agenda' is difficult,
suffice to say it contains (at least) the topic of the game and the range
of strategies the players have. Preferences or interests of players are
reflected in their 'pay-off'-functions: each outcome of the game is
evaluated by a player and the value she ascribes to this outcome is called
the 'pay-off'.
By making use of an example, I will introduce Lukes' typology of
power in a game theoretical context and also reflect on the relationship
between power, compromise and consensus. Consider a dispute between the
management of a firm (actor A) and a trade union who represents the
interests of the employees of the firm (actor B). In the first instance,
both actors are supposed to negotiate on an initial proposal of B,
concerning a particular wage increase. Both actors have a strategy set,
respectively SA and SB. SA-[0,1], which says that if SA-O, the firm
accepts the wage claim of the trade union. SA-1 means a refusal of the
wage claim. B has also a dual choice, SB-[0,1]. SB-O implies that the
trade union accepta the choice of the firm, while SB-1 means that the
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trade union commits itself to a long period of bargaining with the firm.
The firm picks its strategy first, then the trade union replíes. After the
choice of the trade union, the firm has the opportunity to renew its
atrategy choice, using the same strategy set as before. The pa,y-offa of
both players (PA and PB) are given by the following relations:
PA - a1SA t e2SASB
PB - b1SA f b2SASB
(2.1)
(2.2)
The coefficients (al, a2, bl, b2) reflect the costs~benefits of the
consequences of the strategy choices; a1~0, a2,b1,b2 c 0. The extensive
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The pay-offa of the players are put between brackets. The first entrance
shows the pay-off of player A, while the second entrance displays B's pay-
off. The extensive form of this game shows that if the firm accepts the
wage claim of the union (SA-o), the game stops. The firat two rows of the
matrix therefore display the same result, (o,o). A only has to choose for
a second time if H opts to keep on bargaining until A accepts its original
demand (SB-1). The outcome, below-right, is thus a stalemate. If we assume
that alia2 ~ 0, then (SA-1, SH-o) is the unique (subgameperfect) Nash
equilibrium of this gamel5. In this example, the trade union agrees with
the rejection of the proposal on wage increases by the management. This
outcome reflects the first dimension of power distinguished by Lukes:
iven the strategy range of the players and the topic of the game, and
ig ven the pay-off structure that accompanies this strategy range, an actor
is said to have more power if she can force the other actor into a
relatively poor outcome by choosing a particular strategy. The rules and
structure of the game determine the first dimensional power relations and
provide the powerful actor with the opportunity to force it opponent in an
unfavourable position.
The second dimension of power cannot be illustrated by the game
above. In order to show this second dimension, suppose that B originally
did not have two but three strategy options, SB-[o,1,2]. Her third
strategy is to call out a strike after (initial) rejection of the firm













(al,bl) ( al~aZ,bl~b2) (alt2a2,b1.2b2)
The value of the coefficients is cruciel to the outcome of the game. In
order to analyze the problem at hand, it is most convenient to assume that
el.fl2)0)a1~2a2. ThiB implies that an enduring strike is less beneficiel to
the firm than accepting the original proposal of the trade union.
Consequently (SA-1, SB-O) is not a unique Nash equilibrium anymore. If B




rejection of the proposal, B can 'force' A to accept the proposal. The
second dimension of power implies that A would be able to change the
atructure of the game e.g. by pursuing changea of the legal framework of
industrial relations. In the issue at hand it would mean that A could try
to prohibit atriking. This would imply that one of the strategical optiona
of B disappears and the game reduces to the one previously analyzed, with
the subsequent beneficial consequences for A. Thus the second dimension of
power contains inter alia the decision on the width of the atrategy range:
who decides on the strategies actors may use to reach their goals.
A second form of the second dimension of power consists of the
deciaion on which subjects the actors interact. For example, it is well-
defined that in most developed capitalist countries unions may legally
negotiate on wages. But many topics are not subject to discussion: the
management of the firm plainly does not allow unions to negotiate e.g. on
investment decisions (whether unions may wish such influence or not). The
fact that unions are entitled to bargain over wages is not an eternal
human right that fell out of the sky, but constitutes a certain (second
dimensional) power of unions. Summarizing, the second dimension of power
relates to the influence of actors on the rules and the subject of the
game: 'what is the game about?' and 'which strategies are optional?'. In
game theory, this may be analyzed as a game on the gameló
The third dimension of power relates, in my opinion, to the
internal evaluation of the actors of the different outcomes of the game.
It cancerns the influence actors may have on the perception of the
preferences of each other. In the above example, this can be illustrated
by the weight of influence the firm may have on the union members' opinion
on strikes. Suppose that A cannot change the 'rules of the game', i.e. she
cannot legally foreclose the occurrence of strikes. She may well, however,
if ahe succeeds in promoting a very negative view on strikes, effectively
destroy the commitment of B with respect to the strategy of calling out a
strike. If B cannot commit herself to the use of a strike, because of the
low support of its members, again the game effectively reduces to that
analyzed originally. Thus using one's third dimensional power may
positively influence the outcome of the game (from the perspective of the
powerful actor).
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This discussion on power in a game theoretical context providea
some conclusions with respect to the concepts of compromise and consensus.
A compromise is conceived as an agreement on an outcome of a particular
type of social interaction between players. This agreement results from
the conclusions players draw on the subject of the game and the strategy
range they have. Given this agenda and their preferences or, more broadly,
their interests they make an optimal choice. Conaensus only entera the
picture if the resulting agreement is favoured by all actors.
Alternatively, consensus may mean a collective dislike of some outcomes.
Power can be exercised on different levels in order to obtain an optimal
compromise: a player can affect her opponent's preferencea, and thua her
atrategy choice. A second possibility is to foreclose some atrategy
choicea of the opponent in order to change her behaviour. The third way of
exercising power is most direct: by acting optimally given all the rules
of the game, the player effectively forces her opponent to respond in a
way that suits the player best.
2.3 Conaenaus as device for compromiae: the hegemonial structure of
capitaliat society
As was noted in section 2.1, the Marxist argument for the absence of overt
class conflict in a capitalist society, characterized by a zero-sum
distribution game, is captured by the concept of hegemony. Using the
discussion in section 2.2, this argument may now be reformulated and
criticized.
Hegemony is a system where hegemonic power is exercised. This
hegemonic power involves several types of power as in the previous
section. First of all, it includes the manipulation of consensus in order
to achieve compromisesl~. Hegemony rests for a great deal on the third
dimensional use of power: the perception of the interests of the actor
'working class' is distorted by agents of the 'capitalist class' in order
to create a consensus on at least the preferability of avoiding certain
etrategies and sometimes on the preferability of some outcomes of social
processes, in this case the distribution of income. After the creation of
such consensus, agreements (compromises) may result that appear to be made
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by self-conscious, rational actors based on the (distorted) perception of
their interests. An important aspect of hegemonic power is that it leaves
the weaker actor with some choice: the syatem dces not run totally counter
to the distorted perception of the interests of this actor. This
appearance in turn provides the agreements with legitimacy: given the
hegemonial pressure, actors may be fully satisfied with a particular
outcome of the distribution of income.
A second aspect of hegemonic power is the deliberate exclusion of
certain topics or strategies that are allowed to appear in the process of
reaching an agreement: the agenda is set by the capitalist class or its
(state) agents using its second dimensional power to affect the outcome of
the game. By some Marxist theorists this 'game' on the agenda itself is
pictured as an 'accord': according to (among others) Bowles and Gintis
((1982), p.65), the post World War II capital-labour accord consists of
capitalists allowing workers the possibility of demanding distributional
gaina (i.e. trade unions negotiating on wage increases), while workers,
implicitly, do not dispute the capitalists' privilege to run their firms.
Hence hegemony helps to shape a particular game on the distribution
of income where only first dimensional power occurs. Of course, this game
may have different forms in different countries in different times. But
actors must settle their conflicts in a specific institutional
environment. This capitalist hegemonic environment is supposed to be
capable of avoiding conflicts that the zero-sum distribution of income as
such implies. The theories emphasizing hegemonial processes point also to
changes in the rules of the game: if the institutional environment becomes
less capable to absorb conflicts, the capitalist class (and the state)
make an effort to restructure these rules and the perception of interests
of the other actor.
In the sequel of this study I will largely abstain from the
'hegemonial' explanation of compromises in capitalist society. Only
'materisl bases of consent' (Przeworski (1986)) are considered: Througout
it will be assumed that both the working class and the capitalist class
perceive their 'real' interests. However, I do reflect on the use of
second dimensional power as means to obtain agreements between the
classes. The first reason for not including distortion of interests es a
medium for compromises is the difficulty, if not impossibility, of
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pointing to institutes and inatitutions that are responsible for
manipulation of interests. Reference can be made to the educational
system, political partiea or to the media as specific loci of working-
class interests distortion. But these allegations often imply a purely
functional view of these institutiona: they are aupposed to act as
manipulative inatruments, since this ia beneficiel for the capitalist
clasa. It does not become clear (at least not to me) how capitaliata are
able to use these instruments as manipulative deviceal8
A second argument against the hegemonic' explanation of the
frequent occurrence of compromises in capitalism is that this explanation
seems to neglect the posaibility that workers are able to perceive Lheir
'real' interests (whatever these may be). In developed capitalist
countries there exists a large variety of different left-wing political
parties, trade unions and non-parliamentary groups. All these
organizationa pretend to provide the means for workers to acknowledge
their 'real' interests. Besides this, they are among the actors who
'shape' the agenda and co-determine the room for the available and
accepted atrategies. As such, they exercise two- and three dimensíonal
power. To asaert that these groups would have no substantial posaibilitiea
to lnfluence the distributional 'game' would be simply untrue. One may
paraphrase a New Classical Economics adagium with respect to this remark:
'you can fool some of the people all of the time, you can fool all of the
people some of the time. but you cannot fool all of the people all of the
time'.
A third argument for leaving out manipulation of interests in order
to obtain consensus says that one can hardly discriminate between the
manipulation of the perception of the interests of an actor and continuoua
changes in the actor's own perceptions. In order to clarify this argument.
I will briefly summarize the theory of endogenoua preference formation as
exposed by Elster (1983). Preferences (or interests) fulfill an important
role in economic theory: they form the basis for individuel choices.
Economic theory in general treats these preferences as autonomous or at
least exogenous to the economic system. Thia simply meana that the
preferences of an economic subject for certain outcomea neither depend on
the available optiona nor on the actuel choice of this subject. This claim
of exogenous preference formation is refuted by Elater. Endogenous
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preference formation (change) results from an important characteristic of
actors: they want to reduce their cognitive dissonance, or frustration
which may come about as a consequence of an unsatiafactory situation.
Endogenous preference formation has at least two faces: adaptive
preference formation (ibid, p. 25) and state-dependent preferences (ibid.
pp. 121-122)~9. The first refers to the observation that actors tend to
downgrade possibilities or outcomes they cannot reach and relatively
upgrade their real possibilities20. Consequently, if the feasibility set
of an actor changes, her preferences will change too. The second 'face' of
endogenous preference formation has even more serious consequencea for
economic theory: it says that an actor adjusts her preferences to the
situation she finds herself in and therefore adjusts her preferences to
her choice (assuming that her choice has some consequence for the
situation). If these mechanisms of frustration-reduction would work
atrongly, then everybody's preferences would be perfectly satiafied as
everybody would adjust their preferences to each situation, no matter what
their possibilities are. This theory, if valid, has enormous consequences
for welfare economics in particular and for neo-classical economic theory
in general. However, these currents of ideas are not subject to discusaion
here. It also makes a discrimination of a change of preferences resulting
from an adjustment to the feasible set or to the actual end-state of an
actor and of a change of preferences resulting from manipulation very
problematic. If this process occurs, there would be no theoretical
possibility to discriminate between adaption of ('objective') preferences
and manipulating of ('objective') preferences. Hence, it would make
general arguments that ground compromises between capitalists and workers
on ideological distortion of preferences hard, if not impossible to
assert. Only in particular instances in space and time would it be
possible to claim that compromises between capitalists and workers rest on
manipulation and distortion of real interests.
2.4 Income distribution and accumulation: the non-zero sum approach
As the hegemonic 'solution' on the existence of compromisea on the
distribution of income in capitalism is rejected, another explanation is
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needed. In this section, the non-zero sum geme approach to the problem ia
introduced. Although a number of critical remarka are raised, this
approach will provide the basis for the remainder of the study.
A static view on income distribution muat always lead to an
analysis reflecting at best a positive constant aum approach. Once the
cake has been produced, an actor may only obtain a larger piece if her
opponent gives in. But thia situation changea if the analysis becomea
dynamic: if part of the income is used to enlarge production capacity and
thereby (potential) future income, an actor may rationally meke moderate
claima on the income now in order to increase her future pay-offa. Dynemic
game-theoretic models of the class struggle have tried to deal with this
argument: to pinpoint the precise logic of i t and to point to the pitfalls
of the argument. In my view, the most advanced analysis within this set of
models is made by Mehrling (1986). Hence, I will diecuss his paper after
some introductory remarks.
1~o streams of economic thinking form the background of Mehrling's
model. The first, of course, is the pure dynamic non-cooperative game
approach to class struggle introduced by Lancaster (1973)21. In this
approach, both the capitalist class and the working class are considered
to be playera. Income i s divided into profits and wages. Both pleyers
control one variable in the model in order to maximize their utilitiea.
The latter depend on consumption streams financed from their income. The
capitalist class controls the accumulation share; i.e. the part of profits
that is accumulated. The workers control, within limits, the wage share.
As the game is dynamic, both players compute an optimal time path of their
control variables to maximize their respective utilities. These optimal
paths depend ( among others) on the technical parameters of the economy,
discount rates, time horizons, the sequence of atrategy choices and
information available. The most important goal of the Lancaster (-type)
model(s) is to show whether capitalism, characterized by the existence of
two classes, is efficient in maximizing total utility compared with a
state of affairs (socialism?) where both control variables are set by one
actor, i.e. if the dynamic game is replaced by an one actor optimal
control problem.
Mehrling extenda this approach by referring to the growth model of
Goodwin (196~). The moat important feature of this model end ita
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auccessors22 is the direct relationship between changes in the wage share
and the employment rate, capturing the Marxian 'profit squeeze' argument
(cf. aection 2.1). The core of this argument is: During a period of rapid
accumulation the employment rate rises, enabling workers to demand higher
wage increases~3. If the resulting wage-rate growth exceeds the growth
rate of labour productivity, the wage share increases. However, e riaing
wage share impliea a declining profit share and results in slower
accumulation (workers consuming all their wages). Hence the employment
rate decreases, leading to more modest wage demands: the growth cycle may
start again (see also: g 4.1).
As mentioned above, Mehrling's analyais combinea both approaches.
At a given moment in time, a capital stock (K) allows for net production
(Y) according to a fixed capital coefficient (x-1)24 Labour productivity
(y) is also fixed, hence the capital stock determines labour demand (L),
which has to be assumed smaller than labour supply. As labour supply (A)
grows at a constant rate (y), the growth rate of the employment rate
(p-L~A) equals: R~K - y. Workers determine the growth rate of wages (w),
constrained by the labour market situation,
w~w c -alta2s (al.a2 ) 0) (2.3)
As the production coefficients are fixed, it can be shown that the growth
rate of wages equals the growth rate of the wage share (A): w~w - f,~~.
Workers are assumed to consume their income, while capitalists invest the
ahare 'a' of their profits, hence increasing the capital stock (which dces
not depreciate),
R - e(1-a)Y Ocaci (2.4)
Equations 2.3 and 2.4 may be rewritten as:
1~~a c a2(p-S") (2.5)
-y ~ ~~p t -x(a-a') (2.6)
where s"- a1~a2 and A" -(x-y)Ix. Both expressions represent the steady
state values of respectively the employment rate and the wage share if
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capitalists invest all their profits (s-1) and if workers try to enforce
their maximum wage claims (w~w --alia2p). Constraint 2.3 (2.5) reflects
the choice of workers: they are able to enforce wage claims up to (-
~1.~2~). Their choice leads to a particular income distribution, after
which it is up to capitalists to decide on which part of their profits
they invest. This accumulation share (a) sets the growth rate of the
employment rate and hence the strategy range of workers25. All relations
are displayed in figure 2.3 below.
FIGURE 2.3














Workers' goal is to maximize wage income stream. Discounting at rate b
they maximize,
yJo e-btAas dt (2.7)
zs
As labour supply (A) develops independently from the other economic
variables and y is held constant, the workers' goal is to maximize Aa
dynamically. A similar argument leads to the capitalista' goel of
maximizing (1-a)~.
Mehrling distinguishes classes on the level of organizational unity.
For convenience, a class is considered to be either a real strategic unit
or, at the other extreme, a collection of individuals who act without
coordinating their strategies. As there are two classes, four different
situations are distinguished. If a class is unorganized, it does not act
strategically. Class members must be considered analogous to agents in a
free competitive market: for all agents prices are given, and their
individual behaviour does not affect the macro-equilibrium in any
substance. With respect to this case, the individuel decision of a worker
to moderate her wage claims or an individual decision of e capitalist to
restrain her investment efforts would not affect macro variables. In fact,
capitalists invest all their profits: a-1, and workers claim their maximal
possible wage increases: w~w --al~a2~. If both classes are not organized
and do not coordinate their strategies (case 1), their interaction leads
to the original Goodwin growth cycle around the point (~~,~N) as described
above.
If workers are organized while capitalists are not (case 2), workers
are supposed to act as a strategic unit. At the start of the game they
demand less wage growth than is possible, i.e. w~w c(-~1i~2~). As
capitalists invest all their profits (a-1) such temporary wage moderation
results in rapid accumulation and thus a rising employment rate. If the
employment rate is high enough, workers increase their wage demands. The
end result of this game is a steady state where (a,~) -(a~,l).
Case 3 is the opposite of case 2. Now, capitalists act strategically
and workers constitute the unorganized sack of potatoes. At the atart of
the game, capitalists invest less than possible (acl), forcing the
employment rate down in order to limit workers' wage demands. At a certain
moment, they increase their investment efforts. The system is atabilized
at a steady state marked by (~,S) -(~c ~w) ~cc~~
Case 4 is distinguished by an organizational unity of both classes.
it turns out that the only dynamic feasible equilibrium resulting from
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non-cooperative behaviour is equal to the steady etate of case 3. But both
classes may improve their pay-off as is illustrated in figure 2.4.
Figure 2.4: Mehrling'e model: four eteady states and the 'contract zone'
a
Figure 2.4 describes a(a,g) plane containing the three different steady
states of the cases above. Departing from the steady atate point of case 3
(ac,p"), two 'indifference curves' are drawn. 'W' denotes workers'
indifference curve, ~s - acp". All points north-west of curve 'W' indicate
pay-off improvements for workers. 'C' is its counterpart, the capitalista'
indifference curve, (1-a)s -(1-~c)p". Points north-east of curve 'C' are
improvements for capitalista. Hence the shaded area forms a'contract-
zone': all points lying in this zone are Pareto improvements compared with
(ac,p"). By making particular agreements on the development of ~(a) and ~
(w), clasaes may achieve a steady atate combination of (as,ga) as for
example point 4 denotes. A major problem with every such a combination is
3G
its dynamic inconsistency. If for example the employment rate rises above
p~, workers are able to increase the wage share up to ~~. As capitalists
anticipate such behaviour, they are not likely to agree to combination 4.
Hence, Mehrling concludes that a'social contract' containing a steady
state (as,gs) must commit both players to the agreements they made. In
enforcing this social contract the capitalist state may play an important
role.
A few remarks will be raised that form the background of the rest of
thia atudy. At first sight, following the discussion in section 2.2, it
seems that compromises are made in each of the four cases: actors agree on
the outcome of the social process; which is a particular steady state
resulting from their own interests. However, at the economy-wide level I
would not agree to such a conclusion. Apart from case 4, at least one of
the two actors cannot be considered to be a player, and therefore not as a
unit that controls a variable in order to maximize some goal function. Of
course, in many developed capitalist countries the capitalist class and
the working class can often be not considered to act as strategic units.
In itself thia would not violate Mehrling's analysis, only the
characterizations of the steady states as compromises. It does, however,
restrict the relevance of case 4. This point is elaborated on in the next
chapter.
If one assumes that classes are economy-wide players, it must be
questioned whether these players can be considered to manipulate their
control variables. First consider the working class. Equation (2.3)
directly follows from Goodwin's analysis. Organized labour may demand wage
claims that are restricted by the labour market situation. I think this
assertion bears considerable empirical relevance and macro-economic
foundation although it must not be forgotten that wages result from a
bargaining process between firms and employers. Thus, it may be possible
that organizations of workers make (feasible) moderate wage claims: (w~w)'
~ (-alta2p) and some individual firms offer wage increases (w~w)" that
exceed these wage claims in order to attract the best workers ((w~w) " )
(w~w)'). More fundamental doubts can be raised against the notion of a
capitalist class controlling the accumulation share, although capitalísm
is characterized by the prerogative of individual firms making investment
decisions. Section 3.1 elaborates this criticism.
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A more technical remark concerns the treatment of this social
interaction as a dynamic game where players are conceived to be highly
rational optimizing over an infinite time horizon. Needless to say they
have to discount future income streams to make the optimization problem
tractable. In general, I think such an approach can only be argued from a
theorists' point of view. In reality, representativea of social classes do
not have an infinite time horizon. But, if one would introduce a finite
time horizon, behaviour would turn out to be anomalously: at some definite
period before the end of the time horizon, capitalista would stop
investing and workers would demand their maximal possible wage claims (see
the Lancaster-type papers discussed by Glombowski, Wilke (1988)). It would
be more satisfactory to introduce shifting finite time horizons, i.e. at
period t-G, representatives of a class face a finite time horizon t-T and
draw subsequently their strategical plan. At t-1 however, they reconsider
their behaviour since their time horizon has now shifted to t-T.1. A
problem of such an introduction is a reduction of the elegance of the
dynamic game approach.
A fourth remark concerns the rather functional treatment of the role
of the state with respect to the 'social contract' between capitalists and
workers in case four. Mehrling refers to the analysis of Przeworski and
Wallerstein (1982) where they pose that a capitalist state should
stabilize relations between capitalists and workers. It does not become
clear in this kind of analysis why the state and its political actors
should back up such a'social contract' and by which means the state
should be able to do this. Part of chapter four will explicitly introduce
the state as an 'actor' that is interested in agreements between
employers' organizations and federations of trade unions.
However, the non-zero sum approach to the distribution of income
between capitalists and workers enables us to structure compromises
explictly. A notion of consensus is totally missing in this argument: it
is not needed to argue the plausibility of compromises. Classes agree to
particular outcomes in a dynamic distribution-accumulation game, following
their own interests. This does not imply that power i s missing from this
analysis as will be made clear in the next chapters.
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Notes
1 The use of the female gender is only intended as a counterbalance to
the abundant use of the masculine gender.
2 This type of reasoning is supported by 'transaction-costa' arguments
of Williamson (1985, pp. 206-239). According to him, capitalists'
authoritarian organization of work is relatively efficient. It often
performs better than other modes of organization. A central difference
between Williamson's view and the Marxist argument is the claim of the
latter that hierarchical relations especially occur in a society based on
private ownership, while Williamson refutes that claim. A confrontation of
both approaches to hierarchy in organizations is provided by Green (1988).
3 In this line of reasoning, the arguments of writers like Bowles,
Gordon, Weisskopf and Schor have to be placed (Weisskopf, Bowles, Gordon
(1983), Schor, Bowles (198~), Schor (1987)). They argue that the so-called
'cost of losing your job' is a major determinant of (among others) the
incidence of strikes, profitability and productivity growth.
4 Marx (1964, pp. 14~-152) however, makes a remark on the role the trade
unions play as a countervailing power to the tendency of capitalists
trying to depress wages below the minimum reproduction costs.
5 Distribution of a given amount of income forms naturally a(positive)
constant-sum game. However, a constant-sum game has exactly the same
properties as a zero-sum game (for a proof, see Vorob'ev (1977), p. 5) and
as the name of the latter is more familiar, I will use it here.
6 Not surprisingly, language is important here. In mainstream theory,
one does not encounter capitalists and workers, but often 'employers' and
'employees'. These other words for essentially the same groups reflect a
basic difference in the way one views social reality. Since I consider my
own theoretical position as 'somewhere in between', I will use both sets
of terms (and more).
~ For expositions of this view, see e.g. Habermas (19~3), Jessop (1984,
ch. 4), Offe (1985), Poulantzas (1978), Przeworski (1985).
8 A very precise overview on Marxist theories of the state is Jessop
(1984). Shorter reviews on these theories of the atate are provided by
Jessop (1977), Kesselman (1983), Meijs (1984) and Reuten 8~ Wilke (1990).
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9 I consulted "The American Heritage Dictionary", second College
edition. Boston : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985.
10 The pie, of course, serves as a metaphor for a fixed amount of a
certain good that represents for both actors a positive utility. For a
review on modern, non-cooperative bargaining theory, see: Sutton (1986). A
number of these theories are reviewed in section 4.5.II.
11 The background for this example stems from the precise formulation of
a bargaining process by Rubinstein (1982). One of his conclusiona refers
to the ínfluence of the rate individuals discount future benefits of the
bargaining outcome. If an actor is more impatient with respect to future
benefits than her opponent, the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining
process assigns her a smaller part of the total pie.
12 A game is (unless otherwise indicated) considered to be non-
cooperative: cooperative games differ from non-cooperative ones only with
respect to commitment to a particular strategy choice. In cooperative
games, players are allowed to make binding pre-play atrategy choices. A
good, extensive introduction to game theory is the book by Luce~Raiffa
(1957). A non-technical introduction is provided by Davis (19~0). Vorob'ev
(1977) provides a concise account of important game-theoretical theorems.
13 A caveat has to be made here: in the context of this study I am only
intereated in games as models of social interaction. There exist of course
games against nature, games between animals and games between computers.
These are not subject to discussion here.
14 Some phílosophers even question the validity of the claim that
individuals are such units, which in itself is a severe problem for all
social science resting on methodological individualism. See e.g. the
volume edited by Elster (1986).
15 An introduction on the definition and status of a Nash equilibrium ia
given by Kreps (1989). An extensive critical discussion on the (ab-)use of
the Nash equilibrium is provided by Johansen (1982).
16 Undoubtedly, this particular distinction between first and second
dimensions of power and games has a close relation with Schotter's notion
of instítutions (1981, 1989). In his analysis, he refers to Menger's
'organic' institutions, i.e. institutions that come about by human actions
but not by (intentional) human design. Those institutions reatrict the
strategy range that individuals face when they interact with each other on
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a specific subject. According to Schotter, such restriction of the
strategy range is often beneficial to the actors involved, since they have
to deal with less complicated decisional problems in an institutionally
rich environment. Institutions are thus devices that regulate the
behaviour of actors towards higher efficiency. The concept of power is
totally missing in Schotter's analysis which is not surprising since he
departa from neo-classical (Austrian) economic thinking. Indeed, the very
idea of 'organic' institutions precludes each notion of power aince it is
assumed that no actor has e definite influence on the procesa that forma
institutions, i.e. restricts the strategy range in games.
17 See, e.g. the 'isolation effect' of Poulantzas ((1978), pp. 63-92) and
the role of the bourgeois media in election time described by Gramsci
((1978), pp. 35-37).
18 For a vehement attack on functional explanations in Marxism, see
Elster (1982). In the same volume of the journal an extensive debate is
held between defenders and criticizers of Elster's opinion.
19 Another type of endogenous preference formation is the existence of
'joint preferences'. This may have several forms like jealousy ('keeping
up with the Joneses') or the way fashion operates: people like some goods
only if a minimum (or maximum!) number of other people prefer these goods.
20 Elster conveniently captures this process with the fable of the fox
and the sour grapes. The fable tells a story of a fox who is thirsty and
hungry. Wandering around the fields he discovers a bunch of ripe grapes.
Being fond of grapes - it is after all a fable - he tries to reach them
but does not succeed. As he redraws from the bunch of grapes he declares
the grapes 'sour', and not worth eating in the first place.
21 Lancaster's model has induced a number of elaborations and extensions.
See e.g. Basar (et al) (1985), Haurie, Pohjola (1987), Hoel (1978) and
Pohjola (1983), (1984) and (1985). These papers are reviewed by
Glombowski, Wilke (1988). An introduction on applications of dynamic game
theory to macroeconomics is given by Pohjola (1986).
22 See, e.g. Glombowski, KrUger (1987), (1988), v.d. Ploeg (1983). Formal
properties of thls model related to other business cycle approaches can be
found in Gabisch, Lorenz (1989).
23 A microfoundation for this relation is provided by Shaked and Sutton
(1984). They analyze the settlement of the wage rate as a bargaining
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process between a firm and a group of workers instead of the 'normal'
procedure of setting wages equal to marginal productivity. If the pool of
unemployed workers increases, employers may switch sooner to these workers
during the bargaining process. If this occurs, the equilibrium wage rate
decreases in this bargaining game. Their analysis uses Rubinstein's (1982)
model.
24 My notation differs from Mehrling's. A dot (') above a variable
denotes its growth (fírst derivative w.r.t. time), a'hat' (') its growth
rate.
25 This sentence, as well as figure 2.1, may suggest a'Stackelberg' kind
of solution of the game, since it seems that a certain time sequence of
the decisions is involved. However, this suggestion is, unleas otherwiae
indicated, not true. Workers and capitalists have to decide simultaneously
on their control variable in Mehrling's model.
CHAPTER 3
CLASSES AS STRATEGIC ACTORS,
CENTRALIZED BARGAINING AND
CORPORATISM
One of the main problems we encountered by examining Mehrling's
model was the treatment of classes. Do representatives of both the
capitalist and the working class actuslly bargain on a central, i.e.
nation-wide level? What are the topics with which centralized bargaining
deals with? How is this bargaining process to be structured and to what
emount does it differ from decentralized bargaining? What are the effects
of centralized bargaining on economic performance compared with
decentralized bargaining? To what extent does the state play a role in the
settlement and stabilization of centralized bargaining? Which relation has
the concept of 'corporatism' wíth respect to this discussion?
A number of these questions will be dealt with in this chapter.
First, a typology of the objectives and functions of centralized
representatives of firms and workers will be provided, following
industrial relations literature. ~ 3.1.1 treats the federations of trade
unions, while ~ 3.1.2 goes further into the case of employers'
associations. In ~ 3.2, a discussion on some theories of the consequences
of centralized bargaining follows. Finally, in ~ 3.3, a first
approximation of the general content of centralized bargaining and
corporatism as used in this study is provided. Also, a part of the
extensive debate in political science literature concerning the concept of
corporatism is reviewed.
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3.1 Objectivea of centralized federationa of trade uniona and employera'
aeaociationa in capitaliat democraciea
3.1.1 Centralized federationa of trade uniona
Providing a general answer to the questions 'What do unions do?' or 'What
do unions want?' is virtually impossible. Numerous atudies can be found
related to thia topic, but almost all of them aeem to addresa specific
trade union functions of particular types of trade unions in a(few)
country(ies). Especially 'institutional' industrial relations literature,
as opposed to 'economic' theories of trade unionism, emphasize country-
specific traits of the functions and goals of organizations representing
labour interests. A general theory on the objectlves of trade unions seems
impossible, or rather unwanted. Consequently, I will not pretend to
provide a typology of objectives that is applicable to all trade unions in
each capitalist democracy.
One of the most general statements about the role of trade unions
in capitalist democracies is expressed by Flanders (19~0, 40): "The first
and over-riding responsibility of all trade unions is to the welfare of
their own members". Note that Flanders defies a Marxist class vision on
trade unions; these organizations are not seen as defenders of clesa
interests, but only of those workers who are members of the trade unions.
Enhancing the welfare of trade unions members can be done in essentially
two ways: directly improving the conditions of work via collective
bargaining with employers and their organizations or indirectly improving
living conditions of workers by trying to change institutional features of
societyl. Not surprisingly, economic theoriea of trade unions2
emphasize the first aspect. They endow trade unions with utility functions
in which wages and employment of their members appear as arguments.
Departing from different streams of literature, I will enumerate
some important trade union objectives, especislly those appearing on the
centralized nation-wide level3.
a Improving the terms of the labour contract (wages, length of the
working-week and general labour conditions). This objective directly
results from the general rule of enhancing the welfare of the membership.
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b Aiming at 'ideological objectives'; i.e. changing capitalist
society. Federations of trade unions often try to promote a view on
society that ia more labour-oriented. The Marxist view on trade unions as
'vehicles' for societal change is reflected in thia objective.
c Influencing labour legislation in the general sense. As already
mentioned in chapter 2, specific legislation on matters of collective
bargaining may have a large impact on the strategic options of the actors
involved. Not surpriaingly, representatlves of trade unions will devote
conaiderable effort into changing or defending legislation in order to
increase or maintain their bargaining power.
d Increasing workers' control on the labour process in order to
control and monitor the agreements that are made during the collective
bargaining process. In particular rules and regulations that are made at
central level have to be monitored in individual firms in order to become
effective.
e Controlling and coordinating the actions and strategies pursued of
all workers' organizations associated to the federation of trade unions.
f Increasing employment probabilities for members and trying to
accomplish full employment. The latter objective results from two (both
disputed) arguments. First, a higher employment rate increases the
bargaining power of workers. Consequently, higher claims with respect to
wage demands or other direct material job conditions can be enforced (see
e.g. the profit squeeze argument in the previous chapter)4. Second,
centralized (federations of) trade unions often consider themselves as
representatives of all (potential) workers, whether employed or
unemployed, member or non-member.
g Improving social security systems, both with respect to income-
replacing benefits and general collective consumption. Both arguments put
forward in the discussion of the objective of (full) employment apply
here.
h Providing individual legal support and other exclusive advantages
to members. This objective will be discussed in g 5.1.
These objectives can be classified into three groups: direct and derived
objectives and objectives possessing both qualities. 'Derived' means the
quality of supporting a'direct' goel. Direct objectives are headed under
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e and b. Purely derived objectives are those under c, d and e. Objectives
f, g and h appear as having a mixed quality (both direct and derived).
They seem to possess the charscteristic of enhancing the welfare of
workers directly and to enable trade unions to perform their task better.
Although in general all of these objectives appear to be important
for centralized federations of trade unions, relatíve weights in different
countries diverge. By definition, the level and content of collective
nation-wide bargaining determines the direct objectives of the federation.
Only in a few countries do centralized federations of trade unions bargain
directly on wages and other general labour conditions. In aome countries,
trade unions explictly deny the 'ideological' objective of 'changing
society'. The 'bread and butter' unions in the U.S.A. are famous in this
respect. This does not mean however, that this type of union dces not
interfere in the political system. Again US unions appear to have
important links with the Democratic Party. But they seem to lobby
political agents from an instrumental perspective: a different legialation
is not wanted as such, but to enable the unions to accomplish better
labour contracts. Therefore, objectives b and c are distinguished,
although both address the political system. Each centralized federation of
trade unions seems to attach great importance towards all mixed and
derived objectives. In trying to achieve these goals, the federation does
not often deal with firms and their organizations, but with
representatives of the state (political parties, government, civil
servants). A number of analyses stress the important role of the media in
this respect. Workers' organizations often do not (have to) use afficial
bargaining platforms to express their wants, but may try better to change
the view of 'the voter'.
3.1.2 Centralized employers' organizationa
In exemining general features of trade unions, a researcher is faced wíth
an abundance of material. Numerous rich descriptions and analyses of the
role of trade unions in current capitalist societies can hardly be sorted
out in a concise, coherent view. Analyzing employers' organizations leads
to the opposite difficulty: relatively little attention ia paid to these
organizations. I mainly used material collected by Sisson (1983, 198~) and
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Windmuller, Gladstone (1984) to obtain a picture of the objectivea of
centralized federations of employers' organizations5.
In general, employers' organizations shape a countervailing
collective power of firms in order to curb the power of trade uniona. The
existence of collective action of workers historically forma the raison
d'Atre oF employers' organizations. General features of objectives of
centralized employera' organizations resulting from auch countervailing
power argument are:
a Engaging in collective bargaining on wages and general labour
conditions.
b Promoting general employers' intereats towards the state and the
media.
c Providing legal support and exclusive advantages to members.
In fact, thia small list reflects some of the remarks made in the previous
subaection. Particularly objective b appears as an important goal of
almoat every centralized employers' organization in capitalist
democracies. On this level, the objectives of employers' organizations
oppose or supplement the trade union objectivea b, c, d, e and g. There
are essentially two ways of realizing the first objective. If collective
bargaining takes place on a nation-wide level, centralized employera'
organizations directly negotiate with their counterparts. But it is also
possible that the centralized organizations coordinate collective
bargaining on lower levels in the economy, providing rules or advice. The
third objective listed here will, as will objective h of the trade uniona,
be treated in ~ 5.1.
Although collective bargaining may include general labour
conditions and topics related to employment ( like working-time
reductions), employers' organizations do not seem to negotiate on or to
coordinate investment decisions of their members in any developed
capitalist democracy. It is up to the discretion of each firm to decide on
the volume of investment and the specific technological aspecta of its
production capacity. Certainly, investment does not appear as part of
explicit agreements between employers' organizations and trade uniona.
Likewise, coordination of investment behaviour does not exist. Individusl
firms simply do not abstain from their authority concerning inveatment
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decisions to their representative organizationa. Therefore it is not
warranted to analyze investment as a strategic, controllable variable of
the firms (or capitalists) as a macro interest group (or class). As
Mehrling's model showed (~ 2.4) it matters a great deal whether
capitalists act as a class unit or whether they all decide autonomously on
their accumulation quote. An individual firm does not take the
macroeconomic consequences of its investment decisions into account. From
the industrial relations literature, it appears that firms do not
coordinate their decisions on the 'accumulation quote' on macroeconomic
scale and certainly not on nation-wide, cross-sectoral level6. This also
applies to the volume of employment. Trade unions and firms do often
negotiate on lay-off schemes (e.g. seniority rules), but almost never on
the number of workers that have to be hired by a firm. Often, the
bargaining on such schemes are firm-specific~.
This conclusion on the objectives and functioning of employers'
organizations (especially their centralized federations) and consequently
on the content of collective bargaining has important consequences for the
approach of Mehrling as discussed in g 2.4. Without addressing the
difficulty of conceiving classes as macro collective actors ('decision
making units') it can be said that the capitalist class does not control
investment and consequently the accumulation share. Moreover, removing
investment, or related variables, as possible candidates for control
variables, has grave consequences for a pure dynamic non-cooperative game
approach to this topic. The formal structure of these type of games
demands that each player involved at least controls one variable (see e.g.
de Zeeuw (1984), ch. 3 and 4). Consequently, compromises cannot be
conceived as claiming moderate consumptive demands by manipulating a
control variable. The literature on industrial relations shows that
neither class organization 'sets' or 'controls' a macroeconomic variable
but only bargain on some variables. Investment does not belong to these
variables. An alternative analysis of the origin and nature of compromises
in capitalist democracies will have to take account of this problem.
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3.2 Effecta of centralized wage bargaining
In some capitalist democracies, centralized federations of trade unions
and employers' organizations exist that try to accomplish their primary
objectives directly; i.e. the wage formation process takes place mainly at
the national level. This means that the centralized federations bargain
with each other directly or provide effective strict rules on maximum and
minimum bargaining outcomes to their sectoral organizationa. In this
section, economic theories on the effects of such wage formation procesaea
as opposed to decentralized wage formation are discussed. Some empirical
proofs or refutations of the relations asserted are reviewed in chapter 6.
In economic theory, the discussion of the effects of centralized
wage bargaining is stimulated by the work of Mancur Olson (1982, 1984,
1986). His main thesis, put forward in the book 'Rise and Decline of
Nations' (1982) and subsequent papers (1984, 1986), is that intereat
groups in the economy may collude in the form of 'cartels' as time
proceeds and supersede their collective action problems8 in order to
obtain rents; i.e. the fixation of product prices above market-clearing
levels. This 'rent-seeking behaviour'9 is argued to be detrimental for
economic growth. Firms, but especially workers, in certain sectors or
regions are prone to such behaviour: employed workers form a coalition, a
trade union, in order to force wage levels above a market-clearing
equilibrium. Thus, the trade union is considered to be a monopolist who
unilaterally sets the wage rate, subject to the labour demand curve of
firms leading to non-Pareto optimal outcomes. Besides this, trade unions
may press state agents to impose minimum wage levels in the economy that
supersede market-clearing levels. This part of the analysis did not
contain too much new insights, as neo-classical economista had always
considered (and essentially still do so) trade unions to be monopolists
who distort competitive labour markets. However, Olson's analysis made an
exception: if 'narrow-interest' trade unions merge to a so-called
'encompassing organization', the latter faces an incentive to internalize
the external effects of rent-seeking behaviour, i.e. these encompassing
organizations would be more likely to abstain from rents, as they
recognize the growth-decreasing consequences of these rents. Olson's
argument may be conveniently captured by figure 3.1,
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Different types of ineasuring economic performance are available: economic
growth (i), unemployment (-), rate of inflation (-) or a combination of
these (e.g. the Okun misery-index). The argument behind this U-shaped
curve is straightforward: at the left extreme of the horizontal axis,
labour is hardly, if at all, organized and consequently the settlement of
wages takes place at an extremely decentralized level. As a result,
workers have only a little bargaining power, or, in other words, rent
seeking is difficult. Wages will approach the market-clearing level, which
is supposed to lead to optimal economic growth and the lowest possible
unemployment, given the standard assumptions of neo-classical theory.
Moving to the right along the horizontal axis, bargaining takes place on a
higher level as workers erect trade unions. Consequently, monopoliatic
trade union behaviour or rent seeking may occur, leading to wages above
market-clearing levels and subsequently to deteriorating economic
performance. This wage drift will probably have some (cost-push)
inflationary consequences. Besides these, unemployment will come about
which is disliked by trade unions, as one of their main objectives is to
preclude unemployment (see ~ 3.1.1). But, at medium wage formation levels,
trade unions regard such employment consequences as 'externalities'.
However at the extreme right of figure 3.1, encompassing organizations are
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supposed to bargain on wages on centralized level and are therefore able
to 'internalize' these externalities and avoid rent-seeking behaviour.
Here, only a small part of Olson's theoretical argument is
summarized. As his total analysis pretends to explain nothing lesa than
regional differences in economic growth for the whole world during at
least the past two centuries, he had to endure severe criticism (see e.g.
Bowles, Eatwell (1983), Cameron (1987), Whiteley (1983)). However, only
that part of the 'Rise and Decline' which treats 'encompassing
organizationa' seems relevant for this study. A major problem with Olson'a
tackling of these organizations is his ad hoc introduction of them. From
his earlier analysis (1965) concerning collective action problema one
would not expect encompassing organizations to be viable or even to exiat
in the first place (see g 5.1). And even given these organizations it is
not at all clear why they would 'internalize' externalities of wage-
setting behaviour. For example, non-cooperative dynamic game theories (see
~ 2.4) would cast severe doubt on the validity of thia internalization
thesis. But as Olson does not expose his ideas in an elaborated model it
is hard to confront his arguments with other approaches. It aeems as if he
has only introduced the 'encompassing organizationa' to cope with some
'stylized facts' of international comparative research on economic growth,
which the core of his theory cannot explain.
However, several other theoretical studies do provide more
satisfactory explanations for the occurrence of a U-shaped relation like
the one drawn in figure 3.1. The article of Calmfors and Driffill (1988)
is particularly satisfactory from the mainstream economists' point of
view. They split a hypothetical economy up into different levels in a
tree-like form. At each level, trade unions may emerge. Each trade union
acts as a monopolist representing the insiders at its leve110. In the
monopoly union model, a union sets the wage level subject to the labour
demand curve in order to maximize utility. The value of the elasticity of
labour demand determines the wage level. A crucial assumption of Calmfors
and Driffill is that at a low, decentralized level, the elasticity of
product substitution is very high, at least higher than at more
centralized levels. This means that the labour demand elasticity is higher
at the decentralized level, as firms are less capable (for competitive
reasons) to set their product prices higher. Thus, at lower levels, wagea
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will differ less from their (efficient) market-clearing value. This
explains the downward-sloping part of the U-shaped curve. But there is a
second effect that is important. Unions want to maximize the real wage
sum, not just nominal values. A decentralized union will not (or seldom)
take the consumer-price rising effect of its wage demands into account.
However, if wage setting becomes more centralized, unions are better
capable of 'internalizing' this inflationary effect of their wage demands.
This implies more moderate wage-claims. The combination of these two
effects gives rise to the U-shaped relation. Encompassing criticism on the
paper of Driffill and Calmfors should include their use of a static neo-
classical model, but I will abstain from such criticism as this would be
of little interest in this study. However, their approach is quite
wlnerable if the perspective of the economy is broadened to an open
economy. They themselves (ibid, p. 44) conclude that an open economy would
make the 'U-shape' less pronounced, as world market prices are data for
the economy as a whole. In the extreme this would imply that the labour
demand curve would neither become less nor more elastic. Consequently, one
would expect a positive influence of centralized bargaining on economic
performsnce to occur in relatively closed economies. As we will see in
chapter 6, economies characterized by 'corporatism' or 'centralized
bargaining' are on the contrary rather 'open'.
The work of the Swedish sociologist Korpi (Korpi (19~4), (1983),
(i985), Korpi, Shalev (1980)) reflected the role of centralization with
respect to trade union power in the bargaining process. If workers'
organizations are small and dispersed, they are hardly a countervailing
power for capitalists and competitive wage setting at the firm level
prevails. Moreover, the weak relative power of workers leads to a low
level of workers' militancy, expressed for instance in strikes. These
features result in an economy that is relatively efficient from the
capitalists' point of view. As workers become better organized, they are
more capable to act as monopolists on the labour market, with consequently
deteriorating results for profit shares. Depending on the economic model
one introduces, this has detrimental effects on economic growth. Moreover,
militancy will increase which in itself will slow down economic growth.
But if workers' organizations become more stronger and more centralized,
militancy will decrease. Both classes are then so powerful that they are
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both able to draw the economy in a downward spiral, which leads to great
mutual lossesll. Anticipating such losses, it is more likely that a form
of 'societal bargaining' will occur, where centralized trade unions will
only claim moderate wage increasea. Of course, there are more factors that
determine the relative power of trade unions than the centralization oP
wage formation (like unemployment, organizational degree or political
stance of incumbent parties). Indeed, the complexity of Korpi's
argumentation leads to its weakness: relative power of capitalists and
workers seems to be overdetermined by a wealth of argumenta end,
consequently, it is difficult to discern which argument prevails.
Another Scandinavian scholar, Paldam, has recently provided a
concise foundation of the upward-sloping part of the curve in figure j.l
(Paldam (1989)). He models an economy where a number of trade unions exist
who are primarily concerned about the relative wage income of the workers
they representlz. If the wage income of their sectors laga behind wages
paid in other sectors, tension rises; i.e. the trade uníon representing
the 'deprived' workers will try to force higher wage growth in order to
overtake its rivals. This theory is based on assumptions different from
behavioural mainstream economic thought: trade unions (or groupa of
workers) are not supposed to maximize their 'own' wage sum, but to try to
narrow gaps between the rewards of their members compared with those of
other unions. Consequently, a centralized trade union that coordinates the
wage claims of all trade unions organized in this federation may have
considerable moderating influence by mitigating rivalry. If one accepts
the assertion that militant workers' behaviour has detrimental effects on
the performance of the economy, Paldam's analysis provides an original
explanation for the performance improving character of central3zed wage
bargaining. His analysis is backed up by research of Freeman (1988) who
claims to have shown that there exists a strong negative correlation
between centralization of wage bargaining and wage dispersion. Moreover,
Freeman's (empirical) analysis points out that both, highly centralized,
low-wage-dispersion economies and very decentralized, high-wage-dispersion
economiea perform better than intermediate ones and thus agrees with the
U-shaped relation. Although the relation between the existence of a
centralized trade union and low wage dispersion in an economy may be
fairly strong, same important questions still remain. It is not clear w~
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the centralized trade union as modelled by Paldam tries to mitigate rival
claima of the associated trade unions. If the 'leap-frog bargaining'
proceas of uncoordinated trade unions leads to higher wages (which is
assumed by Paldam), why would the centralized trade union try to stop
this7 Besides this, Paldam suggests that striking always 'pays'. If this
would be true, it does not become clear why trade unions would not always
choose for industrial conflict, as they are, according to Paldam, also
interested in the absolute value of wages. The general problem of Paldam's
approach is that he has not embedded his theory in a (dynamic)
macroeconomic model. Therefore, consequences of the behaviour of the trade
unions are hard to assess.
All studies discussed in this section point to the relevance of the
level of organization of trade unions and employers and, subsequently, of
the level of wage formation for the performance of an economy. These
results do not always match with those of the game-theoretic analyses
discussed in ~ 2.4. An advantage of studies backing up the U-shaped
hypothesis is their closer touch with the 'bargaining reality'. However, ~
2.4 presented a more complete model of the economy which explicitly
incorporates some of the dynamics of a capitalist economy. Subsequently, I
will try to combine the strengths of the two approachea. However, several
questions and critical remarks put forward at the end of ~ 2.4 have not
been addressed to yet. An attempt to deal with them will be started in the
next chapter. Before turning to these issues however, parts of the
political science discussion on the role of the capitalist state with
respect to centralized bargaining between employers' organizations and
trade unions will be summarized and commented on.
j.j Corporatism and centralized wage bargaining
Several analyses treated in the previous section relate their
arguments to the discussion on the concept of 'corporatism', a widely
debated notion in political science literature. Strangely enough, they
(except for Korpi) do not or seldom introduce the role of the capitalist
state in determining the levels of wage bargaining explicitly. In
particular Olson is criticized for his neglect of the role of the state in
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analyzing economic consequences of behaviour of interest groups. Lange and
Garrett (1985) argue that it is not the level of wage formation as such
that determines economic performance, but rather the combination of
centralization of wage formation and variables from the political system.
Their theoretical analysis is based on the notion of Przeworski and
Walleratein (1982) who show that in their (non-cooperative game) model
centrally organized workers will only be inclined to moderate wage claims
if they discount future benefits lowly. In their view, the state has an
important function in providing 'security' of the fruita of economic
growth to workers. Left-wing political parties are supposed by workers and
trade unions to perform such a task better. The combination of this
enalysis and the general notion that left-wing political governmenta are
less valued by capitalists than their right-wing opponents leads to four
possible institutional constellations with respect to economic growth:
FIGURE 3.2
POLITICAL STRENGTH OF THE LEFT, LABGUR ORGANIZATION AND ECGNOMIC GRGW1'H




Not encompassing - ~
Source: Lange, Garrett (1985. P. 799)
The 't' (-) means a positive ( negative) influence on economic growth
This analysis is chosen as an example of theories that emphasize
the important role of the capitalist state with respect to the type and
results of different systems of industrial relations. Most of them point
to the general observation that the political 'sphere' and the economic
'sphere' cannot be distinguished anymore in developed capitalist
countries. Consequently, theories that analyze distributional problems in
capitalism cannot meaningfully explain much without including the state.
That branch of theories in particular which classifies developed
capitalist societies according to the level of 'corporatism' would reject
the studies of g 3.2 as inadequate because of the marginal role attributed
to the state. These atudies emphasize the interference of state agents
with respect to the interaction of labour organizations end employers'
organizations.
A large part of the extensive discussion of the origin, explanation
and consequences of 'corporatism' is devoted to conceptuel problems, e.g.
what doea 'corporatism' mean? Instead of discusaing the relevant
literature first, I will start with providing a definition of corporatism.
Then, I will confront this definition with several important aspects of
the (ongoing) discussion about this subjectl3.
Corporatism is a political-economic subsystem of capitalist
democracies where representatives of important functional
interest groups closely cooperate with the state. These
representatives bargain on major socio-economic topica on a
centralized level. They voluntarily allow the state to have
a substantial impact on their strategy set and have
considerable non-parliamentary influence on parts of the
socio-economic policy oF the state. The state only
recognizes a small number of representatives of the
functional interest groups in the corporatist system, thus
enabling these representatives to monopolize the interest
mediation of their (potential) members.
Definitions are not harmless and certainly not undisputed. Departing from
the definition above, I will discuss part of the debate on corporatism.
Although not all relevant issues are addressed to, a substantial part of
the debate is covered.
This concept specifically addresses corporatism at the macro level
of an economy. In recent literature14, large attention is paid to
corporatist patterns on a meso (sectoral) level, or on a micro- (firm)
level. Attention is drawn to these forms of corporatism since in many
OECD-countries neither labour organizations nor representatives of capital
are organized or bargain on a national scale. Still, in a number of these
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countries, meso- or micro-corporatism plays e considerable role.
Especially firms may be highly organized in aome sectors without having
noticeable representation of interests on nation-wide level. Meso-
corporatism will alao occur if sectoral business organizationa collude
with sectoral labour organizations to protect their aector against foreign
competition (Wallerstein (1987)). Corporatism of this kind ia often
regarded as an extensive involvement of the atate in some sectors or
firma. This involvement is mainly meant as a form of industrial policy:
weak mature industrial sectors are protected against (foreign) competitive
pressure and weak but technologically promising sectors are extenaively
subsidized by the state15. In general, the relevant literature on meso-
and micro-corporatism neither considers bargaining between firms and
labour organizations nor the impact of these organizations on general
state policy of central importance. This atudy deala with macro-problema
of interaction between socio-economic actors. Consequently, apecific
organizational forms of sectoral industrial policy are not treated.
In the definition, corporatism is explicitly identified with some
form of concertation. In his famous definition, Schmitter (1979. P. 13)
emphasized corporatism as a specific system of interest representation,
where only a limited number of functional interest groups ia recognized by
the state. By granting the right to monopolize their intereat mediation,
the state would gain substantial control over these groups. However, to
distinguish corporatism from pluralism16, I do think ( following Cawson
(1986), p.71 and Lash~Urry (1987), p. 232), that these main functional
interest groups should have considerable influence on state policy as a
condition for a system to be characterized as possessing corporatist
traits. The treatment of the objectives of centralized representatives of
workers and firms (g 3.1) made clear that in order to effect some of these
objectives, the representatives have to deal with state agenta. According
to Lehmbruch (1984, pp. 61-66), 'strongly corporatist' countries are
characterized by "the effective participation of labour unions (and
organized business) in policy formation...". In most literature, this
participation in the making of governmental policies is connoted by the
term 'concertation'. Concertation is viewed here as a very ímportant
aspect of corporatism: the state is involved in implicit or explicit
'deala' with confederations of employers' associations and trade unions.
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As will appear in the analysis of the next chapters, I implicitly
endow corporatism with a'tripartist' character: the state, federations of
trade unions and employers' organizations are considered as the main
socio-economic actors. In reality, other, mainly business, interest groups
are involved in bargaining with the state on policy issues: farmers'
organizations and organizations of highly specialized self-employed people
seem to be the most outstanding of these groups. These groups may have a
large impact on socio-economic policy in their sector, but they are by
definition only concerned with sectoral interests. Moreover, these
organízations do not or seldom bargain with labour organizations in their
respective sectors. Therefore, I will ignore them with regard to the
problem at hand. Moreover, the background problem of this dissertation is
the explanation of compromises between the central Marxist classes and not
between all interest groups in capitalism.
The definition introduced above refers to corporatism as 'societal
corporatism' (Schmitter (19~9), pp. 1~-22). The prefix 'societal' means
that it is not necessary for the state to initiate the establishment of a
límited number of functional interest groups to control interest
mediation. Contrarily, I will examine some causes of support of relatively
autonomous functional interest groups to a corporatist system. Societal
corporatism is often contrasted with 'state corporatism'. In the latter,
the state initiates, organizes and controls all forms of monopolized
interest mediation and uses these organizations more or less to realize
its own goals. In recent literature, little attention is given to this
distinction. Schmitter (19~9) was more keen on this subject, since the
term 'corporatism' was heavily associated with fascist and~or dictatorial
forms of interest representation. Therefore, he labelled those forms of
corporatism as state corporatism. The definition above describes
corporatism as a subsystem of capitalist democracies. Consequently, I
believe that prefixes like 'neo', 'liberal' or 'societal' are no longer
necessary.
An important part of the literature on corporatism deals with the
relation between the existence of macro-corporatism and the incumbency of
left-wing, social democratic political parties. Especially Marxist authors
(see e.g. Coates (1984), Jessop (1978, 19~9) and Panitch (19~9, 1980))
heavily emphasize the crucial role these parties have in establishing
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corporatist patterns. According to them, the main characteristic of
corporatism is the official recognition of the leadership of labour
organizations by the representatives of the capitaliat class and the
capítalist state. In exchange for its recognition, this labour leadership
has to discipline and control their rank and file, who are assumed to be
more radical ín both their demands as well as in their attitude towarda
the system. This recognition did contain some historical advantages for
the working-class: trade unions were able to bargain for steadily rising
wages and a shorter working week. Besides improvements of labour
conditions, the capitalist state has erected a welfare system: collective
insurances against income loss resulting from sickness or unemployment,
public provisions for old age and the installment of subsidized services
like education or public housing. In general, not only the purchasing
power of wages rose but also the 'social wage'1~.
The Marxist analysis requires state actors who are willing to allow
the participation of the leaders of labour organizations in the
formulation and implementation of state policy. It ís argued (by the
authors mentioned above) that socisl democratic political parties are best
suited to fulfill this role. Part of the argument is empirical: in a
number of developed capitalist countries with a strong corporatist
character, social democratic parties played an important governmental
role. Arguments run along three main lines. First of all, in many West-
Eurapean countries, social democratic parties have strong historical tiea
with trade unions: this is expressed by personal links but also by the
financial support trade unions grant to sociel democratic parties.
Secondly, social democratic parties are opposed to pure class struggle;
they do want to pursue beneficial reforms for the workers but without
revolutionary upheavals. Consequently, this leads to incorporating trade
union leadership in policy-making and have them controlling rank and file
movements. The third and central argument results from the previous two.
Social democratic parties are willing and able to 'make deals' with
organized labour and the latter trust those parties more than conservative
parties.
Although I agree with the assertion that disciplining the rank and
file is an important aspect of corporatismla, I have two critical remarks
on the Marxist analysis concerning the one-to-one relationship between
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atrong social democratic parties and corporatism. Theae remarke are maínly
meant to nuance the exclusivity claim of this relationship. The fírst
remark concerna the all pervading functionalist background of these
analyses. It is presupposed that the capitalist state must channel
working-class power without providing arguments or why political actors
should support such policiea: the 'causal loop' (cf Elster (1982)) is
often misaing. It is not clear, for example, why a capitaliat state dces
not try to crush working-clasa power19. It almoat seems that the
existence of corporatist patterns in some developed capitalist democraciea
is enough evidence for these authors that they meet the functional
imperatives of the capitalist system.
A second point of criticism disputes the claim that only aocial
democratic parties typically support corporatism. Empirical studies (see
chapter 6) point out that Germany and the Netherlands can be found among
the countries with strongly corporatist characteristics. These countriea
did certainly not experience more social democratic political power than
for example Great Britain, where corporatist featurea are relatively
absent. Labour organizations may possess more links with social democratic
parties, but employers' associations are more closely linked to
centre~conservative parties than to social democratic parties. The latter
may fairly easily come to terms with trade unions but may face
difficulties in cooperating with organizations of capitalists, compared
with 'right-wing' parties. If it is accepted that corporatism means a kind
of macro tripartism as defined above then it is not clear why socisl
democratic parties should be better apt to introduce or maintain a
corporatist system than such 'right-wing' parties. Next to this,
controlling revolutionary rank and file movements is certainly not an
exclusive goel for social democrats2G.
Returning to the provisional definition of 'corporatism' given
above and the issues raised in the other sections of this chapter, there
seem to be two major arguments for corporatism to become to exist, given
the problem of class compromises at hand. First, the atate and its agenta
are needed to achieve several objectives of both federations. Therefore,
it ia reasonable to conclude that these organizations will try to get aome
influence on socio-economic policy. They may find political parties as a
means for expressing their needs and views, but political parties will
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often consider themselves as representatives of the 'general interest' or
at least try to create an image of being neutral towards 'sectional
intereats'. Thus, objectives of employers' and workers federation will
always be mixed with interests of other groups in society. If these
organizations succeed in getting some extra-parliamentary impact on
economic policy and if the state acknowledges them as the sole
representative of their class, they have an important organizational
advantage with respect to intra-class competing organizationa.
A eecond reason for deliberate interaction with state agents is
that chances for successful centralized bargaining increase if the atate
interferes. At the beginning of this section the paper of Lange and
Garrett was discussed which argued that increased centralization of
bargaining only raises economic performance if a social democratic party
holds office. The next chapter will devote some arguments to include the
role of the state with respect to centralized bargaining explicitly. Inter
alie, the judgment of Lange and Garrett is shaded. Also, the perspective
of state agents is touched upon: why would the state allow the federations
of workers and firms to exert considerable influence on policy formation
and implementation, and why would they actively intervene in centralized
bargaining? As the analysis concerning the incumbency of social democratic
parties as a necessary condition for corporatism is refuted, other
arguments for state agents' interest in corporatist structures are needed.
Notes
1 This distinction is also made by Marxist theories, but in a
substantiallly different form. Here (e.g. Zoll (19~6), ch. 6), the 'two
faces' of trade union functions are emphasized. Trade unions are supposed
to pursue maximal wage increases within the capitalist system ('economic'
objective) and they try to abolish the capitalist system ('political'
objective).
2 These theories may be labelled as 'neo-classícal' as they treat trade
union as entities maximizing well-defined objective functions under
constraints. The optimizing perspective is used througout the analyses and
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provides them a'rigorous' character. For introductory reviewa on these
theories, see Hirsch, Addison (1986) and especially Oswald (1985).
3 The following references are used: Clegg (1978), Hirach, Addison
(1986), Flandera (1970), Kochan (1980), Reynaerts (1982), Salamon (1984),
zoll (1976).
4 Moreover, increasing employment rates generally have favourable
effecta on membership developments which in itself increasea trade union
power (see e.g. Visser (1985)).
5 At least those employers' organizations that explicitly engage in the
industrisl relations sphere.
6 There are variables sectoral organizations of firms do coordinate,
like prices, market shares or (minimum-) product quality in order to rule
out 'destructive' competition. With respect to such variables, a sector
could be considered as a controlling actor. Naturally, agreements on
variables mentioned above bear consequences for investment behaviour.
However, these agreements have never taken place on nation-wide level, and
consequently coordination of investment behaviour on nation-wide level has
never existed. Moreover, sectoral agreements have often, if not always,
needed some agent (a cartel, the state) that monitors the behaviour of the
members involved to preclude free-riding behaviour. This implies that if
manipulation of investments would exist, an agent should be present.
7 The only way that is available for centralized federationa of trade
unions to influence the volume of employment measured in the number of
hired workers seems to bargain on general rules on working time reduction.
However, federations of employers' associations often fiercely resist
against general (nation-wide) reduction of working-time.
8 The nature of collective action problems is discussed in g 5.1.
9 A clear, introductory paper on the theocy of 'rent-seeking behaviour'
is provided by Tollison (1982). Another currently popular explanation for
higher than market-clearing level wages is the 'efficiency wage' argument.
Here, it is conceived that firms pay workers higher than their 'market-
value' (i.e. their marginal productivity) in order to improve their effort
and to prevent them from switching to other, competing firms.
10 They also analyze the case of wage bargaining between employers and
trade unions at each level. However, introducing this makes no qualitative
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difference with their main argument (Calmfors, Driffill (19~)~ PP. 37-
39.). Wage bargaining is introduced using the 'efficient wage bargaining'
model (McDonald, Solow (1981). Here, trade unions and firms bargain on
both wages and the volume of employment, leading to Pareto improvementa
compared with the outcome of monopolistic wage setting of trade unions.
However, this does not seem to match with most empirical facts from
industrial relations literature, as trade unions almost never directly
bargain on employment.
11 This argument is structured using simplified game matrices by
Lipnowski, Maital (1985) and Wilke (1989a).
12 The idea of workers caring for relative wages goes at least back to
Keynes (1983) who poses that (p. 14), "...The effect of combination on the
part of a group of workers is to protect their reZattve real wage. The
general level of real wages depends on the other forces of the economic
system" (italics in original).
13 An important caveat has to be made. There are authora that explicitly
deny any importance to corporatism (e.g. Streit (1989) or point to
declining interest of macro-corporatism with respect to increasing
internationalization of capitalist production (Windolf (1989). A general
analysis of the declining importance of corporatism as an 'organized form'
of capitalism can be found in Lash~Urry (1987).
14 See e.g., Cawson (1985) for several case studies on forms of ineso-
corporatism and Cawson (1986, ch. 6) for a general discussion on micro-
end meso corporatism. Atkinson and Coleman (1989) combine notions on meso-
corporatism with the efficacy of industrial policy.
15 The famous Japanese governmental institution 'MITI' may be interpreted
as a meso-corporatist establishment. For discussions on Japanese political
economic features with respect to the concept of corporatism, see: Pempel,
Tsunekawa (1979), Jankowski (1989).
16 Pluralism can be considered as a democratic political system where all
organized ocietal interests have potentially equal access to the
political decision levels. The major determinant of the political power
resource is the amount of votes an interest group can gather. By using
this power resource, an interest group is able to influence the outcome of
the political process. Pluralism considers no interest group favoured
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above others in advance, except for the financiel resources a group may
possesa.
17 The term 'social wage' is extensively used by Gough (19~9). It
includea sll entitlements people have on the public goods (including
social welfare benefits) the state offers to them. In a broader context,
the rising welfare syatem in capitalism is functionally explained by Gough
(ibid), ch. 4.
18 This does not necessarily mean that I agree with the normative
rejection of this disciplining aspect, as will be shown in the next
chapter.
19 Political strategies of Thatcher- and Reagan-type governments
aeemingly try to exclude the leadership of trade unions from all political
spheres.
20 In section 4.4, some general arguments about why political parties are
inclined to support of stimulate corporatist relations will be discussed.
CHAPTER 4
CENTRALIZED WAGE BARGAINING AND THE
STATE: THE 'LOGIC' OF EXPLICIT CLASS
COMPROMISE
In sections 2.4 and 3.2, different theories on explicit and implicit class
compromises were discussed. Several shortcomings of these approaches were
debated. Thia chapter is devoted to an alternative account of explicit
clasa compromises. Not surprisingly, some features of the theories
discussed will show up in this account. In g 4.1, the basic model ia set
up, describing an economy without centralized bargaining. g 4.2 suggeats
an explanation of the conditions under which centralized bargaining may
occur and deals with particular contents of the bargaining process. In
both sections, the analysis is set up without incorporating the state or
economic policy. ~ 4.3 is therefore devoted to an explicit introduction of
the state in the basic model to analyze whether and to what extent
economic policy is successful given the absence of centralized bargaining.
In g 4.4 tripartist, 'societal' bargaining is encountered: aimulations of
explicit state interference are made and the consequences for centralized
bargaining are analyzed.
In all sections, I tried to connect the discussion to the
approaches discussed in the previous chaptera. Appendix II which addresaes
problems discussed in g 4.2 contains a comment on some bargaining
theories.
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4.1 The basic model: the decentralized wage regime
The model I will present is a one-sector closed economy formulated
in diacrete time. Monetary variables are absent: all quantities are
measured in real units. The model strongly resembles that of Goodwin
(1967). F~rther references to this type of models are: Glombowski, Kriiger
(198~), ( 1988), v.d. Ploeg (1983), Shah, Desai (1981), Skott (1989)). Not
surprisingly, this basic model partly resembles Mehrlings' (1986), as
discussed in ~ 2.4.
In the model, income (Y) is determined by the capital atock (K),
related to each other by a constant capital coefficient (l~x)1:
Y(t)-xK(t) (4.1)
The capital stock is fully utilized: realization problems are absent in
this model. It is assumed that the capital stock does not depreciate. The
growth of the capital stock (eK) results from (net) investment (I),
ex(t)-I(t)




where a(t) denotes the accumulation share out of profits. Only capitalists
are assumed to accumulate, which provides the model with a strong Marxist
(classical) flavour. Profits that are not accumulated are consumed. The
accumulation share is not considered to be a strategic variable for the
whole capitalist class. It is assumed that the decision on the amount and
type of investments is an autonomous firm decision. As already argued in ~
3.1.2, employers' organizations do not seem to control or coordinate their
members' investment behaviour in any developed capitalist country. In this
respect, the model differs sharply from the non-cooperative dynamic game
modela discussed in g 2.4. Simplifying, it is assumed that the
accumulation share does not fluctuate:
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a(t)-a O~aci (4.4)
It is possible, and probably more realistic, to formulate a dependency of
the accumulation share on the profit rate r, where ~al~r ~ 02. As the
incluaion of this effect does not seem to affect the main conclusiona of
the analysis substantially, I will stick to the formulation of (4.4).
The wage share ia defined as the fraction of total wagea in income,
A(t)-[w(t)L(t)]~Y(t) (4.5)
where w(t) indicates the real wage in the economy at time t, and L(t)
labour demand ( employment). Labour demand is determined by income (net
production) and labour productivity (y),
L(t)-Y(tIIY(t) (4.6)
Technological change is assumed to be Harrod-neutral and captured by the
value of the growth rate of labour productivity (y(t)) which ma,y depend on
the wage share. A rising wage share implies higher labour unít costa, as
A(t)-w(t)~y(t). It is assumed that firms will turn to labour saving
technology if these unit costs rise. The argument behind this relation is
not choice-theoretical (see e.g. Desai, Shah (1981)) as the capital
coefficient is fixed. Otherwise, firms would always choose for the
(technological) highest possible labour productivity since this would
imply a maximization of their profits. Rather, 1t is conjectured that
firms, faced with higher unit labour costs, have an incentive to broaden
their horizon with respect to new, labour saving investment and to change
the organization of production processes in order to apeed up the pace of
work3. A specific functional form that reflects this relation is:
Y(t)-u1'u2a(t) uZ~o4 (4.7)
As long as no centralized bargaining on wages takea place, the
employment rate is suppoaed to be the only endogenous variable that
determines the growth rate of wages5. Wage bargaining takes place
between firms and individual workers, or between trade unions and
62
employera' organizations representing at most sectors of the economy.
Therefore, thia type of wage formation is labelled 'a decentralized wage
regime'. 'Narrow' trade unions defending sectional interests and, a
fortiori, individual workers will only care about wages and not about
employment as they have no influence on the employment rate in thia model.
In aections 4.1 and 4.2, no other objectives besides wages and employment
will be addressed. Alternatively, wage formation depends largely on pure
labour market forces, as the only endogenoua power reaource of workers is
the employment rate in this model. However, capitalist democraciea are
characterized by very large differences in the atructure of labour markets
and, even more importantly, between relative power of firms and workera.
These differences are reflected in the wage level or~and in the parametera
expressing the relation between wage growth and employment levels. I will
use a linear version of that relation:
w(t)--alia2s(t) a1~0, a2~0 (4.8)
The employment rate ( p) is defined as the fraction of supply (A) and
demand (L) for labour,
~(t)-L(t)IA(t) (4.9)
Labour supply is assumed to increase with a constant growth rate,
A(t)-v y~0 (4.10)
The final relations of the basic model define profits,
P(t)'I1-a(t)~Y(t) (4.11)
and the profit rate,
r(t)-P(t)~K(t) (4.12)
This system contains twelve endogenous variables and can be reduced
to two difference equations. First, an expression for ~g(t) ia derived,
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using resp. (4.9), (4.10), (4.6), (4.7), (4.1), (4.2), ( 4.3), (4.4) end
(4.11):
A(t) - {1'~[1-a(t)]}I{[ul~K2a(t).1][l~v]} - 1 (4.13)
where p stands for cx. Then, the growth rate of the wage share is
expressed in terms of g(t) and ~(t), using respectively (4.5), (4.6),
(4.7). and (4.8)
J~(t) s {-al.a2~(t)il}~{y,l.u2a(t).1} - 1 (4.14)
This system of two non-linear difference equations can be examined with
respect to the existence and stability of equilibrium valuea.




During the rest of the analysis, I will asaume economically
meaningful values for the equílibrium wage share and employment rate,
implying Oc a",p" cl. These constraints restrict possible parameter
constellations.
In order to examine the asymptotic local stability of the system,
equations (4.13) end (4.14) are rewritten as follows,
g(t41) - f(s(t).a(t)) - {{l~~Cl-a(t)]}I{[ultN2a(t)tl][ltv]}fP(t) (4.13')
a(tfl) - B(S(t),a(t)) - {{-~lta2g(t)il}~{y,liu2~(t)tl}fa(t) (4.14')
This system has asymptotically stable equilibrium values (~",g"), i.e.
converges to these equilibrium values, if initiel points of reference are
cloae to these equilibrium values and if the characteristic roota of the
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associated Jacobian matrix have moduli less than 1(see: Syds~ter (1981),
p. 415).














For convenience, the following expression i s introduced:
u3(t)-[ul'N2a(t)tl] (4.z1)
Then, i n equilibrium,
-alta2g"ii : xiiH2~"~i : u3" (4.22)
It is assumed that x3"~1.














It can readily be checked that A, C~0 and Bco. If (H1t1))0 (which ia
assumed), D)0.
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It can be shown that A-1, since inserting A-1 into (4.23) leads to,
A~ - {1-[1fHI][l.y]t~}~{x2[l.y].~}, which equals (4.15).
The characteristic roots (~) of matrix M~,
-A B
M~- IC DI
follow from i ts eigenequation
~MM-~II-O
and can be expressed by




From (4.29), two sets of restrictions on the parameters follow. First, it
is assumed that the system (4.13)-(4.14) follows a cyclical movement
around its equilibrium values. A sufficient condition for thia to happen
ís a negative value of the discriminant of the roots ;. Inserting
parameter values for A and D, we obtain the condition,
u2a'~u3" c 2(BC)1~2 (4.30)
Elaborating (4.30) does not lead to a workable formulation of a parameter
restriction. Rather, we check whether particular examples of parameter
values fulfill condition (4.30).
Second, the system is examined on the local stability of the equilibrium
values (a",~'). As already mentioned, the modulus of ~ needs to be smaller
than 1 in order to obtain this stability. The modulus of ~ is,
{[0.5(A'D)]2-[D.5(ArD)]2t(AD-BC)}1,2





u2 ~ {a2~~pu3~[1'vJ}~{~u3"(ltv)72-e2g'[1-p(1-A~)J} (4.32)
The best way to interpret these reaulta (informally) is that a2 must not
be too large compared with u2, which means that if wages movements react
relatively fast on changes in the employment rate and labour productivity
growth reacts only relatively slow on changes in the wage share, the
syatem becomes unstable. A necessary conditíon for the system to be stable





These parameter values lead to
u3-1.0218 a~-0.8 p~-0.818
end, both conditions (4.30) and (4.32) are met. Therefore the system
generated by these parameter values is stable.
Example 2






As condition (4.32) is not met, this system i s unstable.
The resulting consequences for values of a and p are displayed in figures
4.1a (example 1) and 4.1b (example 2). These figures show time paths of a
and p starting at point 0, where ~-0.75 and p-0.90.
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It is important to note that the model does not imply a steady
state employment rate equal to one, i.e. full employment. There are no
mechanisms available that assure market-clearing on the labour market
analogous to general equilibrium theory. In this sense, it is a
disequilibrium model: enduring stable glut oF productive resources (labour
power) may exist. In my view, this aspect serves as a supportive argument
for the explanatory power oF the model, given the experiences of a
diveraity of capitalist countries with respect to enduring unemployment.
The equilibrium values of the employment rate and the wage ahare of
the 'decentralized wage regime' show the very powerful poaition of firms.
Workers have no impact on the parameters determining the equilibrium wage
share whatsoever. Their only partial influence seems to be on the
equilibrium employment rate. If workers become more powerful in their
decentralized negotiations with the firms, this can be reflected in a
lower parameter value of ~1. Starting from the equilibrium positions, a
downward movement of al leads to a temporarily rising wage share (cf.
(4.14). But the logic of the model implies that capitaliats will inveat
less and, moreover, in relatively labour saving technology. In the end,
the result is that only the equilibrium employment rate decreases while a'
remains unchanged and nothing would be gained.
4.2 Centralized bargaining: the corporatiat wage regime
The most important result of the model discussed in the previous
section is the possibility of a steady state with persistent unemployment,
given uncoordinated or decentralized wage formation. As such, it differs
substantially from equilibrium models that are based on market-clearing on
all levels in the economy: workers are not unemployed because they prefer
leisure above income, but because of the structural parameters that
determine the steady state paths in the economy. For some readers it may
be tempting to interprete (1-~') as a particular kind of 'natural rate of
unemployment' or NAIRU. As no monetary variables are taken up into this
model, such comparisons do not seem warranted, although certain common
features exist.
The feature of a stable unemployment rate resulting from
decentralized wage formation distinguishes my model from Mehrling's in ~
2.4: there, only capitalists' or workers' control 'economies' would lead
to asymptotically stable steady states. The reader may remember that the
eteady atate resulting from a capitalists' control trajectory could induce
both actors to make (binding) agreements on choices of control variables
in order to reach Pareto improvements. My argument behind the switch to
another regime of wage formation resembles this type of analysis.
In the sequence of the analysis, I suppose that workers and firms
are organized in trade unions respectively employers' associationa, which
are in turn federated in centralized, nation-wide organizations. The model
deacribed in g 4.1 codifies a particular institutional structure of wage
formation: the decentralized representatives bargain on the growth rate of
wages. As was pointed out in ~ 3.1.1, centralized representatives of
workers care about both higher wages and higher employment. In order to
interpret this insight into the model, I assume that these arguments can
be expressed as a centralized federation of trade unions being concerned
about the wage sum W(t) - w(t)L(t). This wage sum can be rewritten as:
w(t) - a(t)s(t)y(t)A(t) (4.33)
The right hand side of (4.33) can be split up into several parta. y(t)A(t)
denotes total income in period t if full employment prevails. p{t)
indicates some sort of utilization level of the economy: if S( t)cl, less
income is generated as not all available labour-power is used. ~(t)
naturally stands for the wage share. In the sequence of the analysis, I
will assume that the centralized representatives of workers care about the
product of A(t)g(t), as a derived goal compared with (4.33)6.
Analogously, centralized organizations of capitalists are interested in
increasing profits which are represented according to similar reasoning by
the product of (1-~(t))p(t).
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In figure 4.2, a wage share (a), employment rate (g) plane is drawn. Point
A denotes a particular decentralized-wage regime steady state (~N,~g'). Two
curves are drawn, intersecting at A. The curve BB' indicates en
'indifference curve' for workers along which ap-j,~~~ holds. All points
lying in the north-east direction of BB' contain combinations of a,p
depicting pay-off improvements for workers. CC' represents its
counterpart: the 'indifference curve' for firms, (1-~)p-(1-A~)g~. Points
north-west of the latter curve represent improvements for firms.
Consequently, both actors prefer the area enclosed by ABC above (~',~M).
For both actors the decentralized-wage regime steady state is not
optimal, and consequently, Pareto improvements are possible, provided that
the decentralized-wage regime, reflecting pure market power of both
classes, does not lead to full employment. Both the federation of trade
unions and the federation of the employers' associations are likewise
interested in moving the economy upwards in the ABC region. To implement
such Pareto-improvements however, principal institutional features of the
economy have to be changed. The existing institutional environment,
described by the functional relationships and the parameters of the model
of ~ 4.1, does not offer room for any permanent increase of the employment
rate. Centralized bargaining between the representatives of workers and
firms therefore can be characterized as an agreement on a change of the
institutional features of the economic process.
However, it is one thing to argue that Pareto improvements are
possible, and another to assert that such improvements will be made. I
conjecture that an institutional 'regime-switch' will only take place if
both actors have experienced a certain measure of unemployment, and
subsequently a room for Pareto improvements, for some time. If the economy
follows a cyclical pattern (e.g. a Goodwin growth cyle), there hardly
seems to be an incentive for the centralized actors and their affiliated
organizations to change important institutional characteristics of the
economy. For example, if the employment rate rises above the steady state
level (in a decentralized wage regime), decentrally operating trade unions
have no direct incentive to change institutions of labour relations, since
their decentralized power is sufficient to claim a growth rate of wages
that exceeds the growth rate of labour productivity (see eq. (4.8)). An
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analogous argument applies for the behaviour of firms during a trough of
the economic cycle.
But if the economy follows a steady state path with constant levels
of the unemployment rate and the wage share for some time, both class-
representatives may recognize the non-optimality of that path. This may be
the first threshold that obstructs centralized bargaining: representatives
of labour and capital must acknowledge and perceive the same economic
'facts' and have to interpret such facts with approximately similar typea
of theory, in order to conjecture that positive changes can be made by
installing centralized bargaining7. Even if this threshold is
superseeded, centralized bargaining does not necessarily occur. Economic
theory tends to maintain that subjects come to an agreement immediately if
they conclude that this would benefit them both (see, e.g. the non-
cooperative bargaining approach of Rubinstein (1982)). However,
centralized federations of trade unions and employers' organizations first
must convínce their members of the long run benefits of central agreements
that commit their members to new behaviour. Different organizations of
both classes or sections within the same organizations do not always have
exactly the same interests. The steady state employment level and wage
share of the previous section are macro economic variables. Behind these
macro-economic aggregates, major sectoral differences may exist that
obstruct the emergence of a coherent perceived class interest; some typea
of labour power may be relatively abundant, others may be relatively
scarce: (the) trade union(s) representing the latter sectors will be
reluctant to leave bargaining to a higher level. Firms may not care about
e low macro profit share, as long as their own profit rates are
satisfactory. If so, higher employment rates might be looked upond as
diminishing their capacity to discipline their workers (Kalecki (1971)8.
Consequently, it will take time for centralized organizations to convince
their members of changing the institutional environment in order to
improve their class interests. It is not possible to draw these meso-
arguments in a macro, one sector model, but they certainly bear
considerable relevance.
These remarks on the difficulties centralized actors face to
implement pareto-improving institutional changes render the approach a
less deterministic character than often is encountered. I would suggest
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that the inatitutional switch to centralized bargaining ~ occur in order
to benefit from Pareto improvements, but that this switch ia not bound to
take place nor that it will immediately occur.
The only feasible institutional regime ewitch aeems to concern
bargaining on the wage rate. As was argued in ~ 3.1, centralized
federationa of employers' organizations do not have eny impact on the
volume or specific characteristics of investments of their members.
Consequently, neither the accumulation share nor technological change can
be subjected to centralized agreements between labour and capital. This
can be expressed in the model by not changing equationa (4.4) and (4.~).
This does not imply that these parameters actually have to remain constant
in the case of central agreements. It is often argued that 'business
confidence' rises if centralized federations of trade unions are able to
discipline their rank and file. This rising 'business confidence' may be
expressed in an increase of the accumulation share o. But such a movement
of an aggregate variable would only be the outcome of possible reactions
of many individual firms, and not a control variable that can be
manipulated by a collective actor, or a variable that is subject to
bargaining. Subsequently, the opponent of the employers, the federation of
trade unions, has no way whatsoever to hold the employera' organization to
a'deal' of investing a larger share of profits, as this organization is
not authorized to make such deals9.
In this model, the only institution that can be changed, keeping
the discussion within the domain of existing capitalist democracies, are
the processes and rules of wage formation. If federations of both workers
and firms organizations are centrally organized, they both face an
incentive to make central agreements on the development of wages. The
decision to install and implement such agreements implies a sharp break
with the wage formation as expressed by equation (4.8). In the latter, the
growth rate of wages only depends on the employment rate and some
structural power relations between trade unions and employers'
organizations at the decentralized level.
If the regime switch occurs, specific agreements on the development
of wages can be made. The goal of the regime switch ia to raise the
employment rate. A resulting 'steady state' of an agreement must be a
combination of the wage share and the employment rate lying in the aree
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ABC of figure 4.2. An example of a type of agreement that leads to such a
'centralized steady state' can be constructed. In order to increase the
pace of accumulation for some periods, moderation of wage claims is
neceasary. After this period, the growth rate of wages again equals the
equilibrium growth rate of wages (w(t)--ocl~oc2g~). The consequences of such
a specific agreement for values of ~ and p is plotted in figure 4.3.
During the period of relative wage moderation (w(t)~y(t)), the wage
share falls, leading to increasing accumulation. As a result, the
employment rate rises. A consequence of a declining wage share is a
decreasing growth rate of labour productivity. Therefore, from period 4
onwards, the wage share rises again as w(t)-yt)y(t). But as long as the
wage share is below its steady state value, accumulation is so large that
the employment rate rises. This process continues until a new 'steady
~
state' (ac,pc) is reached where ~c-~' and pc~p . This outcome benefits
both classes as this point lies in the region ABC.
This outcome of the bargaining process and the analysis backing it
up, shows very different characteristics compared with mainstream
bargaining analysis. In appendix II (g 4.5), I include a concise summary
of some important contributions to this field and provide reasons why I
did not use them. At this point, I wish to emphasize that in my view
centralized bargaining is more about changing the institutional features
of the wage formation process than about dividing a fixed amount of
product. In effect, given the functional relations of the model of ~ 4.1
and its resulting steady state path, there is no room for bargaining. An
institutional change is needed to create a new dynamic path.
The agreement of the type displayed in figure 4.3 is a apecific
one. But given the model at hand, each agreement on an inatitutional
change of wage formation has to include a temporary wage moderation and,
thereafter, a wage growth equal to productivity growth in order to reach a
steady state combination of a and g lying in the ABC region. However, the
present analysis provides a specific argument behind the upward sloping
part of the 'curve' of figure 3.1, if economic performance is measured by
the employment rate. One could object to the term 'bargaining' with











parameter values: p-0.16 , x1--0.0182, u2-0.05 . v-0.01 , a1-0.07 ,
a2-0.1. Equilibrium values: ~~-0.8 , p"-0.918. Agreement: for t- [1,3],
W(t)-o-75(xltuZa"). For t-[4,-~~, w(t)-ultu2a".
the extra accumulation. In chapter 5, I will go into this problem. If
firms however do not stick to the central agreement, and try to attract
the (relatively) scarce workers by offering them 'market' wages, the
effects of the centralized agreements will fade away. Cooperation of
centralized organizations of firms is certainly needed to make the path to
a new 'steady state' viable.
4.3 The state in the decentralized wage regime: efficiency of economic
policy without institutional change
In g 3.3 the approach to centralized bargaining without
incorporating the state or economic policy was explicitly criticized by
introducing the concept of corporatism. In ~ 2.4, critical remarks were
also raised against game-theoretic models with respect to the very
marginal and not elaborated role of the state as a protector of the
'social contract' between an organized capitalist and an organized working
class. The state only seemed a functionally necessary institutional device
and not an actor in its own right. To allow for some of these criticisms,
I will introduce the state and some types of economic policy (concerning
unemployment) explicitly into the basic model of ~ 4.1. The consequences
of these policies and their subsequent efficiencies are considered. In ~
4.4 the role of the state, with respect to the emergence and
implementation of centralized bargaining, is emphasized.
The extended model consists of seventeen equations. Suffixes 'p'
and 's' are suppleted where necessary. Except for the case of tp, they
indicate respectively a'private sector' variable and a'state sector'
variable. In the case of ip, 'p' stands for 'profits'.
Y(t) - xKÍt) (4.34)
ntc(t) - I(t) (4.35)
I(t) ' oCl-tp(t)~P(t) o~ip(t)~1 (4.36)
7s
P(t) - L1-ap(t)]Y(t) 14.37)
aP(t) - Lwp(t)LP(tJ]IY(t) (4.38)
LP(t) - Y(t)IYp(t) (4.39)
YP(t) - ul'u2ap(t) u2~o (4.40)
wp(t) - -a1ta2L~p(t)t~s(t)] a1~0.a2~0 (4.41)
~P(t) - Lp(t)~A(t) (4.42)
~S(t) - LS(t)IA(t) (4.43)
~(t) - ~P(t)t~s(t) (4.44)
A(t) - v v~0 (4.45)
wPn(t) - L1-Tw(t)]wp(t) Ocqw(t)cl (4.46)
ws(t) - wP~(t) (4.47)
wU(t) - ~(t)wg(t) oc~(t)cl (4.48)
c(t) - ws(t)LS(t).L(n(t)-LS(t)-LP(t)]wu(t) (4.49)
slt) - Tw(t)wP(t)LP(t)tTPLl-ap(t)]Y(t)4n(t) (4.50)
G(t) - s(t) (4.51)
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Before deriving the main difference equations of the syatem above,
some clarifying remarks will be made. (4.34), (4.35) and ( 4.45) correapond
to the relations in ~ 4.1 and do not require further clarification.
(4.37)-(4.40) now explicitly determine variables in the private sector.
(4.36) shows that net investment i s linearly determined by after-tax
profits. The state controls the profit-tax rate Tp(t). The growth rate of
wage in the private sector (wp(t), (4.41)) now depends on the overall
employment rate, being the sum of the employment rate in the private
aector, ~p(t) (4.42) and its counterpart in the atate sector, ~s(t)
(4.43). As the state controls labour demand in the state sector (Ls(t)),
it determines as(t). The wages in the state sector (ws(t) (4.47)) equal
after-tax wages in the private sector (wpn(t) ( 4.46)10). Unemployment
benefits (wu(t)) are assumed to be a constant part of the wage of state
sector workers (4.48). Neither state sector workers nor the recipients of
unemployment benefits pay taxes. G(t) stands for state expenditures.
Besides unemployment benefits, the state offers services to the public. It
is assumed that the costs of these services consist only of state aector
wages. State income (S(t) (4.50)) is the sum of wage taxes
(Tw(t)wp(t)Lp(t)), profit taxes (Tp(t)[1-ap(t)]Y(t)) and debts (D(t)).
For convenience, I assume that state agents employ a strict
balanced-budget restriction, leading to D(t)-011. Then, the wage tax rate
Tw results in an endogenous variablel2. The economíc interpretation of
this endogeny is that the state uses wage taxes to prevent expenditure
surplusses or losses. It is assumed that the average wage of state sector
workers equal that of private sector workers, because the atate has to
compete with firms on the labour market for available labour power.
Unemployment benefits often do not equal private sector wages, thus Ocucl.
[A-Lp-Ls] is the volume component of unemployment.
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It is now possible to derive the new difference equations. First,
an expression for ~(t) is found, using respectively (4.44), (4.43), (4.42)
ana (4.45).
~(t) - {[Ls(ttl).Lp(ttl)]~LLs(t)tLp(t)]){14y}-1 - 1
where,
and
~(t) - {xl[Ls(ttl)~LS(t)] f x2[Lp(t~l)~LP(t)]}{l.y}-1 - 1 (4.52)
xl - ss(t)~s(t) (4.53)
x2 - ~p(t)Is(t) (4.54)
Likewise, the derivation of the growth rate of labour demand in ~ 4.1, the
growth rate of labour demand in the private sector can be computed and
inserted in (4.52),
S(t) - xl(1'v)-1LLs(t~1)]~Ls(t)] '
x2j{1'~'(t)C(1-ap(t)}I(Cltxltx2aplt)]Cl.y]}f - 1 (4.55)
where ~'(t) is defined as ax(1-tp(t)). The difference equation for the
wage share of the private sector turns out not to change, i.e.:
ap(t) - C-alta2slt)tl]Cxltu2aplt)~1] - 1 (4.56)




~,p" - {l.p'-[liHl}[l;v~X}~{9~~~[HZ(1~Y)~X} (4.57)
p" - [xl'H27~p"tocl~Iaz (4.58)
X - [1-xl{LS(trl)~LS(t)}~(itv)~~x2 (4.59)
Some remarks seem to be in order to discusa this system, and the
efficiency of several types of economic policy. If the public sector
employment growth equals labour supply, the essentials of the system
discussed in ~ 4.1 remain the same. If Ls(til)~Ls(t) -(l.v) then it
follows from (4.59) that X-1. Consequently, nothing changes with respect
to the equilibrium rates of the wage share and the employment rate, except
for the introduction of after-tax profits instead of profits: y~ (-6x)
changes into ~' (-(1-Tp)ax). Given such growth of public sector
employment, the means for state agents to influence the steady state
employment rate in this model are limited, since the equilibrium rate of
employment only depends on the tax rate Tp via the mechanism of wage
indexed growth of labour productivity, y,2. This becomes clear from (4.58).
Permanent changes of the profit tax rate do change the steady state wage
share (~~"~~Tp t 0) as lower profit taxes stimulate accumulation and thus
possible wage increases. If labour productivity growth depends on the wage
share, the steady state employment rate rises too, as during the phase of
accelerating accumulation, not only wage growth exceeds its equilibrium
level, but also labour productivity growth. As a result, the system sooner
becomes in a'new' equilibrium (when w-y, ~~-G), leading to a higher
employment rate. The expression '~p"~~Tp (~0) can be explicated, but is
very large and does not offer many insights. To show the impact of tax
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changes on the employment rate, wage share and the wage tax rate in this
model, a numerical example is given in table 4.1.
Table 4.1
Changea in some eteady etate valuea resulting from profit tax rate changee
tp s" ~p" Tw" ~"~P (1-Tw")
0.45 0.9z5 0.814 0.196 0.626
0.46 0.924 0.811 0.167 0.624
0.47 o.9zz o.809 0.165 0.623
0.48 o.9z1 0.806 0.163 0.621
0.49 o.9zo 0.803 o.i6o 0.621
0.50 0.918 0.800 0.158 0.618
0.51 0.916 0.797 0.155 0.617
0.5z o.915 0.794 0.152 0.616
0.53 0.913 0.790 0.150 0.613
0.54 0.912 0.787 0.147 o.61z
0.55 0.910 0.783 0.144 0.610
Parameter constellation: x-0.5, 6-0.64, u1--0.0182, y,2-0.05, v-0.01,
oc1-0.07. a2-0,1. w'0.5, Ss-0.2.
Given the parameter constellation of table 4.1, a slight increase of the
employment rate is possible if profit taxes are depressed. The balanced
budget condition implies an increasing wage tax rate, which is relatively
low precisely because of the rise of the employment rate. Inserting (4.49)
and (4.50) in (4.51), setting D(t)-0, we obtain an identity for the wage





The effect on the after tax wages (~(t)p(t)[1-Tw(t)]) is damped (see the
M
last column of table 4.1) as wages increase relatively (~p rises). In the
next section, I will return to the question of how the federation of
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unions will react to these consequences of a lower profit tax rate. Of
course, the fall in state-income as a result of lower profit taxes may
also be compensated by a lower level of unemployment benefits (u.l.).
However, centralized federations of trade unions will reaist againat such
measures as one of their objectives is the representation of the interests
of the unemployed (see g 3.1.1)13
It is important to note that the atate dces have some temporary
employment success by lowering the tax rate Tp. During the fírst perioda,
accumulation is stimulated and the employment rate rises. Given some
elective arguments from public choice reasoning (see next section), it can
be argued that an incumbent political party is more concerned about
directly decreasing unemployment than about a steady atate value in the
(medium) long run.
If the state increasea public sector employment discretely for some
period of time (Ls(ttl)~L(t) )(l.y)), total employment will temporarily
rise above its equilibrium rate g`, but eventually the overall employment
rate (g) will fall back to its old leve114. Consequently, public sector
employment crowds out private sector employment. If this policy is
financed by a rise of the wage tax rate, no further consequences are
implied. A temporarily relative decrease of public sector employment has
the adverse effect in the short run and no effects on the steady state
value of the employment rate. Permanent deviations of the growth of public
sector employment with respect to labour supply gmwth rate are not
conaidered since they lead to non-meaningful economic outcomes.
To summarize the results, the state has some possibilities to
implement particular types of economic policy succeasfully in this model
economy with decentralized wage formation. Keynesian expansionary policy
is not considered, aince the economy is always assumed to operate at full
capacity. Most of the effects on the employment rate fade away in time,
except for a(small) effect of a decreasing profit tax rate, resulting
from the wage share dependency of the growth rate of labour productivity.
But nevertheless, one has to acknowledge the observation that several
governments in developed capitalist democracies have pursued (and still
do) some of the policies discussed above. Unemployment benefits have been
lowered, (profit) tax rates have been decreased, and public sector
employment has been curbed in order to (formally) raise the employment
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rate. Moreover, administrations of the Reagan and Thatcher type have tried
to install directly union bashing legal measures, in order to weaken the
existing power of decentralized operating trade unions. This may be
reflected in the model with a higher value of a115.
4.4 Economic policy, centralized bargaining and corporatism
As was clear from the previous section, the atate has several
possibilities to implement an economic policy affecting the employment
rate. However, the effectiveness of these measures was not considered to
be very high. Thus it may be argued that state agents would approve an
institutional change of wage formation as was analyzed in ~ 4.2. In this
section, the logic and content of state interference with respect to
centralized bargaining is treated.
Arguments have to be provided about the goals of state agents in
order to avoid the functionalist trap many theories fell into. A first
reason is very general: some state agents care about social order and
atability as such and therefore want to stimulate explicit compromises
between important societal actors. This applies in particular to political
parties which explicitly pursue social consensus throughout the whole
society as part of their ideologies. Christian Democratic parties in
Europe are always characterized by a concern for the 'general interest':
according to their ideology, an harmonious attitude of all social actors
should prevail above narrow group interest behaviour. Without doubt, these
parties have a real ideological stake in explicit class compromise.
This argument is at variance with both Public Choice theorizing as
political theory based on a Marxist discourse. These type of theories
emphasize the specific interest each índividual, group or class tries to
pursue instead of caring about a non-existing 'general interest'. Marxiat
state theories seem to possess one common feature: economic policy cannot
run counter to the interests of the capitalist class. A number of reasons
in favour of such state behaviour have been provided (cf. surveys on
Marxist state theory, fn. 8 in g 2.1), but the most prevailing view seems
to be that state actors are totally tied to the accumulation process which
is governed by the capitalist class. Even if state agents, e.g. Social
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Democratic political parties, want to implement policies that do not
fulfill the interests of the capitalist class they abstain from such
policies as they anticipate the reactions of firms. Small statea in
particular are wlnerable to pressure of capitalists as the latter may
always transfer their capital to other countries supplying a more profit-
oriented economic policy16. I think this argument bears some relevance:
atate agents cannot implement policies that effect accumulation
negatively. This ia already made explicit in the stylized model above: if
the atate raises the profit tax rate, the employment rate and the wage
share decline, since firms will invest less.
But this type of Marxist theory only provides argumenta for
restrictions capitalist states face: it does not really endow atate agenta
with autonomous objectives. Other Marxist-oriented theories typically
endow different political parties with different objectives. Clombowaki
(198~, 1989) for example, argues that right-wing parties tcy to minimize
the role of government in society as they pursue a'laisser-faire'
ideology, closely related to the capitalist class world-view. Left-wing
parties (social-democrats) are labour oriented and try to increase the
employment rate (cf. ~ 3.1.1). Subsequently, both parties pursue different
typea of economic policy: right-wing parties lower taxes and minimize
public sector employment while left-wing parties increase public sector
employment in order to prevent unemployment. As a result, a'political
business cycle' occursl~.
This theory seems to fill a part of the large gap between Marxist
political theory and Public Choice analyses. The latter emphasize narrow
political interests: political parties do not have an intrinsic ideology
or have a class-based world view; they are only interested in political
power as suchi8 and therefore try to pursue policies that maximize their
re-election chances. Consequently, such parties have to recognize voters'
preferences. In general, prosperous economic developmenta support the
chances of re-election, as empirical research has pointed out (see e.g.
Frey, Schneider (1988), Hibbs (1987)). Prosperous economic developments
are measured by (among others) a low level of both unemployment and
inflation and~or by rising real (after-tax) incomes. Therefore, departing
purely from self-interested, non-ideological actors, political agents
should favor explicit class compromises as treated in g 4.2, as such
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centralized agreements at least raise the employment rate. Consequently,
there seem to be no principal theoretical arguments againat the
cooperation of political agents to centralized bargaining on wages19
These arguments do not lead to the conclusion that all political agents
are necessarily committed to support centralized bargaining (since there
are many other ways to pursue their goals) or that they should so (which
would be normative reasoning).
Political agents may want to stimulete centralized bargaining, but
federations of trade unions and employers' organization may want such
interference of the state too. Following the argument in ~ 4.2, a first
threshold to centralized bargaining is the difficulty of acknowledging the
same type of information and interpretation of economic processes.
Moreover, these organizations must convince their members of the
desirability of the outcomes of centralized bargaining. It would be most
convenient if the state would support them with information on the
economic 'reality' that is trusted by both parties as being class-
neutra120. However, it may be even more important that the state
interferes as an actor in its own right in the process of centralized
bargaining. Recall the analysis of ~ 4.2, especially figure 4.3. In order
to reach the better combination of wage share and employment rate (~c ~c)
the growth rate of wages has to be temporarily moderated, leading to a
fall in the wage share. For a number of periods, the level of the derived
objective for the federation of trade unions, a(t)g(t) ís below the
indifference level ~`p' (the path moves left from BB' for a number of
periods). This may be a major obstacle for such type of agreements to
occur in the first place. In a dynamic optimizational perpective, the
federation of trade unions should have a considerable time horizon and a
low discount rate in order to agree with such an outcome of centralized
bargaining.
This obstacle can be overcome if the state is actually involved in
centralized bargaining, which may then be named 'societal bargaining'21.
Now, there are more possible types of agreement. However, all have in
common that the decentralized wage formation ia superseeded by central
agreements on the growth rate of wages. One possibility consists of the
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parameter values: a-0.64, x-0.5, Tp-0.5, x1--o.o18z, y~Z-0.05 ,
v-0.01 , a1-0.0~ , a2-0.1. Equilibrium values: ~P~-0.8 ,~~-0.918.
Agreement: For t- [1,3~. 2P-o.375 end wp(t)-(xltx2a~). For t-[4,~), tp-0.5
end wp(t)'xl'x2~`.
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representatives of labour and capital agree on a growth rate of wages that
dces not exceed the steady state level of the decentralized wage regime. A
specific example ís plotted in figure 4.4.
The resulting path of the economy stays in the region ABC which simplifies
the choice for the federation of trade unions. Even more successful would
be a combination of both agreements as figure 4.5 displays. Here, both
temporary wage moderation and tax relief are implemented.
Both paths of the economy are the result of a tri-partite agreement or
compromise on the development of some variables. The atate temporarily
decreases the profit tax rate. If there would be no cocomittant change in
the wage formation institution, this would hardly have any effect, as was
analyzed in the previous section. But the state only decreases this tax
rate if a similar institutional change is made as was analyzed in ~ 4.2.
Class representatives of labour and capital agree on a system of
centralized wage bargaining. In figure 4.4, the consequences of a wage
growth rate equal to its steady state value are depicted, which means that
trade unions do not use their increased power, resulting from a rising
employment rate, to raise the growth rate of wages. In figure 4.5, the
effects on the employment rate are reinforced as the federations also
agree on a temporarily relative wage growth moderation. Both figures show
that because of the interference of the state, workers' derived objective
does not fall below the steady state level. This presumably helps the
compromise to arise.
Needless to say, if a strict balanced budget condition is given
(D-0), wage taxes have to rise temporarily. This may cause problems if the
federation of trade unions cares about the after-tax wage sum (1-tw)W.
Numerical examples show that the tax rate rises two or three periods above
its (decentralized) steady state level (for computations, use eq. (4.60).
Then, the tax rate drops below its steady state level, as less
unemployment benefits have to be granted (assuming ~)0) and there are more
workers employed in the private sector who pay taxes. However, I am not
convinced that the federation of trade unions is concerned about the
after-tax wage sum, as taxes form the funds for both state sector wages








parameter values: 0-0.64, x-0.5, Tp-o.S, u1--0.0182, y,2-0.05 ,
y-0.01 ,~1-0.07 , a2-0.1. Equilibrium values: ~P"-0.8 , p"-0.918.
Agreement: for t- [1,3], TP-o.3~5 and wp(t)-0.~5(ul.uz~"). For t-[4,-~),
Zp-0.5 and wp(t)-y.lty2a".
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may cause some resistance by trade unions that represent only private
sector workers. I will return to this subject in the next chapter.
To conclude, these types of class compromises seem to benefit all
actors involved. In the next chapter, this rosy view on societal
bargaining will become clouded. For the moment, I want to emphasize again
the characterization of societal bargaining as a class compromise and not
as consensus. Although it seems to benefit all actors, one cannot conclude
that all actors prefer this outcome above all other socio-economic
possibilities. Especially as centralized representatives of the
capitalists' interests do not control investment, workers bear all the
risks during the development of the economy towards a'corporatist ateady
state'. This essential feature of capitalist society (the autonomy of
firms with respect to investment) provides the distinction between the
definitions on compromise and consensus (~ 2.2) with a specific meaning.
The outcome of 'societal bargaining' is not collectively preferred as
such, it is agreed upon, since given the institutional environment, both
actors pursue their own interests. More comments on the relation between
the concept of corporatism (~ 3.3) and the type of economic policy as
analyzed above will be made in the next chapter where the stability of the
class compromise will be analyzed.
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4.5 Appendices
Appendix 4.5.I: A variable accumulation ahare
In ~ 4.1, the accumulation share a(t) was taken to be constant. Needless
to say, this is a severe abstraction from reality. A step towards a more
realistic macro-economic investment function is to introduce the profit
rate r(t) as an argument for the accumulation share. To simplify we asaume
a positive linear relationship between the accumulation share end the
profit rate22.
a(t) ' 61~62r(t)
- 61i6ZC1-a(t)]x 61.62~0 (A1)
while the rest of the basic model as introduced in ~ 4.1 does not change.
As a result the difference equation for the wage share remains as 4.14
while its counterpart for the employment rate changes:
p(ttl) ' F(p(t).~(t)) -
{{lt[a1;v2x(1-a(t))][1-a(t)]K}~{C14v]Cx1tH2a(t)tl]}fg(t) (A2)
a(t.l) - ~(~(t).a(t)) - {{-~lta2s(t)tl}I{Nltu2a(t).1}fa(t) (A3)
Again, this system can be examined on the existence of equilibrium values
a` and g~ as well as on the (asymptotic) stability of these values.
However, the functional form of (A2) prevents a compact value of a'. It
appears that,
~~ ' {{uZC1~U].o2KZ.alx} 4 (Det}lI2f~2o2K2 (A4)
where
9z
Det - {u2L1'v]iK(zQ2Ki61}2 - ~i62K2{1;I26ZKt61]K-C14Y]L}11i1J} (A5)
~Bk directly follows from a~ and (A3). As only economic meaningful casea
are considered (Gc ~~,5~ cl), parameters are restricted as in ~ 4.1. In
numerical examples it appears that a wide range of parameter valuea would
lead to a unique pair of steady state values (A`,p'). Therefore, I will
continue assuming that such a combination exists.
In order to assess the effect of the introduction of (A1) in the basic
model with respect to its stability, the partial derivates of system (AZ)-
(A3) have to be explicated. As G(g(t),a(t)) has not changed, its partial
derivatives did not change either.
aF(s(t).~(t))lap(t) - 1,{vlta x[1-a(t)]}{1-a(t)}x-[~.v x3 t (A6)
aF(H(t).a(t))laa(t) - Bo - }{xC-z~zK-al.zozxa(t)]}{[ltv]x3(t)} -
uz[ltv]{ltx[altazK-[al.zazx]a(t)tózxaz(t)]}} l;v u(tt 2 (A7)
3
Needless to say, expressions (A6) and especially (A7) are quite
complicated. However, (A6) is equal to 1 for equilibrium values of
(g(t),~(t)) and as such, does not differ with the associate partial
derivative in ~ 4.1. It can be shown that for each pair (a(t),p(t)), BotO
which is an important result. Up to now the system (A2)-(A3) shows the
same qualitative characteristics as the basic model did. As all elements
of the Jacobian in equilibrium are equal to ~ 4.1, except for (A7), I will
examine whether the latter changes and the consequences of such a change
for the stability of the system.
First, (4.18) is repeated,
~f(R(t).a(t))~~a(t) - B -
{-6KH3(t)C1fL]-142L1tL]{1t6KL1-í`(t)]}}H(t),{iA3(t)C1tL]}Z (AÓ)
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During the qualitative examination of the system of difference equations
in ~ 4.1 it was derived that the main condition for stability is (AD-BC)c
1(eq. 4.32), where A, B, C and D are the elements of the Jacobian of the
system evaluated in the equilibrium point (a~,a~). The introduction of
(A1) does not change A, C and D if we are evaluating these elements in
(A~,a') again. In order to be sure of a similar ateady state, the
following restriction on the parameter values is introduced:
a - olta2x(1-a') (A9)
Now, we are able to compare Bo with the previous element B. If ~Bol ) ~B~
then the system becomes less stable, given the condition for stability





Q2x(1-A~) ~ 0 (A10)
which is always true given the restrictions on the parameters. Therefore,
we may conclude that the introduction of a positive 62 has an instable
influence on the system. However, numerical examples show that this impact
is quite small and that a stable system with a particular value of Q only
sometimes, with a relatively high value of c2 turns unstable.
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Appendix 4.5.II: Theories on bargaining
Introduction
One of the more important accomplishments of game theory seems to be the
explicit modelling of bargaining. In all social sciences the processes and
outcomes of bargaining between individual and~or group actors have often
taken a central position. In particular, theories considering the
behaviour of organizations representing interests of firms and workers are
often focussed on bargaining processes, as these actors normally negotiate
in actual societies instead of commanding their opponent. Game theory has
partly succeeded (and is still developing) in providing a formal general
framework for bargaining procedures between rational agents. Needless to
say, it does not pretend to capture each aspect of every particular
bargaining process: no general theory would be able to do so. As I did not
use a game theoretic approach to establish feasible outcomes of
centralized wage bargaining and societal bargaining in sections 4.2 and
4.4, it is necessary to indicate why. Before giving the appropriate
arguments, I will first summarize some of the main themes from bargaining
theory in this appendix. Then, arguments are provided that reject the
relevance of these theories for the subject at hand. By doing this, I want
to emphasize that I do not intend to reject these approaches in
general.~3
Cooperative theory on bargaining: the optimal outcome of bargaining
procesaes
The first formal approach to bargaining to be considered are the
theories that analyze particular bargaining outcomes as optimal, given
specific axioms. An extensive introduction to this field is Roth (1979).
The most famous of these optimal bargaining outcomes is the Nash-scheme.
According to this scheme, the weighted geometric product of all extra pay-
offs has to be maximized in order for this pay-off vector to be the
optimal bargaining outcome. Figure 4.6.a shows a specific two-person






Figure 4.6.a depicts a XI,X2 plane where X1 denotes the pay-off for actor
1 and X2 the pay-off for actor 2. p1-p2 are the maximum pay-offs the two
actors have to divide, X1~X2c pl(-p2)24. If they do not reach an
agreement each player has at least a pay-off di (iE(1,2)). Often, this
point is interpreted as a'threat point': players may use this pay-off in
order to enforce a more optimal bargaining outcome. The Nash bargaining
outcome shows that there is an optimal bargaining outcome (X1,X2) which
can be computed by the following rule,
~X1-d1~~~X2-d2~1-a ~ (X1-dl~a(X2-d2~1-a (All)
for each X1,X2
(Proofs and formal elaboration in Roth (1979))
A few remarks are important here. The Nash bargaining outcome is
(axiomatic) always Pareto-optimal: neither player can improve her pay-off
afterwards without worsening the outcome of her opponent. Given standard
economic analysis this seems reasonable; rational actors keep on
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negotiating until there is at least no 'utility left'. The weighting
factor ~ expresses the asymmetry in the game. If a is higher than 0.5,
player 1 has a higher share in the Nash bargaining outcome. The arguments
behind this asymmetry factor are often somewhat vague: more often than not
there is ad hoc reference to "bargaining capabilities" or "bargaining
power" of players that are reflected in these "weights". But this
indetermination is a serious problem for the theory since each combination
of X1,X2 lying on BC can be established as an asymmetric Nash outcome,
provided that one takes the appropriate asymmetry factors. Before touching
upon a currently fashionable interpretation of these factors, an






This figure is equal to 4.6.a except that the minimum point (d1,d2) is
normalized to (0,0). Again (X1,X2) denotes the Nash bargaining solution of
the game of dividing the cake pI(-p2). But there is also another
bargaining game drawn in the figure: divide the 'cake' limited by the
borderline pIFpZ'. Here the maximum pay-off of actor 2 is p'2
(0.5PZ~PZ'~P2-PI). The Nash bargaining solution of this new game is again
(XI,XZ), because of the repeatedly criticized assumption of 'independence
of irrelevant alternatives' (Luce, Raiffa (1957), pp. 132-134, Kalai,
Smorodinsky (1975) and Roth (1979). PP. 98-103). Abstaining from this
assumption, Kalai, Smorodinsky (i975) have derived a solution that depends
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on the maxima the players are able to receive in the game, the 'unique
monotonic solution' (X1",X2~). A simple rule can be established to compute
(XI~,X2M) in the game depicted in figure 4.6.b:
X1~IX2` - P1IP2~ and X1'.X2" - max {pl,p2'}. (A12)
In the 'asymmetric game' drawn in figure 4.6.b, p2'(pl which leads to







It can be shown that the solution (X1",X2"j is equal to (X1,X2) if the
weights in the Nash product are equal to the maximum utility players can
receive:
m~. LP1-X2w](P1)LX2.](P2~)




Thus, in these types of games, the maximum value of the cake a player can
get, is one endogenous interpretation of the weights of the Nash
solution25. However, this is not a sufficiently satisfying
interpretation, as it may not hold for bargaining games in general, and
because there exists no economic argument why maxímum possible pay-offs
should be of any importance in bargaining processes. In general, the
absence of a positive theory of the bargaining process prohibits the above
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solutions of the bargaining outcome of adding some explanation to the
problem of which outcome will be reached.
Non-cooperative bargaining theory: the analysis of bargaining proceases
According to the normative Nash bargaining outcome, players should behave
'cooperatively' in the. game, i.e. they make binding agreements on the
(optimal) division of the cake. But naturally, an interesting aspect of
bargaining is precisely the process by which players come to specific
agreements. One of the axioms of the Nash bargaining outcome is the notion
of Pareto-optimality. In actual bargaining processes however, bargaining
often breaks down before agreements are reached, or a substantial amount
of utility is 'lost' during the bargaining process. A descriptive, and
predictive theory of bargaining - which in effect means a behavioural
theory of bargaining - should analyze these processes and try to make
general inferences about them.
Several (non-cooperative) bargaining theories have been developed
during the last few decades (a recent introduction is by Sutton (1986)).
As I believe one of the (by now standard) approaches is elaborated by
Rubinstein (1982, 1985). In its nature, the game is again simple. Two
players bargain on a fixed pie that represents a positive utility to both
of them. They make sequential moves in the bargaining process, which means
that they make bids (a claim on a part of the pie) and accept~reject bids
of the other players. Being rational players, they want to maximize their
pay-off and therefore bid agressively. But, time is money (utility) in the
bargaining process: players discount future pay-offs or bear fixed costs
during each time unit of the bargaining process or face the risk that
bargaining breaks down after an uncertain period of time. This gives both
players an incentive to moderate their bids: bidding too high may lead to
a rejection of your bid by the opponent which may cause (opportunity)
costs. Thus, the important aspect of bargaining implying opposed and
common interests is captured.
To discuss some of the implications of the Rubinstein model, the
case of discounting future pay-offs is commented. Suppose each player i
has a discount factor bi (O~bi~l). The current (t-0) value of pay-off
Xi(t) is expressed by U(Xi(t),bi) and can be computed by U(Xi(t))-biXi(t).
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Then, Rubinstein shows that the equilibriumz6 outcome of the game depends
solely on the values of these discount factors2~. Not surpriaingly, the
more patient player (having a higher discount factor) will obtain a higher
share of the pie to be bargained for. If both players have an equel
discount factor, they both receive an equal part of the game (cf. fn. 2~).
Surprisingly, both actors immediately come to an agreement in this game.
Both rational players are aware of all relevant parameters in the game and
are thus able to compute the end result. Hence, they will settle this
equilibrium result immediately. In his 1985 paper, Rubinstein relaxea one
of the full information assumptions: in this paper one player dces not
know the precise discount rate of her opponent. This complication
substantially increases the problems concerning an optimal solution.
Rubinatein shows that the resulting equilibrium outcome in this adjusted
game depends on (inter alia) the exogenous pre-play assessment of the
opponent's discount rate.
Although the non-cooperative approach must be preferred above
axiomatic cooperative solutions on bargaining problema, it appears that
many problems still exist. The immediate settlement of a bargaining
outcome doea not cope with one of the most important observations of
bargaining processes, namely that these processes take some time. A
probably related problem to this is the huge computational capability
Rubinstein ascribes to his actors, especially in the less than complete
information case. Particularly for a theory pretending to theorize on
strategic aspects of bargaining, the strict assumption of rational
maximizing players considering every relevant detail of the game does not
seem to be warranted28. A second problem concerns the indetermination of
the discount factor. In fact, all uncertainty with respect to the most
likeable outcome of the bargaining process is put into two parameters; the
discount factors of the players. However, separate theories are needed to
infer the influence of ineasurable variables on the discount factor in
order to give the theory some predictive value. A further disadvantage of
the theory is the limited object of bargaining: players only bargain on a
fixed amount of desirable pie.
In an important paper, Binmore et al (1986) have established some
relations between Rubinstein's strategic approach to the bargaining
process, and the axiomatic Nash bargaining outcome. Consider Rubinstein's
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game described above and imagine that between each move there exists some
time ei, iE(1,2). For example, el expresses the time that player 1 needs
to formulate her counterproposal to a bid of player 2. Binmore et al show
that if e1-e2 and if ei-~0 then the outcome of Rubinstein's 'discounting'
game is equal to the symmetric Nash outcome of the game (X1,X2). If el~e2
and ei~0, then the outcome of the same game equals the asymmetric Nash
outcome of the game with oc-e2,[e2}el]. The paper examines another game
with an analogous result. Given these types of games, the results are
fairly strong, since they provide s strategic background of the Nash
bargaining outcome, and an endogenous interpretation of the asymmetry
factors, which removes some of the criticism above on these factors.
However, it may well be that this method can hardly be made operational
for specifice theories, as: a) the time between moves in the game often is
not negligible, b) it may be hard to establish a constant proportion
between the reaction times of the two actors and c) there may be other
factors which are far more important determinants for the asymmetry
factors than the reaction times on bids and offers.
Why no application of these bargaining theories in ~ 4.21
First, I will indicate why the Nash bargaining solution does not offer
much insight into the particular bargaining problem of ~ 4.2. Then, I will
step to question the appropriateness of Rubinstein's strategic games to
this problem.
Consider again figure 4.2. Suppose that one can 'translate' this
bargaining problem to a problem that in essence is equal to the problem of
the division of the cake, depicted in figure 4.6.a. X1 now expresses the
goal-level of the federation of workers (Xg), X2 its capitalists
counterpart ([1-a]~), and (dl,d2) the minimum point A(X"~',(1-XM)pw). The
limit of the game is given by g-1 (in both figures the line BC). Hence,
the Nash asymmetric outcome of such an (imaginary) bargaining game says
that each point of the line BC can be an outcome, given appropriate
asymmetry factors. As this approach would not gives us much more
information (what are appropriate factors?), it is left aside.
The argument for not including Rubinstein's approach is fundamental
and bears also relevance for the rejection of the Nash solution.
ioi
Basically, the bargaining problem of ~ 4.2 is of a different nature than
the theory discussed in this appendix. The problem at hand is not about
dividing a cake (that represents an amount of utility for both actors).
Here, bargaining can be divided into several phases. First, the
centralized federations and their associates have to agree on the economic
analysia that describes point A(figure 4.2) as a result of the existing
process of wage formation. Second, the associates have to agree on
abstaining from their authority with respect to bargaining on wages and to
leave this bargaining to their federation. Already thia procesa of
institutional change belongs to the bargaining process.
However, the central argument is that at the period where both
federations actually start centralized bargaining on wages, no 'cake'
exists. The translation of the ABC-region to a Nash bargaining problem as
is done above is therefore false. Rather, bargaining is about an agreement
on a particular development oF wages in order to create the 'cake'. A
compromise has to be reached that changes the institutional features of
the wage formation process. In order to stimulate investment, the
federation of trade unions even has to contravene a basic assumption of
bargaining theory: it has to accept a lower pay-off than the 'threat-
point' (dl,d2) implies. This becomes especially clear if the state has no
part in the bargaining process; see e.g. figure 4.3. During a number of
periods, workers receive less than their indifference level of the
equilibrium of the decentralized wage regime. Thus for some t-[l,to~,
X1(t)cdl(0). At t-to, the dynamic path of a,~ crosses the 'indifference
curve' BB': X1(t))dl(0) for tito. This conclusion becomes even stronger if
one analyzes the threat point dynamically, i.e. compare Xi(t) with di(t).
As workers are able to set wages higher than as a result from the
bargaining outcome if ~(t)~g", Xi(t)Cdi(t). Even if the state intervenes,
as showed in figures 4.4 and 4.5, workers would still receive less pay-off
than their (dynamic) threat point implies.
Consequently, the bargaining theories described above do not seem
to be of use in analyzing this problem. Nevertheless, it seems important
to develop a theoretical framework in which such bargaining problems can
be analyzed, as the approach used in sections 4.2 and 4.4 is rather 'sd




1 For specific meaning of the signs, see also fn. 24 of chapter 2. Greek
letters denote exogenous parameters, except for the wage share and the
employment rate. An asterisk denotes a steady state equilibrium value.
Control variables are designated by bars.
2 A(linear) example of an accumulation function where ~a~~r ) 0 is
elaborated in appendix I.
3 This suggests a more 'behavíoural' approach to technological change,
captured in reaction functions that are not explicitly derived from
maximizing behaviour. See for discussion on the 'behavioural' approach vs.
the neoclassical story: Berger (1989) and Simon (1984). A second reason
for an increase of labour productivity growth as a result of an increasing
wage share is that effort of workers has a positive impact on the labour
productivity rate. As higher wages may imply a higher 'cost of job loss',
increasing effort may be expected. This discussion can also be traced in
the 'efficiency-wage' literature, see e.g. Akerlof, Yellen (1990).
4 It appears that parameter ul is not restricted. However, in the
sequence I will assume that the steady state growth rate of labour
productivity (y'-ultuZa`) has to be non-negative. In this sense, the value
of H1 is restricted.
5 Although this type of macro-economic models is not derived from micro-
economic considerations, it is possible to provide this relation with such
foundation. See e.g. Shaked, Sutton (1984) for a micro-model where firms
bargain with inside workers and unemployed over the wage rate. It is shown
that if unemployed enter the bargaining scene, the equilibrium wage rate
decreases as firms have the possibility of switching jobs to the
unemployed. Of course, the basic idea behind this is nothing else than the
function of the reserve army in Marxian theory.
6 A(t) develops independently and is therefore not considered by the
organizations of workers. Abstraction from y(t) is less unambigous as the
growth rate of y(t) depends on the wage share. However, I proceed with
analysis departing from a steady state wage share and a development of the
wage share that does not deviate substantislly from this value.
Subsequently, effects on the value of y(t) are not very large.
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7 De Klerk and Prast (1988) analyze the consequences of a game between
trade unions and a government who decide on the basis of different
'modela' of the economy. Even in a very stylized setting they are able to
conclude that the assumption of most mainstream theory that all actora act
on basis of the same economic model is far from innocent.
8 See also the 'cost of job loss' analysis in ~ 2.1. If workers face a
smaller probability of becoming unemployed or, alternatively, a higher
probability finding a new job, they will be less inclined (ceteris
paribus) to subsume to the authority of their management.
9 See, in this context, Schelling's classical analysis (1956) on
bargaining power and strategy ranges. His main point is that effective
bargaining results from committing yourself to a strategy and thereby
forcing the opponent to give in. The real strategic aspect of bargaining
is the problem of committing oneself trustfully. The most extreme way of
strategic commitment seems to be a total lack of control on the strategic
variable: which then stops being subjected to bargaining.
10 It is assumed (for reasons of simplicity) that wage taxes are not
shifted. Besides the advantage of a more tractable model, I think that the
approach that is proposed would exclude a parameter implying a positive
wage tax shift into equation (4.41) as well, as it is assumed that wage
claims are enforced using power resources. If workers face higher wage
taxes they may well want to claim higher wages, but it is not clear why
they would be able to effectuate such higher wages, given parameters al
and a2 and given a particular employment rate.
11 If the possibility of state debts would be introduced, saving
behaviour should have been made explicitly together with an interest rate.
12 If the start conditions of the model are given, eighteen endogenous
variables result: Y, K, I, P, ~, w, L, y, p S, g, A, w T, w,
P P P P P~ s Pn' w s
wu, G and S.
13 But, if the level of unemployment benefits is included as argument in
the wage equation; w(t)- f(a1,a2,g,W), c~f~1u)0, then lowering unemployment
benefits will presumably increase the employment rate as wage claims will
decrease. This 'cost of job loss' argument is not included in the
discussion.
14 After the period of a relative change of Ls(t.l)~Ls(t), X again equals
1, which leads to the steady states discussed above.
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15 An extension of the model with s political cycle (see Glombowski
(1987). (1989)) could include this effect. The wage equation would change
into: w(t)--~i.~2s(t). 'i' indicates '1': if the left wing party holda
office or 'r': the right wing party is incumbent. Not surprisingly, due to
legal measures it can be assumed that: alr~~ll.
16 This argument is very well exposed in several chaptera of Offe (1985).
17 Studies on politically induced business cycles have both a mainstream
and a Marxist background. Kalecki (1943) already pointed to the
possibility of a recession engineered by governments in order to crush
working-class power. This argument has been picked up by Boddy and Crotty
(1975). William Nordhaus (1975) started the discussion in mainstream
theory arguing that incumbing political parties try to manipulate economic
variables in order to increase reelection chances. Borooah, v.d. Ploeg
(1983), Hibbs (1987) and Alesina (1987. 1989) are among many who have
contributed to this discussion. According to Frey (1974, 1978) and Frey,
Scheider (1979,1988) political parties have both ideological goals as the
urge to become (stay) incumbent. Manipulation of economic variables result
from a mix of both goals. v. Winden (1981) and Velthoven, v. Winden (1985)
model economic policy as the consequence of pressure of interest groups
and thus introduce a(partially) politically induced development of
economic varíables.
18 Surprisingly, very little studies are devoted (to my knowledge) to
reasons behind the preference for political power. As top politicians
relatively earn low salaries (compared with business), theorists often
vaguely point to status or prestige as possible candidates for reasons
behind this preference.
19 One exception may be made: some right-wing parties may dislike
centralized bargaining as such. Centralizetion of wage formation implies
curbing of free market forces on the labour market, which doea not fit
into the ideology of these parties.
20 In the Netherlands, a central planning agency ('Centraal Plan Bureau'
(CPB) was erected just after World War II. However, this agency does not
function primarily as an institute that plans economic development. Its
moat important task seems to justify economic policies of the atate and to
serve ea e reliable supplier of economic information for different
political parties, trade unions and employers' organizations. Many
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politico-economic debates are heavy influenced by verdicts of this
institute (see further , ~ 6.2.1).
21 This term was introduced by Korpi (1983), p. 20.
22 The basic model of g 4.1 functions as the background of thia
discussion.
23 A short introduction to bargaining theory is Harsanyi (1989).
24 In this section a different notation is used.
25 Note, that if p1-p2', the Nash solution equals the 'unique
monotonicity solution'.
26 A specific, refined equilibrium notion is used here: the 'perfect
equilibrium'. This equilibrium is 'subgame perfect' which inter alia
implies that equilibrium strategies are credible at each stage of the
game. A concise treatment of these 'perfect equilibris' is given by
Rubinstein (1982), pp. 101-103. A more easy proof of the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium of Rubinstein's game can be obtained in
Shaked, Sutton (1984) and Sutton (1986).
27 The first player to move has an advantage in the original game. But,
as the time between moves becomes negligibly small, this starter advsntage
vanishes.
28 Hodgson (1988) provides an extensive well-founded critique on this
one-dimensional methodological viewpoint.
CHAPTER 5
COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS AND THE
INSTABILITY OF SOCIETAL BARGAINING
The previous chapter provided some reasons for the occurrence of
corporatism or societal bargaining. Next, it is important to establish the
(in-)stability of such explicit class compromises. If these would exhibit
a strong self-enforcing character, it might be concluded that such central
agreements between workers' and firms' organizations and the state would
be ubiquitous in capitalist democracies; in fact there would hardly be any
grounds for classes in developed capitalist countries to abstain from such
explicit compromises. But in many cases, societal bargaining does not seem
to occur, or it breaks down after some period of time.
The argument behind the non-occurrence or break down of societal
bargaining will be derived from 'collective action' problems decentralized
units of class representatives face (g 5.2). Therefore g 5.1 is devoted to
a concise introduction of these types of problems. Besides this, the
impact of corporatism on collective action problems on the 'individual'
level is examined. Given the instability of centralized bargaining ~ 5.3
discusses arguments on whether the state will stabilize this institution
or not, and what forms stabilizing measures may take. ~ 5.4 summarizes and
comments on the most important results of chapters 4 and 5.
5.1 The logic and relevance of the theory on collective action
The original formulation of the problem of collective action was put
forward by Olson (1965). His central theorem states that individual
members in large groups with similar interests have no incentive to
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contribute voluntarily to collective action of the groupl, if the
outcome of the action can be characterized as a collective, non-excluaive
good2. The individual member does not contribute as ahe is trapped in a
multi-peraon prisoners' dilemma (Hardin (1971))3. Her own contribution
is too amall to have a significant impact on the amount of the collective
good to be produced. Since the collective good is ex definition non-
exclusive (for members of the group), there seema to be a good reason to
take a free-ride on the collective train. In this section, I suggest some
effecta of the existence of a corporatiat system on the collective action
problem of classes.
Since most groups in modern society are large, Olson's analysis has
had a tremendous impact on social scíentists4. Should the theory be
valid, it would predict that no rational individusl would voluntarily
contribute to any form of action that delivers collective goods. In order
to guarantee collective action, all defecting behaviour would have to be
punished: every group would need an internal revenue service to check that
each group member pays her duea. The formal resemblance of the collective
action problem with the prisoners' dilemma (cf. fn. 3) gave an extra
pertinency to the latter. Its most important characteristic, the
incongruity of individually rational behaviour with Pareto-optimal
outcomes, has stimulated numerous theorists to find 'solutions' for this
dilemma. A'solution' or 'efficient outcome' is defined as the conjuncture
of strategies that leads to a Pareto-optimal pay-off vector5. It is not
my intention to review the host of literature regarding this problem6.
The (by now) most accepted solution to the prisonera' dilemma (given
utility maximizing homines economici as playera) is its formulation as a
repeated game. If actors meet each other recurrently in a prisonera'
dilemma-like situation, there exist Nash-equilibria that are characterized
by strategies leading to Pareto-efficient outcomes. These 'contributing'
strategies are conditional; actors only contribute as long as (enough)
others do. By doing so, actors show each other that Pareto-optimal pay-
offs are possible and that the free-riding trap can be avoided. In a one-
ahot aituation this result is impossible for there are no future gaina to
be won. However, the existence of s Nash-equilibrium vector of atrategies
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is not a guarantee that it will occur, mainly because multiple Nash-
equilibria can exist~. A conditionally contributing behaviour
equilibrium is only possible if several requirements are met:
- Actors must have an infinite time horizon, or have to be uncertain
about the end of the game8.
- Actors must not discount future gains too heavily. In certain cases,
theorems can be established that settle a'minimum' discount rate in order
for conditionally contributing to be a best-reply strategy. This specific
discount rate, also called 'the rate of temptation', depends (negatively)
on the gains from cooperation and (positively) on the benefits from free-
riding.
- The group must not be too large otherwise defecting cannot be
monitored effectively. If the punishment on defecting behaviour is not
directed at the defector, free-riding becomes more attractive. A second
reason against the feasibility of conditionally contributing behaviour in
large groups is that it is precisely large groups which are likely to be
more heterogenous. The probability of a segment of this group discounting
future benefits at a(too) high rate increases. This segment will
rationally defect all the time and thus provide a stimulus for the rest of
the group to 'punish' this behaviour by defecting as well. A third reason
concerns the existence of a'focal point' of behaviour. As was said
before, continually defecting is still a best-reply strategy, regardless
of all other considerations. Consequently, all group-members must
initially choose the conditionally cooperative strategy to make it viable.
In a game with multiple Nash equilibria, an additional coordination
problem exists: on which outcome should actors focus? By and large, a
large group faces a greater coordination problem than a small one9.
As a general conclusion, one may assert that purely voluntary
cooperative behaviour with respect to collective action is highly unlikely
in large groups even given the theoretical 'solutions' to repeated
prisoners' dilemmas.
In most thearies, the (il)logic of collective action is mainly
discussed with respect to the rationality of individual contribution to
collective action. In the sequence of this section, I will treat the
rationality of individual contributions of workers and employers to the
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collective action of their respective representatives. This problem is not
innocent, as one of the main problema of federations of trade unions and
employers' organizations i s their attractiveness to potential members. If
nobody wanta to join these organizations, i t is hardly imaginable that
these organizations will become legitimate representatives of their class
or even that they will have the organizational means to bargain. To a
certain extent, trade unions and employers' organizations must solve this
collective action problem, in terms of organizing enough individuel
members from their class. It i s also interesting to discuss what the
posaible impact of societal bargaining on these organization degrees are:
if corporatism would stimulate membership it would stabilize the strengths
of centralized representatives of the classes and hence the legitimacy of
societal bargaining. If, on the other hand, the organization degree would
fall, trade union federations and employers' associations would face more
difficulties in disciplining their respective rank and file.
It is questionable as to whether a conceptualization of collective
class action as a repeated multi-person prisoners' dilemma solves the
problem of showing why members of classes cooperate with the organizations
that are supposed to represent them. The choice of contributing va.
defecting to the collective action that trade unions or employera'
associations perform seems to have a recurrent character in most real life
aituationa. Workers and employers do not have to chooae once and for all
whether to contribute to their class collective action or not10. But not
all collective action problems are based on a prisonera' dilemma
structure. Taylor (198~) in particular, has emphasized that in many
realistic situations, actors (or sub-groups of actors) do want to take a
free-ride on others' behaviour, but that they also prefer to contribute to
collective action above universal defection. This occurs i f actors rate
the collective good as indlspensable. There are many situations in which
workers estimate powerful trade uniona to be essential collective goods.
If situations are characterized by such preferences, collective action
problems have the structure of a'chicken dilemma'. Universal defection is
not a Nash-equilibrium in these dilemmas. Actors may commit themselves to
defect in order to force thelr opponents to cooperate, but in any case,
cooperation is rational, even in a static environmentll
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The conceptualization of individuals considering whether or not to
contribute to collective action is not always correct. Firms have to be
regarded as decision-making units although they are not 'individuals'. But
large firms seem to make a different cost-benefit judgement than small
firms. Comparative empirical studies on employers' asaociations show that
"most of the 'free-riders' consist of the smaller firms"
(Windmuller~Gladstone (1984), p. 21). Above that, the motivation of
joining (contributing to) an employers' association differs between large
and small firms. The latter join the association in order to benefit from
the 'selective goods' these associations offer12. The 'selective benefit'
argument has been emphasized by Olson as being an important solution to
collective action problems. It says that the organization providing the
collective good may offer exclusive benefits to members in order to give
an incentive to contribute. As was noted in g 3.1, both clasa
organizations pursue the objective of supporting individusl members. For
this reason, these objectives were labelled as being partly indirect.
Although the provision of individusl benefits enhances the welfare of
members, class organizations seem to use these membership advantages
primarily in order to attract potential members. Theoretically, however,
this argument seems invalid. As Stigler (19~4) emphasized, any
organization that would not provide the collective good could undercut the
class representative by offering only the selective goods. With respect to
employers' organizations, there seems to be another argument to question
the general validity of the selective benefit argument. The selective
goods these organizations offer mainly consist of juridical assistance and
access to specialized data of economic importance. For large firms, such
selective goods are often redundant, since these firms have their own
specialized staff to collect and process the relevant information.
Empirically, it can be concluded that these highly rational actors
generally do not consider contributing to their sectoral or national
representatives as a dilemma. Available figures show that in several West-
European countries, confederations of employers' associations organize at
least 80 per cent of all employers (Sisson (1987), pp. 6ó-68). Although
all arguments based on Olson's theory point to the logic of defecting
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behaviour with respect to collective action, the capitalist class
certainly seems able to overcome some collective action problemsl3
In most capitalist democracies, workers are less organized than
firms. Workers' costs of contributing to collective action may be high.
Individual contributions do not only consist of trade union fees, but also
of the willingness to act during industrial conflicts. Moreover, trade
union membership may imply negative consequences for the individusl worker
concerning her career possibilities which might be considered as costs.
Consequently, if the view of the individual worker as a strict homo
economicus is accepted, free-riding surely seems a plausible strategyl4
Moreover, the working-class is a'classic' example of a large group. The
equilibrium strategy of conditionally contributing may, therefore, loose
its relevance for reasons mentioned above. Still, numerous workers
voluntarily contribute to collective action as members of trade unions. As
was argued before, the 'selective benefit' argument does not seem
convincing, although trade unions certainly offer these selective benefits
to members. Several theorists have tried to analyze why rational workere
would voluntarily participate in collective action. Crouch (1982)
emphasized that workers organize themselves in small communities where
they frequently interact. In these situations, conditionally contributing
seems to be a convention (almost) everbody sticks to, and therefore, a
suitable strategy. A second approach is based on workers' preferences more
explicitly. Workers may evaluate contributing to collective action
positive: contributing is not only considered costly but also 'utility-
increasing'. Such actors may be labelled as 'process-oriented' (Elster
(1985b)). Thia solution is essentially straightforward: it states that
people who contribute to collective action are socially or morally
supported by their peers, such that the benefits of free riding are
superseeded by the benefits of social approval. Hence, free-riding becomea
en irrational choice. Consequently, social support is an important non-
Olsonian 'selective good', which can not be offered by any competing
organization that does not provide the collective goods.
Particularly if these 'social goods' are considered to be important,
the theoretical discussion on collective action problems renders a
somewhat indeterminate character as will be shown below. Of course, a
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choice to contribute voluntarily to collective action is influenced by the
perceived cost-benefit relation of contributing and non-contributing. But
there is a large variety in the perception of both workers and firms of
costs and benefits of collective action, as preferences can hardly be
assumed to be identical. Therefore, it is hard, if not impossible, to make
general judgments about the solvability of these collective action
problems. However, one may try to assess the consequencea of certain
factors on the likelihood of contribution of individusl actors to
collective action. In the context of collective class action, one of these
factors is the exiatence of a corporatist system, as discussed in the
previous chapters.
Following the definition of corporatism in g 3.3, the concept of
corporatism presupposes considerable influence of representatives of
capital and labour on the socio economic policies of the state. Hence, it
may be asserted that centralized class organizations are able to provide
more collective goods in this politico-economic system than in a system
where interest representation only runs along lines of political parties.
In purely parliamentary capitalist democracies, political parties are
supposed to choose an 'optimal' socio-economic policy which would then be
implemented by a policy-neutral bureaucracy. The account for their policy
choices would mainly run via the electoral process: people show their
(dis)agreement to policy choices by casting their votes. Of course,
exiating parliamentary democratic systems are more complex. But the
exclusiveness of corporatism is the additional impact of some interests of
the population on socio-economic policies. In the preparation of policy
measures, both centralized employers' associations and confederations of
trade unions are consulted to secure their approval for these measures. In
fact, as was noted in ~ 3.1, the objectives of centralized representatives
of labour and capital explicitly contained impact on socio-economic
policy. This influence can be divided into the impact on policy measures
being of direct importance to the interest organizations (legislation
concerning hiring (and firing) conditions, organizational practices,
cartel policy) and on general economic policy (fiscal and monetary
policy). In some corporatist countries, these organizations even initiate
legislation. By exerting influence on legislation and the sort and amount
of public goods that are provided by the state, these organization perform
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collective action, the beneficiel consequences of which are not only
accessible for the members of these organizatíons but for all clasa
membera. Consequently, this influence is a collective good that is not
available in non-corporatiat democracies (see e.g. Salmon (1987)).
The existence of corporatiam may lead to declining membership'
coats. Institutionalized central wage bargaining lowera the need for trade
union members' willingnesa to act, and lower fees are needed to cover
expected strike outlays. An analogous decline in memberahip coata for
firma can be expected as they need less funds for 'lock-out' actiona.
Centralized wage bargaining may also decrease the organizational coats
that are needed to bargain. In general, bargaining is a time and effort
consuming process. If bargaining takes place on each decentralized level,
organizational costs per member may well be higher compared with
centralized bargaining. However, it muat be admitted that monitoring coats
will riae as bargaining becomes more centralized. Trade union membership
is likely to be leas unfavourable for a worker's career in a corporatist
syatem where firms' and workers' organizations respect each other than in
a system which lacks the corporatist characteristic. By and large, total
membership costs for workers will probably decline as they will for firma.
In contrast to these analyses, Offe (1981) and Offe, Wiesenthal
(1980) have argued that inatitutionalized central wage bargaining
increasea collective action problems for trade unions. From a theoretical
point of view, they assert that bargaining by centralized unions
diminiahes workers' affiliation to their organizationa. Given this
institutional structure there is hardly any discussion between ordinary
union members (the rank and file) and the professional negotiators of the
federation of the trade unions. As an important effect, eolidaristic
values disappear, and workers become more inclined to utility-maximizing
type of behaviour economiats assume: free-rider strategiea become dominant
as a result of institutional features of society. In Elster's (1985b)
terminology, workera become goal-oriented inatead of procesa-oriented. As
was noted by the protagoniata of the conceptualization of collective
action problems as repeated gamea (aee above), the atrategy of
conditionally cooperating is especially relevant in small groupa. If
collective action is executed at the central national level, the reference
group for workers is so large that communication via strategic behaviour
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of individuals is likely to be irrelevant. In any case, collective action
problems are aggravated.
To structure all arguments, a simple framework is proposed in order
to analyze the consequences of the (non-)existence of corporatiam for the
choice of an individual member to contribute to the collective action of
her class representative15. The class contains n members (n)0)of whom m
cooperate (0(mCn). Each member i has an expected pay-off Pi which is a
function of several variables:
Pi ' fi(o.ai,bi.si.ki) (5.1)
Function 'fi' determines the pay-offs of collective action for individual
i in the case of absence of corporatism. 'o' is the organization degree,
defined as (m~n). 'ai' denotes the choice between contributing (ai-1) or
defecting (ai-o), 'bi' are the costs of contribution to collective actíon
which may differ between the groupmembers i. 's.' are the social benefitsi
of contribution and 'ki' the selective benefits that are offered to
contributing members. The following partial derivatives are assumed:
16~fi~~o , ~fi~~si, ~fi~~ki ~ 0 and ~fi~~bi~ 0. A specific functional form
of (5.1) is:
Pi - BiÍo(ai)) - ai~bi-(sitki)~ (5.2)
Where gi(o-o) - 0 and ~gi~~o ~ 0. The member will defect from contributing
to the collective action if the parameters of this choice characterize the
game as a'multi-person prisoners' dilemma' (MPD). Two conditions have to
be fulfilled in order for this game to be a MPD. The first condition
requires that, given each number m~ of contributors, i prefers to defect
íai-0) than to contribute (ai-1):
I Pil(ai-0.o-m~~n) ~ Pil(ai'l.o-(m~~l)~n) ~
l16
{gi[(m~l)~n] - gi[m~n]} . {si4ki} c bi (5.3)
In a large group, (m.l)~n will be apraximately equel to m~n. As a result,
this condition boils down to a comparison between the benefits of
contributing (sitki) and the costs of contributing (bi).
The aecond condition atates that each individual i rather prefers
ell to cooperate (including herself) than all to defect,
II Pil(~i'1.o-1) ~ Pi~(ai-G.o-G)
gi(ai'1.o-1) ) {bi-[siiki]} (5.4)
(5.4) is an important condition with respect to the existence of a NQ'D:
the maximum value of the collective action for member i has to exceed her
private 'net' costs of contributing. Assuming that this latter condition
is metl~, the only relevant variables with respect to the individuel
choice are si, ki and bi, if it is accepted that the amount of influence
of the class organization is not affected by the individual choice of
contributing. Each member will probably ascribe a different value to each
variable: therefore, in my opinion, it is hardly worth determining whether
thia condition holds. But as is argued above, corporatism will probably
have some general impact on the pay-off function for workers and firma.
Therefore, assume that the pay-off Pi now depends on a function
hi(o,ai,bci,sci,kci), where hi determines the pay-offs for individual i,
in the case of existence of corporatist institutions. The verbal
discussion above leads to the conclusion that hi(o)~fi(o) for each o, and
bcicbi and sci(si for each i. No specific arguments were put forward
concerning a comparison between the selective benefits ki of collective
action. Given that the choice of a member dependa on the sign of [bi-
(si~ki)], a general conclusion on the consequences of corporatism for the
solvability of thia collective action problem of classea cannot be given.
Thus, in the light of this analysis, one should not expect a clear-cut
positive or negative relationship between the organizatión degreea of
class representatives and the (non-)existence of corporatism. Hence, it is
also important to conclude that the existence of corporatism dces not
necessarily stab3lize the explicit class compromises in this respect,
provided that there is no compulsory membership of class organizations in
a corporatist society.
5.2 Stability of class compromises and collective action problems
In this section, the central analysis, with respect to the explicit class
compromises from chapter 4, is continued. Now, the stability of the
outcomes of centralized~societal bargaining is considered. The focal point
in this section is whether these outcomes can be examined as collective
goods and therefore related to collective action problems.
Before extending the model, some remarks are needed on the internal
organization structure of centralized class representatives in capitalist
democracies. Historically, classes organized themselves locally, both
functional and regional. Then, on a different scale and with distinct
paces (and with setbacks!) several small-number organizations colluded,
again both on functional and on regional grounds. But at a particular
level, this process of organizational integration of class representatives
stopped18. National centralized organizations of trade unions and
employers' associations almost always have a federative structure: the
participants are normally independent organizations. With respect to some
decisions, they voluntarily transfer part of their authority to the
centralized federation, but they are usually free to recall their decision
rights. An essential characteristic of the institutional change from
decentralized bargaining to centralized bargaining is precisely the
authority that decentralized units leave to their respective federation
with respect to wage formation. But they may always withdraw their
cooperation iF they consider this beneficial. The incentive to withdraw
cooperation will turn out to be the basic argument behind the
vulnerability of centralized bargaining and its outcomes.
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The main attractiveness of a class compromise as analyzed in ~ 4.2
and ~ 4.4 was a higher 'stable' employment rate that could be reached (see
figure 4.2). However, if one unit of the centralized federation of trade
unions withdraws its authorization with respect to wage formation and
tries to set wages as high as possible, the employment rate is likely to
fall back steadily to its 'old' steady state level, as will be shown
below. In fact, the well-known process of 'wage drift' occurs: on lower
bargaining level, labour representatives are able to claim better labour
conditiona than centralized levels have set.
The moat important relation with respect to this problem is the wage
equation. Under corporatist agreements, wage growth should, after initiel
moderation, equal (ateady state) labour productivity growth in order to
bring about a constant wage share and employment ratel9, i.e.,
'cw ' ul` A2a" ' -alta2p" (5.5)
Suppose there are 'n' unions operating in this one-sector economy, all
organized in the centralized federation of unions. All unions are supposed
to have an equal 'weight' (e.g. they all represent equal numbers of
workers)20. The number of unions that deviate from the agreement (5.5) is
notated by 'j'. Deviating unions that try to "exploit" the employment rate
bring about an average wage growth that exceeds (5.5), for instance
p(t) - [(n-~)InI[-alt~2p"J t L.iln]L-~lia2g(t)] (5.6)
where, ex definition, p(t)~g". (5.6) can be rewritten as,
M(t) - -al ~ a2L{(n-,))In}S" } {~~n}a(t)~ (5.7)
The consequences of this adjusted wage equation for the whole system (4.1
- 4.~, 5.~, 4.9 - 4.11) can now be examined. The difference equation for
~(t) and consequently, the equilibrium wage share remain unchanged21. But
using (5.~), the difference equation for a does change into,
i19
a(t) - {-~1~1fa2L~'(n-j)In ~s(t)jln~}I{xl'u2a(t)tl) - 1 (5.8)
To find the resulting steady state employment rate a'"22, put a(t)-0 and
insert the steady state value a" in (5.8);
S`" - {L(a1tulip2aM)~a2~-[~'(n-j)In]}n~j (J~o) a
~'" - a' (j:o) (5.9)
Thus, no matter how small the relative number of 'deviating' trade unions
may be, the employment rate eventuelly drops to its steady state level of
the decentralized wage regime or even falls temporarily below this level
(in the case of a stable system, ~(t) eventually approaches ~"). This
relative number can be expressed by j~n, the 'deviation factor'. The value
of this factor does have an impact on the speed and type of this procesa.
Figures 5.1 a to c plot the development of the employment rate with
respect to time, for different values of this deviation factor.
As the outcome of central agreements appears to be beneficial for
all trade unions, centralized bargaining can be defined as a collective
good for all trade unions associated with the centralized federation.
Above, it is concluded that this collective good is susceptible to
collective action problems: deviating behaviour of trade unions leads to
a gradual hollowing out of the collective good. This collective action
problem cannot be simply identified with a prisoners' dilemma. In ~ 4.2 it
was assumed that the federation of trade unions cares for the wage sum
W(t). Following this line of reasoning, each lower level union i cares
about:
WiÍt) ' wi(t)Li(t)-wi(t)n-1~Ít)AÍt) (5.10)
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Parameter values belonging to 5.1.a to c: y-0.16, y-0.01. K1--0.1575.
u2-o.25. a1z0.06, a2-0.1. These parameters lead to a"-0.75 and g"-0.9.
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(cf. fn. 20), the derived goal of the union i s wi~. In s dynamic
perspective, this leads to concern about Oi which equals,
Ui- tT0 b(t-1)wi(t)s(t) (5.11)
where b stands for the discount factor, O~b~l and T is the time horizon.
We further assume that the union considers only symmetric solutions: all
unions represent an equal number of workers, and they all pursue the same
goal. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that they will all behave
alike. In the sequence suffixes 'i' are dropped. In each period t, a union
must choose between subsuming under the authority of the federation of
unian, and consequently to stick to the central agreements, represented by
u(t)-0, or withdrawing its cooperation to the central agreements and
trying to set wages as high as possible (u(t)-1). The latter choice
effectively means a breakdown of societal bargaining. If union would have
a time horizon of T-1, they would always set u(t)-1, as the consequences
of extra wage growth for accumulation only appear a period later, given
the investment lag. In fact, there is no 'prisoners' dilemma' in such a
'one-shot' game, as the Nash solution is Pareto-superior to all other
solutions.
The dilemma for the unions only becomes clear, in the case of a
dynamic analysis. In order to keep the discussion tractable, it is assumed
that the time horizon T-2. Now the unions want to maximize:
u1u).u(1),u(2) U- b-lw(0)~(0) t w(1)S(1) ~ bw(2)S(2) (5.12)
(5.12) can be simplified, as at t-0, the values of w and ~ are already
given, and u(2) has no consequences for values of wages and employment
rate in the period under consideration,
u~~) u(1) U- w(1)~(1) t bw(2)s(2) (5.13)
The development of the state variables are:
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w(t.l) - {x3' . u(c)az[s(c)-~`]}w(c)
~(tal) - ~{1t9~1-~1t)]}~{u3(t){l~v]}ÍS(t)




Uaing (5.14)-(5.16), it is possible to explicate the wages and the
employment rate, given the following start values,
w(o) - w (5.17)
~(0) - s~ (5.18)
r(o) - a" (5.19)
Before defining wages and employment rates for the periods 1 and 2, it can
be argued that u(1)-1, as this choice only affects the wage in period 2.
Civen the strict positive impact of u(1)-1 on U, unions will always
deviate from the central agreement in the penultimate stage. In effect,
the game at stage equals the outcome of the 'one-ahot' game as mentioned












It is now possible to compare the pay-offs U(eq. 5.13), as result of
'cooperative behaviour', U~u(0)-0, and 'deviating behaviour', U~u(0)-1. In
order to shorten notation, we write: a3-u3"fa2[pc-p"]. In order for a
better understanding of the outcome of the analysis, K3" is the growth
rate of wages in case of cooperation to the central agreements. a3 is the
growth rate of wages in period t-1 if the union deviates from the central
agreements.
U~[u(0)-~] - wopcK3"{l.ba3} (5.25)
UI[u(0)'1] ' wopca3{1.Sa3;{liP[1-a"a3~N3"]}~{[ul'H2a`a3~x3"'1][ltv]}I}
(5.26)
We now are able to examine the conditions under which trade unions will
stick to the cooperative agreement, or
U~u(0)-0 ~ U~u(0)-1




As the RHS of inequality (5.28) is always positive (a3~u3"), the LHS must
be positive too. This means that the second factor of the LHS must be
positive, implying that the effect of increasing wage growth on the
employment rate (the term between the large brackets) has to compensate
for the effect of rising wages on the goal level of the union (a3). If the
second factor of the LHS is positive, a rising discount factor increases
the change of an affirmation of inequality (5.28). This lAst result is not
surprising: if unions care more about future pay-offs, they will be more
inclined to cooperative behaviour as defined above. If condition (5.28) is
fulfilled, unions will voluntarily stick to the centralized wage
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agreementa given the restriction put forward in the text above. This can
be argued uaing a'shifting-time-horizon'. In period t-0, the unions
cooperate (assuming (5.28) ia met), which equals to u(t)-0. Resultingly,
the parameters of the model, and the 'ateady state' values, ~c and A~, do
not change. Then, if the time horizon of the uniona ahifts, uniona will
face the same choice in t-1, 2, 3 etc. However, numerical examples show,
that given a two-period time horizon, it ia very difficult to find a
parameter constellation leading to an affirmation of (5.28). It appears
that unions should have a long time horizon and a high discount factor b,
in order to cooperate to the class compromise from pure self-interested
motives.
To summarize, explicit class compromises appear to be unstable,
because of the internal collective action problem of the trade unions
federation. Before I go into other reasons that contribute to the
instability of central wage bargaining, a remark is in order with reapect
to the relation institution-collective good. Several authors belonging to
the emerging field of the 'New Institutional Economics' often claim that
existing institutions are efficient, that in fact, particular inatitutiona
develop in time mainly due to their efficiency, and fade away when
competing (new) institutions are more efficient~3. The inatitution
analyzed here, centralized bargaining on wages, is efficient compared with
ita counterpart: decentralized wage bargaining. However, it is ita
efficiency (a higher employment rate) which, at the same time, causes its
instability. Consequently, there may exist incentivea to introduce
efficient rules or institutions, but it has to be acknowledged that the
efficiency of these institutions dces not always contribute to their life
span.
Besides the core reason of instability of centralized bargaining as
analyzed above, there are at least two alternative argumenta for a
breakdown of centralized bargaining. These arguments will be dealt with
only verbally: at this stage I am not able to illustrate them within a
coherent model.- Still, I think they are of considerable importance and
should therefore be mentioned.
A first alternative reason behind instability is the aectoral
difference of the labour market situation trade uniona face. Above, it wea
concluded that a general rise of the employment rate provides
decentralized units of labour representatives with the opportunity of
raising their wage claims. Some sectors in the economy, and especially
some types of labour will, however, face a'tighter' labour market than
others, in the sense that trained labour power in these sectors is less
available than on average. An extra scarcity of these types of labour(-
power) supply will stimulate competition. The attractiveness to free-ride
on the collective action will be particularly high for these groups of
workers. Also, the role of employers seems important here: not only trade
unions play their part in the process of wage drift. Employers operating
in a sector characterized by a short supply of trained labour, may offer
wage rises above the level of the centralized wage agreements in order to
attract or keep those workers tied to the firm (the 'efficiency wage'
level lies above the level implied by centralized wage agreements). This
in itself may not prove to be a large problem for the central
representatives, since they could well anticipate such behaviour and
subsequently draw agreements, implementing general wage growth below
average productivity growth, thus leaving some room for (harmless)
decentralized wage drift. However, the effect of (extra) wage rises may be
expected to spread to other sectors, in particular i f workers and trade
unions are interested in 'relative wages'. Particularly in countries
characterized by central agreements on wages and other corporatist
arrangements, notions of distributive justice may be stronger developed
than in economies that are marked by 'pure' supply-demand considerations
of wage-setting. Then, the wage drift becomes a national phenomenon (see
the discussion of Paldam's (1989) analysis in ~ 3.2).
A second alternative argument for instability is the occurrence of
'external shocks' in the economy. As has been pointed out above, the
essential characteristic of the class agreement is that decentralized
actors voluntarily relinguish part of their decision power in favour of
their centralized representative, in order to improve the performance of
the economy (and thereby, their own medium and long-term pay-offs). In
order to agree with this type of class compromise they have to convince
their own rank and file of the benefits of leaving bargaining to the
central levels which may imply a lower wage growth rate than otherwise.
Suppose that while the centralized wage agreement is in force, a negative
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external shock takes place that leads to a decreasing employment rate. The
members of the trade unions may interpret this result as an indication
that wage restraint does not 'work', in fact that it has adverse effecta.
Again, one must point to the possibility, that different agents in the
economy operate on the basis of different economic models, implying
different 'optimal policies'. If the trade union members hold a'lack of
demand view' on the economy, they may well argue, that instead of
moderating wage growth, a rising wage share ia needed. Conaequently, they
may press their trade union to abstain from centralized wage agreements.
Surely, a negative external shock would also have its consequences for the
employment rate if the decentralized wage regime prevailed. Then, however,
the trade unions would not be able to deviate from the class compromise in
order to legitimate their representative function for their members.
5.3 Inatability and the role of the atate: corporatism reconaidered
The analysis of g 5.2 presents a gloomy picture for centralized or
societal bargaining. In fact, it will be difficult to aet up such a system
of wage formation, since the forces making for instability will be present
from the very stert of central wage bargaining. In this section, some
actions and mechanisms are indicated that might counteract the forces
destabilizing societal bargaining to some extent.
In the first instance, the federations of trade unions and
employers' associations will try to enforce the centralized agreements as
much as possible. Following the analysis above, the federation of trade
unions in particular may be expected to put a lot of effort into
coordinating and monitoring its members' behaviour, with respect to
contracts on labour conditiona. Moreover, it may be expected that the
federations will try to convince their members of the success of the clasa
compromises. The ultimate measure to discipline its affiliates is that the
federation may threaten that deviating members will be expelled from the
federation. Although this threat may only be aymbolic, most trade
unionists are quite sensitive to this argument; the 'culture' of trade
unions contains a strong commitment to 'the' group. Hence without
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enforcement of other actors, federations will have to rely mainly on the
solidaristic attitudes of their members.
Again, the state is introduced as an actor that may support the
stability of centralized (or societal) bargaining. Interference of state
agents who help changing the institutional features of wage formation, and
especially their role in stabilizing centralized agreements between
representatives of firms and workers is important. This role gives the
definition of corporatism (~ 3.3) a more specific content. In ~ 4.4,
societal bargaining has been defined as centralized wage bargaining
between workers and firms with the state as an actor supporting the
stabílity of subsequent agreements. Societal bargaining, in turn, is a
particular form of corporatism. I will try to argue below that the
definition of corporatism, which was based on political science literature
copes quite well with the functional role of the state in atabilizing
centralized bargaining. A number of motives for state agents to stabilize
centralized bargaining, already given in ~ 4.4, are not repeated herez4.
An extra general incentive to support general agreements, is the possible
occurrence of wage-costs induced inflation, if the class compromise breaks
down. Most political agents value inflation negatively, mainly for
elective reasons.
The definition of corporatism already contained the remark that the
state would have a substantial impact on the strategy set of the
representatives of labour and capital. Given the instability of
centralized bargaining on wages, an important option of state policy may
be to provide a law-like status to the centralized agreement which implies
a strong constraint on the strategy set of trade unions and employers'
associations. The state codifies the agreement and forbids lower-level
agents to settle higher wages. In fact, this implies a rigorous form of
incomes policy~5 that 'solves' the collective action problems of the
federations of trade unions and employers' associations. Next to this, the
state may offer some extra-parliamentary influence on aocio-economic
policies to these federations to compensate for the loss of autonomy. The
legitimacy of direct state interference with wages increases if
compensation in the form of policy impact is offered. This may well be
related to the function of providing collective goods by the federations.
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If the state installs a rigorous incomes policy it may be argued that
trade unions and employers' organizations have become superfluous in a
certain way since their collective action task with respect to this issue
is taken over by the state. The extra-parliamentary influence then
functions as an alternative form of collective action and thereby becomes
an important raison d'étre for the federations. However, legitimacy
problema probably still exist. Pressure for higher wages (given the high
employment rate) now is likely to take place at lowest firm levels (i.e.
vs. individual workers) as trade unions are bound by the incomes policy of
the state. Thus, there is a probability that the wage drift becomes even
more dispersed than is analyzed in the previous section, and therefore,
harder to monitor and to control.
Given this legitimacy problem of incomes policies, the state may
also pursue alternative measures to stabilize class compromises. An
alternative may be to settle particular deals with classes, and, again,
especially with the trade unions26. As the atate controls important
variables affecting possible goals of trade unions, e.g. the wage tax rate
(tw2~) and the relative level of unemployment benefits (W), the state may
punish (reward) deviating (cooperative) behaviour of trade unions by
increasing (decreasing) Tw and~or decreasing (raiaing) ~. Such
punishing~rewarding behaviour of the state would have influence on the
choice of trade unions as analyzed in g 5.2. There are, however, some
problems with these types of policies. One problem is the alowness of
implementing rewarding resp. punishing strategies. The decision-making
rules of the political process do not always provide the incumbent
political parties with a large flexibility to act as an alert plsyer.
Another, more severe problem, is the fact that such strategiea would
affect all wage earners and~or people receiving unemployment benefits. The
groups who neither deviate from the centralized wage nor benefit from
extra wage increases would consider such state behaviour as highly
unjustified, to say the least. Particularly if electiona are coming up,
auch punishment would presumably not increase the re-election chancea of
the incumbent political party. Therefore, the punishment threat might not
be feared by deviating trade unions. A third problem may be that the
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explanation for auch state behaviour is not trusted by the clasa
representatives. They may infer that the state uses 'punishment' arguments
in order to conceal other policy objectives behind higher wage tax rates
or lower unemployment benefits (e.g. to solve state budget deficits
problems).
A third way to stabilize centralized wage agreements is the
introduction or extention of active labour market policies28 to improve
the match of supply and demand on the labour market, especially if the
implementation of particular instruments ia executed together with the
representatives of workers and firms (see, e.g. Meidner (1988), Skott
(1990). The function of these policies ís to reduce tension on tight
labour markets, e.g. for those sectors where trained labour is scarce (see
previous section). Naturally, such policies may also have a wage-
depressing effect given decentralized wage bargaining, as well-trained
unemployed workers form a better replacement for inside workers than un-
or low-skilled workers. However, in this case less cooperation of trade
unions in the implementation of such labour market policies can be
expected.
It must be concluded, that the instability of centralized wage
bargaining cannot be rectified with the policies mentioned above. They all
seem to be more or less cosmetic measures that cannot definitely solve the
underlying collective action problem. As a result, it must be expected
that macro class compromises will probably break down after some period of
time, and for the same reasons in some countries they will never emerge.
If the state actively intervenes with some of the policies, mentioned
above and~or in ~ 4.4, to stabilize class compromises, a certain type of
corporatist structure is said to exist. These corporatist structures may
continue to function after centralized wage bargaining breaks down, i.e.
in e decentralized wage regime, due to existing structures and policy
patterns often being relatively rigid. However, if the federationa of
workers' and firms' organizations are unable to coordinate their members'
behaviour for a longer period, state agents will probably atart to
criticize the extra influence of these actors on socio-economic policy.
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5.4 Concluding commenta on chapters 4 and 5
The analysis has emphasized a particular type of disequilibrium
movement of a capitalist economy, where workers and firms are organized in
trade unions and employers' associations respectively. These organizations
are federated in national associations. The disequilibrium character
appears as result of both the efficiency of centralized class compromises
and the instability of such an institution. Despite the efficiency for
both classes, centralized wage bargaining is defined as a compromise
instead of a consensus. In a static sense, both actors undeniably favour
the pay-offs associated with the compromise as compared to the pay-offa
under the decentralized wage regime (recall figure 4.2). Consequently,
there ahould be a consensus with respect to this compromise, following the
concepts introduced in ~ 2.2. However, the dynamics of the approach point
to other conclusions. The path of the economy from the steady state of the
decentralized wage regime to a corporatist 'steady state' is essentially
due to wage restraint from workers. During this process, firms benefit
most from the class compromise. This part of the analysis contrasts
aharply with the approach of dynamic non-cooperative game theory towards
that problem (~ 2.4). In the underlying approach, orgenizations of firms
are not ellowed to manipulate the accumulation share as a macro control
variable. In fact, no macro-economic variable~9 appears to be a control
variable. As investment does not belong to the items of bargaining,
workers 'pay the bill' of the transition to the more efficient steady
state. If investment would be a macro variable, the organization of
workera might enforce extra accumulation efforta of firms. In this
respect, the analysis of ~ 2.2 again becomes actual. Since manipulating
investment does not form part of the strategy set, or the bargaining
'agenda', workers must moderate their wage claims in order to improve
their position. This is an important reason to label centralized wage
bargaining as a class compromise instead of class consensus.
Another argument is the instability of (the outcome of) centralized
bargaining. As there exists continuoua pressure to settle a growth rate of
wages above the level of the centralized wage agreements, one may infer
that there is no real consensus towards this institution and ita outcome.
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Moreover, firms will experience declining profit shares if centralized
wage bargaining breaks down and trade unions benefit from the high
employment rate. Given this instability of centralized wage bargaining,
organizations of firms will consider it as a compromise as well.
The analysis provides partial support to the 'U-shape' hypothesis
discussed in ~ 3.2. The upward-sloping part (see figure 3.1) in the case
of centralization of wage bargaining às partly confirmed. Only if
representatives of workers and firms decide not to use their entire
bargaining power (and hence leave the decentralized wage regime), the
'performance' of the economy increases. The downward sloping part can be
explained as an impact af an exogenous influence of the 'power' of
decentralized trade unions on the growth rate of wsges. If this power
increases (decreases), ~1 falls (rises). One of the many determinants of
trade union power is the level on which they execute their activities.
The role of the state is argued to be less deterministic than in
other analyses. It is maintained that state support to install class
compromises may be important, especially with respect to prevent this
compromise breaking down. However, state interference is not needed, and
may not be effective a priori. Corporatist institutions are likely to
emerge in capitalist democracies where centralized federations of firms
and workers operate, and they may often support the processes and outcomes
of centralized agreements. Given the instability of centralized wage
bargaining, the level of indeterminacy of the theory stays high. In
particular, it may be concluded that each class compromise has a positive
probability of breakdown. General notions on the specific value of this
probability are not warranted since they would be of a speculative nature.
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Notea
1 The 'group' is defined as a collection of individuals who ell ascribe
a poaitive (negative) value towards a particular issue.
2 The problem is also formulated with respect to individuals who
underestimate their preferences concerning public gooda. This approach is
eapecielly used in welfare economics. For a review see: Mc Millan (1979)
and Mueller (1979). pp. 19-27.
3 There are, however, many contributions in the literature that
criticize the exclusive focus on prisoners' dilemma analyses of collective
action. Collective action problems may alao be characterized as
coordination games (Schotter (1981), (1988)) or Chicken dilemmas (Taylor,
Ward (1982), Ward (1987) and Taylor (1987). In general, collective action
problems are analyzed as 'Harsanyi-dilemmas' (Raub (1988)).
4 A second reason for Olson's popularity is that the type of theory he
proposes directly results from neo-classical, mainstream economic
thinking, which has a huge popularity among (esp. American) social
acientista.
5 The phrase 'solution' is slightly misleading in this respect, as every
conjuncture of strategies is a solution of a game. A number of articles
even use the term 'cooperative solution' or 'cooperative outcome' to
indicate the same idea. This is even more misleading as game theory
providea the term 'cooperative' with a well-defined meaning. A prisoners'
dilemma is, contrarily, a non-cooperative game. However, I will follow
auit during the discussion.
6 Besidea lmportant discussions in the contributions liated in footnotea
3 and 7, aeveral other works are worth mentioning: Hardin (1982) offers a
large overview on the subject and Schelling (19~8) illuminates a number of
non-cooperative multi-person games, from which the repeated prisoners'
dilemma is an example. As far as I know, the best (up to date)
introductions on the subject are Taylor (1987) and Raub (1988).
7 The formulation of the Prisoners' dilemma sa a repeated game is
elaborated in (among others): Taylor (1976, 198~), Schotter (1981, 1988),
Axelrod (1984), Bendor, Mookherfee (1987) and Raub (1988). Among the many
posaible (Nash) equilibrium strategies in this game, two are repeatedly
stresaed. The first is the so-called TIT FOR TAT - strategy: an actor
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starts by cooperating and acts, in each period, like her opponent did in
the previous stage of the game ( a kind of conditional cooperation). The
aecond is the strategy of always defecting, which remains an optimal
atrategy.
8 If the repeated game has a finite time-horizon and both pleyera are
aware of it, defecting is the only rational strategy in thia game. Luce
and Raiffa (1957. PP. 97-102) derived this result by backward reasoning:
at the last stage of the game, both players defect (equivalently to a one-
shot prisoners' dilemma). Therefore, at the penultimate stage of the game,
both players know that cooperating on behalf of future benefits ia useless
as there are no benefits in the future (last stage of the game). Thus both
defect at the penultimate stage. This line of reasoning can be backwardly
continued until the start of the game.
9 Naturally, defectors can be excluded from the group, loosing their
access to the collective good. However, this 'solution' of the collective
action problem actually redefines the collective good as a private good
which is exclusive.
10 If the organization does not exist one can imagine a certain situation
in which potential group members decide to try to set up such an
organization (or act collectively in another way). If cooperation fails
once, this attempt may not be repeated.
11 A strong commitment to defecting behaviour may even be punished in a
repeated version of this game, a'super-chicken-game', which then stops
being a best-reply strategy (see Ward (1987)).
12 See, as examples, the empirical studies of Marsh (1976) and Moe
(1980).
13 Here, only collective action in labour relations is considered.
Another question is whether firms are able to limit price competition. If
firms in an oligopolistic market would be able to form effective cartels,
profits would presumably rise above a level resulting from severe
competition. But firms may be inclined to cheat after price agreements
have been made, by lowering their price in order to increase their market
share. Hence, the formation of an effective cartel may form a substansive
collective action problem. Such issues are dealt with by e.g. Bowman
(1982), (1985).
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14 Naturally, such a view of people can be criticized, on both
methodological and empirical grounds. A different view can be found in
(among numerous others): Offe (1985), Lembcke, Howe (1986), Hodgson (1988)
and Roemer (1978). In 'mainstream' economics too, the concept of man as a
etrictly rational utility maximizer is criticized, especially with respect
to its relevance for behaviour in groups. See e.g. Sen (1977) and Margolie
(1982).
15 The notation in this section differs from that of the rest of the
atudy. Analogous modelling of collective action can be found in Hardin
(1971), Booth (1985) and Wilke (1988).
16 It should be noted that this functional relationship between
collective action and organization degree is specific. One may argue for
other forms, as: the organization degree does need some threshold value
before collective action can take place, at a certain level of
organization degree there will be no increase in collective action, etc.
17 In reality, there may be an important number of firms and workers for
whom this condition is not fulfilled. For them, there exists no 'dilemma'
with respect to collective action, for they would not sufficiently
appreciate the outcome of this action, or may even dislike it.
18 As far as I know, this is a correct indication of most historical
developments. Nevertheless, there have been important working-class
organizations which were set up from 'above', like the First
International. However, such organizations probably had more political
influence, than direct impact on the labour conditions (broadly apeaking).
19 As point of departure, the basic model (without the state) is
analyzed. A'c' above a variable denotes the value of this variable of a
'steady atate' in the centralized wage regime.
20 The assumption of equelly large trade unions may be criticized as
during the dynamic process, changes may occur. 'Deviating' trade unions
succeed in bringing about higher wage growth than 'cooperating' trade
unions, which leads to relatively high labour costs for workers who are
represented by the 'deviating' trade union. Consequently, such workera
will probably be sacked sooner and this may cause a drop in the relative
weight of the union. On the other hand, an 'agressive' union, which
succeeds in fixing higher wages may be able to attract workers organized
by 'complying' unions, which leads to an increasing relative weight of the
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'egressive' union. Although these organizational dynamics form an
interesting research area, I will not elaborate on them. For simplicity, I
will stick to the assumption of unions, which represent a constant (equal)
part of the labour force.
21 This assertion depends on the assumption of a one sector economy. In a
multi-sectoral economy, where each trade union might be assumed to
represent the workers of a particular sector, differences in sectoral
'wage shares' (or rather: labour costs) would emerge, if different wage-
setting behaviour would exist.
22 A double asterisk denotes the steady state after deviating behaviour
of j unions.
23 It is not to say, that each author who is labelled as a'new
institutionalist' would argue that efficiency would always stabilize
institutions. See, for relevant discussions with respect to these
problems, Binger, Hoffman (1989), Bromley (1989). Johansen (1979).
Langlois (1989), North (1981), Schotter (1981, 1989) and Williamaon
(1985).
24 A remark has to be made on the specific motivation for social
democratic parties to stabilize centralized bargaining as compared to
conservative parties. If (some) trade unions deviate from the centralized
agreement, the latter parties may well use such behaviour as an argument
to introduce measures that curb trade union power, and these measures may
be electorally useful. Social democratic parties may be less capable of
using these arguments given their strong links with these trade unions.
Consequently, they have more to loose from a breakdown of centralized
bargaining than conservative parties do.
25 A detailed overview on the experience of several European countries
with different types of incomes policies is given by Flanagan et al
(1983 ) .
26 Empirical analyses which point to such deals are: Armingeon (1986),
Boston (1985). They both emphasize the vulnerable character of these types
of deals.
27 In the model put forward in ~ 4.3, Tw should change into a control
variable in order to examine effects of such tax deals, implying another
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variable of the atate sector to become endogenous (given the balanced
budget restriction).
28 The notion of labour market policies here only refers to those
policies that try to adjust the quality and quantity oP the supply of
labour power to the particular demand of labour power.
29 Apart from state-controlled variables, see g 4.3 and ~ 4.4.
CHAPTER 6
EMPIRICAL RELEVANCE
This last chapter is devoted to the issue of the empirical
relevance of the theoretical notions developed in the previous chapters.
At this point, I emphasize that the theoretical discussion has addressed
problems that have theoretical roots. Therefore, this chapter must not be
considered as occupying a central place. The main intention is to
illustrate the main assertions and relations argued above.
~ 6.1 deals with the established way of assessing the consequencea
of institutional variables, like corporatism and centralized wage
bargaining on economic variables. It is concluded that this manner, which
rests upon the forging of country-rankings and subsequent correlation
analysis, is highly unsatisfactory. Therefore, I choose an alternative
research strategy which contains a description of the (mainly post World
War II) developments, with respect to explicit class compromises in three
countries (the Netherlands, Austris and Sweden) who have experienced a
form of such class compromises and an interpretation of these developments
in the light of the theoretical notions as mentioned above in g 6.21. ~
6.3 makes some concluding remarks.
6.1 Corporatiam, centralized bargaining and econanic outcomes: commenta on
comparative studies
The concept of 'corporatism' was 'discovered' by political
scientists ( see g 3.3). Not surprisingly, the first empirical applications
of theories based (partly) on corporatist notions were performed by
political scientists. One class of studies ia characterized by its
comparative approach. Another branch analyzes longitudinal developmenta of
140
the socio-economic institutions of one country. Some of the latter will be
used and commented on in the next section. Here concentration is laid upon
comparative empirical studies. This theme has been (empirically) picked up
by economists since the study of Bruno and Sachs (1985). The main question
addressed by researchers involved is whether 'corporatism matters': do
differences in institutional country-specific arrangements concerning
corporatism account for a relevant amount of differences in (mainly)
economic developments?
As will be clear from the theoretical perspective I have chosen,
large emphasis will be laid upon the relation between corporatism and
unemployment. According to many theorists performing comparative studies,
the existence of corporatist institutions (among which centralized wage
bargaining often plays an important role) should reduce unemployment
rates. Hence if country A possesses institutions that exhibit a stronger
corporatist character than country B, country A should show a better
employment record. To give the reader some idea of this kínd of studies
chart 6.1 is displayed.
This figure plots the average unemployment rate of sixteen OECD-countries
during the period 1965-1982 as a function of their place in a'ranking' of
countries, based on a'degree' of corporatism. The specific rankingz
used defines Austria as the 'most' corporatist country in the sample, and
the U.S.A. as the one 'least' corporatist. According to the (general)
hypothesis, the figure should display an upward trend: if a country is
positioned lower in the ranking, and therefore more to the right in the
figure, its performance with respect to unemployment should be worse.
It is not always easy to compare the results of several studies on
the consequences of corporatism, as there exist considerable contradictory
judgements about a satisfying corporatism ranking, even if only the
countries in the sample above are considered. Whats more, a large variety
of dependent variables analyzed: not only the kind of variable
(unemployment, inflation, economic growth, strikes) and the measurement
(level, average, change) differ, but also the periods covered. With
respect to the relation corporatism-unemployment, some results are
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TABLE 6.1
CORPORATISM, CENTRALIZED BARGAINING AND UNFFl~LAYMEDTf IN THE OECD-AREAB
Author(s) Period Rankingb Result Remarks










Monotonic low, Confirms for





Lehmbruch Low dependency No systematic
study, rough
ranking
Rowthorn, '73-'85 No ranking Strong Analysis for
Glyn ('88) dependency different
countries
Schmidt ('82) '74-'78 Lehmbruch r--0.67 Rough ranking
a The sample of (OECD) countries differs between the studies
reviewed. The set of countries always included is: Austria, Australia,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japen,
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US. Often, some amall
countries like Iceland and Luxemburg are left out because of their small
eize. Others, like Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey are regularly
neglected as they did not experience an parliamentary-democratic political
system over the whole period of analyais.
b The expression (-) indicates that the author has developed his own
ranking. If rankings of other authors are used, they are often slightly
adapted.
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As a general conclusion, a low negative relation between
corporatism, or centralized wage bargaining, and the average unemployment
rate of developed capitalist democracies is observed. Rowthorn and Glyn
(1988) report a strongly negative dependency, but they do not explicitly
compare countries3. Schmidt (1982) and Czada (1983) also point to a
considerable correlation between corporatism and unemployment but their
dependent variable only concerns a short period during the seventies. As
will be shown in this chapter, this type of research ia quite sensitive to
the period under consideration. This typically relates to the seventies
and the eighties where unemployment figures were relatively fluctuating.
Although this type of research sheds some light on the empirical
relevance of the use of the concept of corporatism to compare country-
specific developments of unemployment figvres, I do not think it is very
satisfying. A first major problem concerns the different rankings that are
used. Some rankings, and the respective criteria on which they are based,
are displayed in table 6.2 below.
The rankings differ considerably although certain patterns become
clear. Austria, Norway and Sweden are considered strongly corporatist by
all authors. An equsl consensus among researchers concerns the weak
corporatist character of the UK, USA, Canada, France and Italy. Denmark,
Finland and Belgium are generally thought to be of intermediate nature.
But although the patterns do not differ too much for the countries, their
precise rankings do. In order to show some consequences of these
differences, I regressed the rankings of Calmfors and Driffill (1988),
Bruno and Sachs (1985), and Cameron (1984) with respect to the same
unemployment figures. From table 6.3, it appears that major differences
exist in the 'performance' of the various rankings. These comparisons
between several rankings show that the ranking of Bruno and Sachs performs
relatively well. Schmidt's (rough) ranking is not regressed, as he only
discerns three 'levels' of corporatism. This table shows, besides the
difference in explanatory power, that the rankings are very sensitive to
the period under consideration. All rankings4 perform better for the
period '65-'82 than for the period '74-'85. Besides this, I have examined
the consequences of removing Japan and Switzerland from the sample: except
for the testing of the Bruno and Sachs' ranking for the period '~4-'82.
This removal improved the 'explanatory power' of the regression equations
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considerably. In particular the explanatory power of Calmfors and
Driffill's ranking jumped concerning the period '65-'82. Thia is
visualized in figure 6.1: leaving out Switzerland and Japan gives a'neat
cloud' of points.
The differences between the rankings naturally result from the
different criteria which are used, and the weights that are attached to
these criteria. These criteria, in turn, point to the content of
TABLE 6.2
RANKZNGS OF OECD-COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO 'CORPORATISM-DEOREE'
Country Bruno, Calmfors, Cameronc Schmidtd
Sachsa Driffillb
Austria 1 1 1 s
Germany 2 6 7 m
Netherlands 3 7 8 m
Norway 4 2 3 s
Sweden 4 3 2 s
Switzerland 6 14 9 s
Denmark 7 4 5 m
Finland 8 5 4 m
eelgium 9 8 6 m
Japan 10 13 14 s
UK 11 11 10 w
France 12 10 16 w
Italy 13 lz 15 w
Australia 14 9 11 m
Canada 15 16 12 w
usA 16 15 13 w
a Criteria (see also Crouch (1985)),: Union movement centralization
(4), Shop-floor autonomy (-), Employer coordination (4), existence
of works councils (.), p. 226
b Criteria: Level of coordination of bargaining (t), number of
parallel central organizations and their cooperation (-), pp. 52-53
c Criteria: Organizational unity of labour (t), Power of
confederation(s) in collective bargaining (~), Organization degree
of workers (t), pp. 165-166
d 's' meens strong corporatist character, 'm' medium and 'w' weakly
corporatiat. Criteria (see also Lehmbruch (1984),: Commitment of
trade union leadership and employers' associations to social
partnership ideology (t), existence of tripartism and concertation
(.), low strike levels (.), absence of authoritarian incomea
policies (i), Schmidt (1982). p- 25Ï
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corporatism the authors have in mind. Schmidt explicitly considers
concertation and tripartism as essential to a corporatist character. The
other authors only refer to aspects of the centralization of wage
bargaining. Cameron and Calmfors~Driffill use criteria concerning the
centralization (level of bargaining) and concentration (the measure of
dispersion of trade unions on a particular level) of trade union
organization while Hruno and Sachs also take the coordination of employers
into account. All rankings are compound weighted rankings of the criteria
TABLE 6.3
SENSITIVITY OF SOME CORPORATISM RANKINGS FOR SEVERAL RANGFS OF VARIABLES
MEASURING UNEMPLOIMENT
Ranking Dependent X-coefficientb r2
variablea
Calmfors, A1 0.14 (1.62) 0.16
Driffill; A2 0.27 (5.87) 0.75
corp index B1 0.14 (1) 0.07
az o.33 (3.3) 0.50
Cameron A1 0.17 (1.89) 0.19
A2 0.24 (3.43) 0.51
B1 0.21 (1.4) 0.12
Bz o.31 (2.82) 0.39
Bruno, A1 0.25 (3.57) 0.53
sachs A2 0.24 (4.8) 0.69
H1 0.28 (2.33) 0.27
B2 o.z6 (z.6) 0.24
Calmfors, A1 0.12 (1.2) 0.09
Driffill; A2 0.10 (1.11) 0.10
U-index B1 0.30 (2.14) 0.27
B2 o.z9 (2.64) 0.36
a Four dependent variables are regressed: A1: the average unemployment
rate for all countries during the period '65-'82 from the basic sample:
Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and USA. A2:
like A1 but now without Japan and Switzerland, B1: the average
unemployment rate for all countries in the sample during the period '74-
'85, and B2: see B1, but now again without Japan and Switzerland.
b t-statistic in parentheses
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mentioned. The processes of computing the rankings do not seem to be very
refined. All authors admit this and consequently point to the weaknessea
oP these 'subjective' rankings. Civen the low level of consensus among
theoriats about the relevant criteria behind the rankings and given the
crudenesa of forging rankings, reliability of 'tests' resting on such
rankings can be aeverely questioned, as table 6.3 suggests5. The value
of empirical research that is based on such rankinga ia therefore limited.
The limited value of this research dces not change if a different
type of ranking is used. Calmfors and Driffill argue that a'monotonic'
ranking based on the centralization of wage bargaining cannot help to
explain comparative differences with respect to unemployment rates: they
propoae e'U-ahaped' relation between centralization of wage bargaining
and economic performance (for a theoretical justification, aee g 3.2). In
order to test the empirical strength of their argument, they adapt a'U-
shaped' ranking from their 'normal' corporatism ranking, as displayed in
table 6.2, by inserting the 'lowest' three countries on their liat
(Canada, U.S.A, and Switzerland) between the countries placed third
reapectively fourth {Sweden and Denmark) (Calmfors, Driffill (1988), p.
23). This procedure is repeated after the number six (Germany)6. The
(renumbered) ranking gives a better 'fit' than their original ranking for
the period '~4-'85, as table 6.3 shows (regression w.r.t. data set B1).
This leada them to conclude that in this respect the 'U-shaped' hypotheais
is superior to the 'monotonic' hypothesis concerning centralization of
wage bargaining. Whatever the merits of the 'U-shaped' hypothesis are, I
do not think that their empirical comparative test warrants auch optimiam.
This new ranking is less affected by the removal of Japan and Switzerland
from the sample, but gives a very poor fit if the '65-'82 data are used
(even worae than all other 'corporatist' rankings). Moreover, the
procedure by which the new ranking is adapted is very rough. Other U-
ehaped rankings can be constructed, using different 'corporatism rankinga'
as a departure, and~or different procedurea of adaption that lead to a
similar variety as in the case of 'monotonic' rankings. The conclusiona on
the value of comparative research based on country rankings above aeem
also to apply here.
More problems exist with respect to the 'robuatness' of the
empirical research discussed. The dependent variable (the unemployment
rate) cannot always meaningfully be compared between countries, even
although standardized OECD data are used. A well-known example is
Switzerland, which is notorious for not regarding the large contingent of
unemployed foreign workers as officially unemployed, but instead expels
these unemployed workers to their home countries (see e.g. Katzenstein
(1984)). Japan does not count fired female workers as being unemployed,
thus depressing the official unemployment rate~. These two countries are
best known for an adjustment of the official labour supply in order to
improve the unemployment record, but then analogous policies exist in many
countries. Thus, unemployment figures may be hard to compare. Even if
unemployment figures can be compared between countries, far more important
country-specific trends may occur in labour supply or demand that will
seriously disturb a meaningful comparison with respect to wage setting
institutions. Rowthorn and Glyn (1988) have correlated many variables with
the unemployment rate for a number of OECD countries. A different growth
rate of the labour supply, as a result of different developments in
participation degrees or population growth, have large impacts on the
unemployment figure. Some countries are worse hit, with respect to
industriel employment during the economic crises in the seventies, which
appears to be a major determinant of the overall unemployment figure. In
any case, direct correlation of unemployment rates and degrees of
corporatism between countries is not undisputed.
Analysis of the previous chapters gives rise to even more critical
comments. The distinctive feature which reduced unemployment was the
explicit class compromise, resulting in centralízed bargaining on wages.
State interference, leading to the introduction of the term 'societal
bargaining', mainly functioned as facilitating the class compromise or
stabilizing its existence. I therefore agree with Calmfors and Driffill
((1988), pp. 27-28) in that lower rates of unemployment do not directly
result from extensive state interference with class organizations or from
concertation. Thus, low unemployment does not result from concertational
institutions, as is often argued in political science literature. As was
suggested in g 5.3, corporatist institutions may well remain relevant
after a breakdown of the class compromise.
However, the most important critical remark on the types of
comparative research discussed above, is the neglect of institutional
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flexibility of countries. It may well be that some capitalist democracies
are characterized by centralized wage bargaining during some period of
time. As was argued in ~ 5.2, this type of wage aetting inatitution is
threatened by a breakdown. Accordingly, institutional features of wage
setting change, and countries may switch positions during the period under
consideration. The inherent instability of wage setting institutions are
neglected in the comparative research on corporatism and centralized wage
bargaining.
It muat be concluded, on the basis of all arguments, that the type
of research diacussed in this section leads to little understanding of the
effects of institutions like corporatism or centralized bargaining on
economic developments. Consequently, I would rather study some of the
(post World War II) developments in three OECD countries, instead of
trying to construct my own satisfactory 'ranking' of corporatism, as such
a'ranking' would exhibit the same weaknesses as the ones di.acussed above.
Before studying these developments, I will comment briefly on a
number of studies on comparative research that link corporatist
institutions to other socio-economic variables. A great deal of studies do
not treat unemployment as a major explanandum of corporatist institutions
but rather take alternative economic variables. I will comment on analyses
with respect to economic growth, the size of the welfare state, the degree
of unionization and the amount of strikes. This limited overview is
provided in order to give some idea of the existent results of the
empirical comparative 1lterature behind the concept of corporatism.
Although I will not repeat my criticism of the 'rankings' (which play an
important role again), I must emphasize, that in general this remains the
achilles heel of the analyses discussed.
Given the (theoretical) analysis of chapter 4, one would not expect
a substantial relation between the existence of corporatism or centralized
wage bargaining and the structural pace of economic growth. The most
important endogenous variable which determines economic growth is the wage
share, as Y(t)-p[1-a(t)] (see ~ 4.1). As it was asserted that societal
bargaining would not lead to a lasting rise or decline in the wage share,
no comparative differences, with respect to the growth rate of the
national, product are expected. Only during the dynamic path to a higher
employment rate 'equilibrium', and after a breakdown of centralized
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bargaining, are substantial effects on economic growth predicted8.
However, several scholars have suggested that differencea in political-
institutional variables could explain substantial differences in averaKe
growth rates of income between OECD-countries, especially the differences
that have emerged since 1973 (Cameron (1984), Lange, Garrett (1985).
Lehner (1988), Schmidt (1982), (1983) and Whiteley (1983)). These papers
do not offer empirical tests that directly regress economic growth to a
ranking of corporatism. But all authors do frequently suggest that the
existence of strong centralized trade unions together with a strong
position of the political left is a major positive force behind economic
performance, because representatives of the working-clasa are sooner apt
and willing to stimulate economic growth if a left-wing party is
incumbent. Testing comparative growth rates of gross domestic product,
with respect to the different corporatism rankings reported above (see
table 6.2) only leads to the conclusion that no evidence exists whatsoever
of correlation between corporatism and growth rates. Splitting up growth
rate averages in the period '60-'80 into two periods, i.e. '60-'73 and
'74-'80 does not improve matters. A slight (negative) correlation appears
between corporatism and the reduction in average growth rate of the two
latter periods: corporatist countries have been somewhat better capable of
absorbing the adverse effects of the international crisis. As the
correlation is not very strong, this result should be interpreted very
carefully. (Test results are displayed in the appendix, table 6.4).
Often, a positive correlation between the unionization degree and
the strength of corporatism is suggested. Causal mechanisms suggested
differ however. A number of scholars use the unionization degree as an
explanatory variable of corporatism (e.g. Cameron (1984)). But other
theorists point to the reinforcing effects of corporatist institutions on
unionization (see ~ 5.1). In that section, I argued that on the basis of
collective action theory no correlation between corporatism and
unionization can be predicted, as corpocatist institutions may have both
cost- and benefit-depressing effects on collective action. Using a
corporatism ranking that is not derived from (inter alia) the unionization
degree, figure 6.2 displays the sample of sixteen OECD-countries according
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Source: Corporatism ranking: Calmfors, Driffill (1988). Unionization:
Cameron (1984), p.144. The rates are average percentages during the period
'65-'80.
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The figure shows clearly that little correlation between corporatism and
density rates exists. (In the appendix, regression tests on this data set
are shown in table 6.5) Extensive comparative research on unionization in
ten European countries has pointed to manifold arguments behind different
levels and developments in density rates (Visser (1985), (1987)). The
strength of the social democratic, or left political party(ies) appeared
to be a much more important determinant of unionization than corporatiam.
Visser (1985. z8-z9) does mention a substantial atabilization effect of
corporatist institutions on density rates. Strongly corporatist countriea
appear to have far more stable unionization degrees then countries
characterized by a decentralized system of wage bargaining and a low level
of concertation. An extra problem with respect to statements on the (non-)
correlation between corporatism and unionization is of a more practical
nature. Comparative research on unionization faces the enormous problem of
standsrdizing data. Visser (1987, 1989) has provided admirable work, but
he 'only' gives data of ten European countries.
Some authors also use the existence of corporatist institutions as
a partial account for the existence and functioning of welfare state
institutions (Korpi (1980)9, Lehner (1988) and Schmidt (1983)). Of
course, the specific developments of welfare states in developed
capitalism can only be explained by a wealth of arguments and not by a
monocausal link10. The theory developed in chapters 4 and 5 does not
predict a strong correlation between corporatism and an extended welfare
state. Concertation is considered to be circumstantial to state
interference with centralized bargaining. However, concertation refers to
the influence which both federations of trade unions and federations of
employers' organizations have on socio-economic policy. It is not obvious
why the latter would stimulate or extend welfare state institutions. Korpi
(1980) and Schmidt (1983) emphasize that corporatism is conducive to the
welfare state expansion as workers' organizations have more influence on
state policy. Lehner (1988), on the other hand, argues that corporatism
depresses distributional conflicts between workers and firms. According to
him one of the important functions of the welfare state is to smoothen
these distributional conflicts by increasing the amount of redistributed
income. Thus, corporatism would functionally decrease the need of welfare
state growth.
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Both types of influences are not supported by some tests. Again,
the by now familiar corporatism rankings are used as independent variablea
to predict several variables that measure the extent of the welfare state:
public expenditure as a percentage of GDP in 195o and 19~5 and the social
security outlays as a percentage of GDP in 1962 and 19~2. Only Bruno and
Sachs' ranking indicate a slightly positive correlation between the social
security outlays in 19~2 and the amount of corporatism (see appendix,
table 6.6). It is, of course, possible to object against these epecific
variables as welfare state indicators and to formulate alternative
criteria. The disadvantage of such a strategy is, however, apparent: the
numerous possible indicators of the strength of the welfare state would
enable researchers to accept or reject almost every hypothesis regarding
comparative developments in welfare states.
As already mentioned, Lehner (1988) argues that industrial
conflicts about the distribution of income between workers and capitalists
diminish if strongly corporatist features exist. Korpi and Shalev (1980)
hypothesize a kind of 'U-shape' relation between 'corporatism' (see ~
3.2)) and militancy of workers, the latter being measured by figures on
strike involvement and volume. Cameron (1984) like Lehner (1988) predicts
an equal relationship. It is therefore appropriate to correlate the
rankings to compilations of certain strike data. From these regressions
(see appendix, table 6.7) it appears that the lack of corporatist features
is moderately correlated with certain measures of strike activities. A
number of caveats are in order however.
Strike data are not very reliable and are subject to considerable
manipulationll. Does one take the volume of strikes, the frequency of
strikes or the relative involvement of workers in strikes as the relevant
measure? A single ratio is often not sufficient to compare countries
(Hibbs (1987), Korpi, Shalev (1979), Paldam, Pedersen (1984), Robertson
(1990), Shalev (19~8, 1980, 1981)). Researchers therefore, made strike
profiles of countries in order to compare them. Several of the authors
mentioned indicated a causal link between the incumbency of left-wing
political parties and the decreasing importance of strikes. The change in
long-run strike patterns is especíally ascribed to the political role of
socisl-democratic parties; short-run movements of strike figurea are less
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explained by political factors (Hibbs (1987)). As the strength of left-
wing political parties partly correlates with the corporatism rankinga,
the correlation between the latter and strike figures may run via the
political factor.
An attentative conclusion may be that concepts like corporatism or
centralized wage bargaining are of limited value in explaining differences
of important socio-economic variables between OECD-countries. I will
postpone further comments to the last section of this chapter and turn to
some studies on country-specific experiences with class compromises.
6.2 Clasa compromises in Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands
In this section I will describe and analyze some of the socio-
economic developments in post World-War II Austria, Sweden and the
Netherlands, using the conclusions of the theory displayed in the chapters
above, particularly chapters 4 and 5. The analysis is concentrated on the
institutional features of the relations between organizations of employers
and workers as these were argued to be of central importance for the
problem of the dissertation. I have abandoned the strictly comparative
approach as discussed in the section above for reasons that should be
clear by now. Nevertheless, I try to describe the institutional
developments in a way that comparisons between the countries at hand are,
up to a certain point, possible. The choice for these three countries as
empirical 'cases' is partly arbitrary; a restriction to three economies is
made for reason of available time. As these countries have both some
experience with forms of societal bargaining and quite different
historical and cultural backgrounds (given European limitations) they aeem
apt for the purpose of this section. If one would for example only study
the Scandinavian countries, (too) much attention would be drawn to the
specific cultural background of these countries as a major explanation for
important socio-economic institutionslZ. The choice of these three








Although the structure of the subsections devoted to these three
csaes differs slightly, each will contain at least a sketch of the moat
important organizational aspects of industrial relations especially with
respect to wage formation, the developments with respect to explicit class
compromises, the role of the state in these compromises and an overview on
unemployment figures and wage shares. All these data will be interpreted
by using statements from the theory above. In order to give some
preemptive comparative impression of the three countries, the developments
of unemployment rates and wage shares of the countriea are ahown in
figures 6.3 end 6.4.
6.2.1 The Netherlands
The organization of Dutch representatives of labour and capital was
strongly centralized in the aftermath of World War II14. The national
federations of both functional groups had considerable influence on the
policies and strategies of their sectoral affiliates concerning a wide
range of topics. This centralized character of trade unions and employers'
associations declined somewhat during the sixties and the seventiea.
Sectoral organizations became more autonomous in formulating and
implementing their strategies. The strong centralization of clasa
representatives was not matched by a strong concentration of the
organizations. Dutch society was (at least up to the end of the 196o's)
strictly 'pillarized'. Organizational cleavages based on religious grounds
divided representatives of the capitalist class and, even more so, of the
working classl5. The importance of these differences gradually
diminished, and in this respect concentration of class organization
increased in the post-War erai6. An important event in this concentration
process was the integration of most Catholic trade unions ("Nederlands
Katholiek Vekverbond" (NKV)) with the non-religioua trade uniona
("Nederlandse Vereniging van Vakbonden" (NW)) into one federation
("Federatie Nederlandse Vakverenigíngen" (FNV)) in 1976. sut,
deconcentration developments can also be discerned: separate white-collar
trade unions and their federations became of increasing importancel~.
Unionization was almost constant of about 40 percent of the labour force
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in the period 1950-1978 (Visser (1989), p. 152). From 1979 however,
density rates declined sharply to below 30 percent.
Before World War II, wages were commonly set on the company level,
but sectoral bargaíning was beginning to emerge. One of the most important
legal institutions, that accompanied a process leading to more centralized
wage bargaining, was a law (adopted in 1937) that could oblige all firma
and workers in a particular sector to stick to a wage agreement between
the trade union(s) and employers' association(s) of that sector. However,
this instrument was not sufficient for supporting nation-wide centralized
bargaining18. After World War II, a wage-setting system was established
which exhibited strong centralized characteristics. The typical procedure
with regard to wage formation was, that first federations of trade unions
and employers' associations negotiated internally on the claims they could
put forward in the sectoral bargaining rounds. After that bargaining on
sectoral level took place. The results, however, had to be approved by a
parity commission of the 'foundation of labour' ("Stichting van de
Arbeid"), established in 1945. This foundation was (and still is) the
institute where representatives of the national federations of labour and
capital negotiate. Moreover, the bargaining results also had to be
approved by a state committee. Naturally, trade unions and employers'
associations anticipated possible interventions from the top and,
consequently, s de facto centralized nation-wide bargaining on wages on a
tri-partite basis came into existence.
The basic characteristics of this system of wage-setting continued
until the end of the sixties. However, it seemed to have been eroded by
wage drift on the firm level from the mid-fifties onwards. Firms offered
individual workers wages which were above the officially approved levels.
Sectoral unions took this wage drift process over 3n the mid-sixties and,
up to the present, sectoral organizations of firms and workers remain the
primary organizations with respect to wage bargaining. This does not mean
that the central federations do not play a role anymore in Dutch wage
setting. Internally, trade unions and employers' associations try to
coordinate their demands and offers within the federations. Often, the
federations have tried to install 'central agreements' with respect to
wage developments as well as working conditions, labour time and (more
recently) employment. Officially, however, only the negotiations in 1972
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and 1982 have resulted in 'central agreementa' between capital and labour.
Both contained moderation of wage claims of workers as an important part
of the agreements.
The state has always played a considerable role in the wage setting
process. As already mentioned, agreements had to be approved by a atate
committee. In the Netherlands, wage setting was considered to be an
explicit instrument in reaching macrceconomic policy goals. A governmental
economic institute, the Central Economic Planning Agency ("Centrasl
Economisch Planbureau" (CPB)) plays an important role here. It provides an
overview on the performance of the Dutch economy and its proapects,
assuming specific developments, in particular of variablea like the wage
rate for instance. In effect, the government dominatea the economic
discussion via this agency, as all actors involved more or less trust the
conclusions and forecasts of this institute. Up to the end of the fifties,
conatrained wage development was thought to be of importance in increasing
investment efforts, and thereby, replacing the old capital stock and
rapidly extending industriel capacity. Later, on several occasions, the
government interfered in the bargaining process in order to adjust (i.e.
to reduce) the level of wages to policy goals (incomea policies). The
Dutch government has the legal right to abolish agreementa between
employere and trade unions if it considers the results of these agreements
to be detrimental to Dutch economic developments. More than once, a
maximum on wage increases has been set, in order to prevent the
deteriorating effects of rising labour costs on the balance of payments.
This atate interference coincided with the establishment of several
concertational institutions. Most important in this respect is the already
mentioned "Sociel Economic Council". The seats of this parity council are
occupied by representatives of the federations of trade unions and
employers' associations and by so-called 'independent experts', mostly
recruited amongst economiatai9. Admission of a federation to thia council
effectively meana a state approval of this federation. The council was
origínally formed to operate as a coordinating institution above sectoral
corporatist organizations. Soon however, it became an instítution where
labour and capital formulated and expressed their views on policy matters.
In thia respect, the council functions as a'voice' of organized classea
in matters of state policy. On almost all relevant socio-economic
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legislation, governmenta firat aeek advice from the council before
approval from the Dutch parliament is sought.
During the period of centralized wage bargaining, a number of
income-replacing measures had already been installed, as well as flat rate
pension schemes for all citizens. The level of welfare state programs
seems comparatively high in the Netherlands, especislly when it comes to
income-replacing programs (Roebroek, Therborn (1990)). Representativea of
trade unions have supported welfare state programs considerably, more so
since the onset of the economic crisis of 19~4. On the other hand,
representatives of employers' associations have not fought welfare state
programs fiercely. After the breakdown of centralized bargaining,
federations of trade unions tried to enforce welfare state programs as
part of the centralized agreements mentioned above. It is often
conjectured, that trade unions would not oppose strict incomes policies of
the state as much, if the state would extend welfare programs at the same
time.
During the fifties, the wage share rose slowly in the Netherlands,
as figures 6.4 end 6.5 show20. After a temporary decline in 1959 and
1960, the wage share increased rapidly up until 19~5. This period of
rising wage shares was interrupted by three years of temporary decline.
After 19~5, the level of the wage share remained almost stable until 1980.
The latter appeared to be a water-shed. The wage ahare up until 1985
dropped dramatically to levels that had been experienced during the mid-
sixties. The latter part of the most recent decade shows a re-
stabilization of the wage share.
Certainly in retrospect, unemployment was negligible in the
Netherlands up until 1970. However, this situation of near full
em l0 21p yment was accompanied by an (for European atandarda) extremely low
participation rate (see e.g. Therborn (1986)). Then, unemployment rates
began rising steadily during the seventies (see figures 6.3 and 6.5).
Here, too, 1980 was an important year. From 1980 to 1984, the unemployment
rate rose to a level of 11 percent. Although during the last few years
unemployment rates are decreasing somewhat, the level is still high
compared with the other two countries under consideration. The
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Rowthorn (1988)). Naturally, there is a wealth of arguments to account for
these stylized post-war movements in the wage share, and eapecially for
the unemployment rate in the Netherlands. I will not even attempt to claim
that an analysis concerning class compromises can offer a more
comprehensive explanation than is possible otherwiae. Rather, I will try
to expose how the argumenta of chapters 4 and 5 can be brought to bear on
some of the institutional changes described above.
The way in which wages were set during the first post-World War II
perlod (up to the mid-sixties), can clearly be considered as a variety of
an explicit class compromise. Dutch commentators typically characterize
labour relations in this period as 'consensual', but for theoretical
reasons outlined in chapter 2, I will abstain from this notion. National
centralized representatives of (an important part of) labour and capital
agreed to a highly centralized fixation of wage rates, where wage ratea
were considered to be instrumental in order to reach macro-economic goals.
Contrary to the general analysis of chapter 4, an increasing rate of
employment was not an explicit goal of societal bargaining. Rather, a low
unemployment rate was a'by-product' of rapid accumulation, which was
considered to benefit both class actors. Investment was not considered as
an instrumental variable either, although low labour costa were seen as a
necessary condition for high investments. The background of the post-war
institutional change to centralized bargaining cannot sufficiently be
explained by pointing to unused (labour) resources as a result of
decentralized bargaining. Most analyses point to the devastating
consequences of the war that unified the class actors. This also provides
a reason as to why decentralized actors were willing to abstain from
autonomous strategies. State actors played a large role in bringing about
centralized bargaining by defining a'desired' wage rate and by giving
agreements a law-like character.
Because of this type of state interference, sectoral trade unions
were not the main actors behind the gradual breakdown of this explicit
class compromise. Given a tight labour market, individuel firms paid wage
rates which were higher than the official ones. As can be seen in figure
6.5, during the period of strict centralized bargaining wage shares were
already climbing and this process accelerated after 1960. Still, it may be
argued that centralized wage bargaining de facto existed up to 1963. In
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particular, the declining wage sharea in 1959 and 196o are hardly
understandable in a system of decentralized wage bargaining, where labour
ia quite powerful given the shortage of labour supply. From 1964 onwards,
sectoral trade uniona started to demand wage rates well above the official
guide lines. In this respect, the explicit class compromise had faced its
breakdown. Although a number of general state policies mentioned in
section 5.3 were used to keep the system alive (up to strict incomes
policies) in general they did not work: sectoral representatives remained
the primary actors in wage bargaining. Again, in 19~2 and 1982 central
representatives succeeded in consenting to nation-wide class agreements.
However, with respect to both agreements, one may severely doubt whether
they had any substantial effect on the development of wages. Especially in
1982, sectoral trade unions would probably have not succeeded in securing
higher wages in the bargaining process anyway. The sharp decline of the
wage ahare during the first years of the eighties can be better explained
by the deteriorated power position of the trade unions (high unemployment
and dropping unionization) than by referring to centralized agreements.
Despite the centralized agreement in 19~2, containing guidelines for
growth rate of wages below labour productivity growth, the wage share
actuslly rose during the next three years. It can be concluded that de
facto there was no reversal to centralized bargaining in the Netherlands
after the mid-sixtiea.
The experiencea, with respect to unemployment rates seem less easy
to interpret using the theory. The breakdown of centralized bargaining did
not lead to rising unemployment during the sixties. Whether it cen be
claimed, that the rising unemployment during the aeventies and beginning
of the eighties ia for a major part due to decentralized wage bargaining
is doubtful. However, one must conclude that representatives of both
clasaes did not succeed in fighting unemployment vis the implementation of
nation-wide compromises.
After the breakdown of societal bargaining, concertational
structures did not cease to exist. The functioning of the Social Economic
Council remained important and both class representatives atill have a
major voice in policies concerning working conditions, labour market
functioning, social insurances, end health mattera.
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Although the analysis has not been set up to predict future
developments, it may be conjectured that the current chances for a renewed
emergence of societal bargaining are considerable. For the last five
yeara, the Netherlands have faced with a high stable level of
unemployment, together with a wage share which dces not fluctuate too
much. Given the theory above, this could motivate both actors to reach
centralized agreements. Moreover, the strongest political parties in the
Netherlands have a Christian-democratic and a Social-democratic
background. As was argued in g 4.4, these parties, constituting the ruling
coalition government since 1990, are likely to stimulate clasa compromisea
leading to higher rates of employment. Some caveats are in order, however.
The high rate of unemployment is concentrated among some groups. The
majority of long-term unemployed workers appear to be weak competitors on
the labour market. Therefore, the unemployed who actually compete on the
labour market are not as large a group as the official figurea would
suggest. Therefore, a rising wage share belongs among the likely
possibilities for the near future. A second argument is the ideologically
motivated unwillingness of employers' associations to engage in
centralized bargaining. In fact, they seem to be quite content with the
current profit share and unemployment rates. A third reason is the
declining legitimacy of trade unions as representatives of labour in the
Netherlands. The density rate has dropped from 40 to 28 percent in one
decade and, although the pace of decreasing unionization has fallen,
unions are still fighting to reverse the downward trend. The question now
may well be whether unions, if they succeed in bargaining with employers
on a centralized level, will be able to enforce the agreements throughout
the economy.
6.2.2 Auatria22
Many outside observers are struck by the apparently ultimate
centralization and concentration of Austrian representatives of firms and
workers: I have no deviant opinion on this issue. Both trade unions and
employers' associations have peak organizationa that seem to exert great
influence on the strategies and policies of their affiliates. In Austris,
there are two lines of functional representation: workers and firms are
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obliged to acquire membership of a'chamber', respectively the chamber of
labour and the chamber of commerce~3. The chambera are semi-public law
intereats organizationa, who have been in existence since the mid 19th
century. As they represent all their potential members,hey are atrongly
legitimated to act as a'voice' for labour and firm interests
respectively, towarda the state and other groups. Next to thie line of
repreaentation, workers and firms are free to organize themaelvea in
'normal' trade unions and employers' asaociations. All important trade
unions are affiliated to the 8GB (8sterreichischer GewerkschaftsBund), the
nation-wide umbrella organization of labour. No parallel-like competing
organization of labour exista, which makes the system not only centralized
but also highly concentrated24. Density rates of union membership are
remarkably conatant in post-World War II Austria; ita level has been about
60 percent for the lsat forty years (Visser (1989)). The ~GB seems to be
the primary labour organization, directing and steering its affiliates.
This state of affairs strongly differa from the 'normal' pattern of trade
union organization, where sectoral unions are the primary organizations
and their federations only secondary. There is also a parallel
organizational line of firms. The nation-wide organization V(SI
(Vereinigung ~sterreichischer Industrieller) organizes a major share of
private enterprises, especially the intereats of large firms. The most
important actor on the employers' side however, is the chamber of
commerce, while the ~GB is considered to be the main actor on the labour
side.
This importance is reflected in the central wage setting
inatitution of the country, nsmely the wage subcommittee of the joint
(parity) commisaion on wages end prices. In this commission,
representatives of the chambers of labour and agriculture are aeated, and
in particular the chamber of commerce and the bGB. The latter two have
more seata in the commission and appoint the chairmen. The current
atructure of the joint commission (displayed in e.g. Marin (1985), p.109
and OECD, Austria (1988), p. ~0), dates from atate commissiona, formed
just after World War II to regulate prices and wages. However, from the
end-fifties onwards, no direct atate interference took place in this
commission, it is a'pure' bi-partite affair between representatives of
employers and employees. Apart from the non-interference of state actors,
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two other aspects of this commission stand out: its guidelines on wages
and prices are not binding: agents on lower levels are 'free' to act
otherwise. However, this 'freedom' is bound by the fact that all deciaions
of the joint commission, including its subcommittees, must be unanimous.
This unanimity gives the decisions a strong legitimation end thus makes it
difficult to ignore them. Besides regulating wages and a subatantial
number of prices on the nation-wide level, the joint commisaion also
functions as an advisory board on economic and social affairs. Without
doubt the joint commission can be labelled as the core of corporatist
Austria. Until now, the functioning of the wage-setting institution has
been relatively undisputed: centralized wage bargaining has not (yet)
faced its breakdown in Austris.
The following steps can be discerned in the wage setting process:
First, trade unions coordinate their strategies within their federation,
the BGB. As all unions, including those of 'white-collar' and public
sector workers, are affiliated to this federation, the outcome of these
discussions implies an important part of the wage setting process. Then,
bargaining on sectoral level may take place, but only after the approval
of the wage subcommittee of the joint commission has been given.
Consequently, the subcommittee determines the timing of new bargaining
rounds. Afterwards, the results of the bargaining process have to be
ratified by the same subcommittee. As the federatíon is present during the
coordination of wage claims by the different unions, and heavily
represented in the joint commission, it does not come as a surprise that
this working-class organization occupies a primary place in Austrian wage
setting. However, there seems to be some room for decentralized wage
drift. More or less approved by the centralized actors, extra wage
increases on the firm level are possible. Important actors on this level
are not only the firms but also the work councils of the firm. Most of the
members of these councils are also trade union members, therefore, higher
level trade union officials still have some grip on the wage drift
process. In fact, some observators even point to the anticipation by the
central actors of this wage drift process: deliberately, they agree to
'too' low wages, in order to allow for some decentralized, flexible wage
increases without causing damage to their goals (see e.g. Pollan (1982)).
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As mentioned above, the state does not directly interfere with this
wage setting process. However, there is frequent interaction between atate
agents and the repreaentatives of labour and firms with respect to wage
bargaining and related issues. First, the state is an important employer
itself. In Austria, large parts of major industries are nationalized~5.
Second, strong personal ties exist between the political parties and the
national representatives of unions and employers' associations, as well as
with the chambers of labour, commerce and agriculture. While the social-
democratic party SPS (Sozialiatische Partei i3sterreichs) and the ~GB have
numerous personal links, the interests of firms end the agricultural
sector are better represented by the conservative party ~VP
(~sterreichische Volkspartei). As these two parties have dominated the
political scene of Austria during the last forty years, often joining in
coalition governments26, in practice the wage setting process is
'politicized'. These links become even more clear if the substantial
influence of the national class actors on several aspects of the eocio-
economic policies of the state is considered. Several scholars have, for
example, pointed to the pressure the trade uníons put on the state during
the seventies to expel foreign (unemployed) workers as a means of keeping
unemployment rates down2~. The subcommittee on social and economic
affairs of the joint commission ís an important advisory committee for
state policy; more so because of the unanimous character of policy advices
or proposals. Even the national bank, which is assured of a considerable
autonomy with respect to the parliament, has direct links with the
national class actors. Six of the fourteen members of the central council
of the bank are nominated by the "Sozialpartner", as the union and
employers organizations are called in Austria (Nowotny (1982), p. 120)28.
Besides all these interactions between state institutions and class
organizations, the state tries occasionally to interfere in the wage
setting process by proposing 'tax deals' to the joint commission: íf the
latter aucceeds in moderating wagea, the atate will relieve tax rates
(Flanagan et al (1983). pp. 62-63).
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Before interpreting the Austrian wage setting system in the light
of my theory, I will comment briefly on the post-World War II developments
of the wage share and the unemployment rate, referring to figures 6.3, 6.4
and 6.6. For at least two decades (from 1960 to 1980), unemployment was,
again in retrospect, negligible: it did not exceed two percent of the
active labour force: the Auatrian labour market has been rather tight for
several decades. Relatively speaking, the years 1981-1983 ahowed a
particularly sharp rise in the unemployment rate. Afterwards the level of
4 to 5 percent stabilized. The wage share in Auatria did not ehow an
upward or downward trend in the period 1950-1970, although it oacillated
fairly. During the first five years of the seventies in particularly,it
rose considerably, most notably in 1975~9. After 1978, up until 1985,the
wage share fell graduelly. Afterwards, its level has been stabilized.
Following thia concise overview on Austria's industrial relations
and wage setting institutions, it does not seem unreasonable to
characterize the relationa between representatives of workers and firms as
a macro class compromise, as analyzed in chapter 4. Wage bargaining
effectively takes place on the national level and is even concentrated in
a eingle institution. Both firms and workers' organizations have to agree
on the outcome of this targaining process, and thus, each outcome can be
characterized as a compromise itself. Up to now the basic rules of the
system have not changed, although the class compromise has sometimes come
under pressure. Macroeconomic consequences of wage growth~moderation
explicitly enter the wage negotiations. All commentators point to the
counter-cyclical role of wage growth during the fifties and the sixties.
Downward phases of effective demend were counteracted by wage rises that
exceeded the growth rate of labour productivity (which leads to a rising
wage share), while during upward phases of the businesa cycle, wage growth
was moderated. This is reflected in the osc311ations of the wage share
during these two decades. Centralized actora have thua been very
successfull in etabilizing the class compromise: on the decentralized
level the temptation to cheat on centralized agreements on wage
moderation, given a situation of (almost) full employment and an upward
phase of the business cycle, is quite strong. The atrategy of centralized
actors of allowing some measure of wage drift and probably even
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enticipating theae decentralized wage increases, appears to have
contributed to this success.
However, the real challenge to the class compromise preeented
itaelf during the period 1971-1975. As sketched above, the wage share was
rapidly rising in these years. The government followed an expanaionary
fiscal policy during this period, keeping employment high. Moreover,
nationalized industries hoarded labour in a considerable amount and
thereby mitigated the adverse employment effecta of the oil aupply-aide
ahock. In the first instance, the trade union orgenizations refuaed to
moderate their wage claims, which resulted in a sharp increase of the wage
ahare. However, the system of centralized wage bargaining appeered
resistent to the threat of breaking down. Employers' organizations kept on
bargaining on the nation-wide level and the 8GB moderated ita claims
during subsequent negotiations. In effect, the fall of the wage ahare
aince i9~9 cannot be understood in the context of a decentralized aystem
of wage bargaining, since unemployment was, at least until 1982, very low.
Combined with the other aspects of trade union organization in Auatria - a
high density rate and strong concentration - workers must be considered to
be powerful enough to increase their share and to squeeze profits. That
those processes did not occur should, therefore, be ascribed to
consciously practical wage moderation. The explanation of rising
unemployment during the first few years of the eighties cannot run via en
argument of too high labour costs. In a recent OECD report on Austria
(OECD, Austria (1988)), it is argued that the interpretation of
unemployment resulting from capital shortage (effectively unemployment as
analyzed in chapter 4) is only very partial: real wage flexibility is
considered to be quite high. Summarizing, the class compromise has
aucceeded over a long period in using the development of wages in order to
achieve and preserve a low unemployment rate.
The stability of this class compromise is even more remarkable in
view of the relatively low degree of state interference in order to
prevent collective action problems30. As Korpi~Esping-Andersen (1984) and
Scharpf (1984) note, the Austrian state hardly offers an active labour
market policy that would mitigate the potential wage drift effects of a
tight labour market. A recent increase of such policies (OECD (1988)
Austria, pp. 58-60) can better be explained by the wish to fight
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unemployment rather than by a strategy reducing labour-market strains.
Welfare state measures have expanded during the past forty years, but,
compared with for example Sweden, the Austrian welfare state is still not
highly developed (cf. Korpi~Esping-Andersen (1984)31). Flanagan et al.
(1983) report a varying success of the policy of 'tax deals' mentioned
above. According to them, the centralized actora on the trade union side
are not all too happy with tax reductions, as the latter would complicate
expansionary fiacal policy.
The stability of the Austrian class compromise can best be
understood as a consequence of the de facto atrong power of the
centralized actors over the decentralized levels. The close ties between
all leading representatives of the organized classes and the big
eatablished political parties probably result in a substantial amount of
mutuel truat: the actors involved do not expect each other to 'cheat'. The
relative success of the system provides it with legitimation vis-à-vis the
decentralized levels, and thereby with an extra source of atability. By
this, I do not mean that the Austrian clase compromisea are not
ausceptible to the chancea of breaking down. At least three political-
economic developments can be touched upon which ~ put centralized
bargaining under pressure, although it must be acknowledged that this
pressure does not seem to be very strong. First, increasing
internationalization of Austrian product markets3~ will inter alia imply
a atronger resistance of employers towards higher labour coata, as
compensation for higher wagea by higher product pricea becomes more
difficult. As a result, chances of disagreement in the joint commisaion
may increase. A second argument ia the role of the Austrian liberal party
("Freiheitliche Partei bsterreichs" (FP(S)) which has become more important
during the last decade and can put the 'proporz'-system under preasure. As
this party has less links with the centralized wage and price aetting
system and with the organizations of employers and workers, she may attack
the corporatist syatem. A third reason is the increasing need for higher
flexibility, especially in the industrial sector. It is not unreasonable
to auggest that workera will demand differentiated wage increases if they
are auppoaed to adjust more readily to the demanda of their firms. The
goal of low unemployment may then well looae its current heavy emphasia.
But these arguments have only a limited value. Unambigous forecasta with
171
respect to the stability of the Austrian class compromise are not
warranted.
6.2.3 Sweden33
As already mentioned in the general introduction to this section,
references to the 'Swedish model' are ubiquitous in Anglo-Saxon
literature. In this subsection, I will stick to the structure employed in
the cases of the Netherlands and Austria. Therefore, not ell aspects of
the 'Swedish model' will be considered and I will explicitly refrain from
the (popular) question of whether this 'model' works for other countries.
In some places this subsection will be a bit lengthier than the other two,
as the developments with respect to class compromises are quite
complicated in Sweden.
For more than half a century now, the organization of class
representatives has been fairly centralized. The encompassing federation
on the employers' side, the SAF (Svenska ArbetsgivarefCreningen), was
established in 1902, being the sole federation of employers' associations.
This central (capitalists') organization is considered to be a mafor
incentive for trade unions to build a similarly strong organization on a
nation-wide level (Fulcher (198~). Two important peak organizations were
established, the LO (Landsorganisationen i Sverige) and the TCO
(TjHnstemannens Centralorganisationen). The TCO brings together the white
collar or salaried employees trade unions, while the LO federates the
trade unions that originally represent 'blue-collar' workers. All three
peak organizations are thought to exert a strong influence on the policies
and strategies of their affiliates. However, the latter are free to
bargain as autonomous units (see further below). In the trade union
organization, both concentration and deconcentration trends can be
discerned. Trade unions have been merging during the past three decades
(see Windmuller (1981)), leading to increasing concentration. But the
deconcentration trend is more important: the TCO has become more and more
important during the last thirty years, especially because they organize
the white collar public sector workers, a fast rising segment of Swedish
employment. Besides this, a peak federation for unions organizing
'professionals' has emerged, the SACO~SR (Sveriges Akademikers
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Centralorganisationen~Statistjënstemannens Riksftlrbund) which makes the
picture on the labour side even more diverse. The denaity rate of trade
union membership is unsurpassingly high in Sweden compared with other
OECD-countriea. What is more, it is even ateadily rising, i.e. from 68
percent in 1950 to 91 percent in 198534.
A description of the wage setting procesa in Sweden must take the
historical developments into account. Up to the mid-thirties, wage setting
in Sweden was primarily done on firm level and was characterized by a high
conflict level (see e.g. Korpi~Shalev (19~9]). The main centralized actora
(the SAF and the LO) tried to get more grip on the behaviour of their
affiliates, which led to a first success in 1938 when the famoua
'SaltsjtSbaden' agreement was signed. It ia important to note that this
agreement did not contain an explicit accord on wage developments. Rather,
a framework of bargaining was decided upon and agreements on industrial
peace and mutual recognition35 were settled. Besides this, the central
role of the peak organizations was effectively established. But it took at
least 18 years (until 1956) before the first national wage agreements
between the central representatives of both parties were concluded (Elder
(1988), p. 155). From that year on, up to the end-seventiea, the
federations had been the most important wage-setting actora, they not only
coordinated the strategies and demand~offers of their affiliates, but also
negotiated directly on the national level on generally desired wage
developments. At any rate the SAF has even had the right to (dis-)approve
the outcomes of collective bargaining of its members on the aectoral
level.
1~0 'models' of thinking have been the point of departure of
centralized bargaining processes in the Swediah labour relationa since the
beginning of the aixties. These 'modela' did not always explicitly
determine the bargaining outcomes, but, according to moat commentatora,
they codified the views of the Swedish class actora sufficiently. Firat
there is the 'Rehn-Meidner model' which has ita roots in the L0. According
to this view, wage differentials would have to become as amall as
possible: the development of relative wagea would have to take place on
the basis of e'solidaristic' wage policy. In this view, the state plays
an important role by promoting labour market policy in order to prevent
'tight' segments of the labour market. Second, the 'EFO-model', which wea
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presented as a co-production of representatives of workers and firms3ó,
distinguishes two sectors in the Swedish economy. The firat aector
produces for world markets and must therefore be conaidered as price-
taking. The second aector produces primarily for the domestic market and
is characterized by mark-up pricing. If the centralized actors agree on a
growth of wages throughout the whole economy, equal to the growth of
labour productivity in the 'world market sector', the labour coats per
product of the latter sector will not rise and its profit-ahare will be
left unharmed. As productivity growth of the 'domestic sector' is often
lower, end given the possibility of mark-up pricing, wage growth leads to
rising product prices in this sector. These views on the desirable outcome
of centralized wage bargaining seemed to a certain measure to be
compatible.
Only representatives of labour and capital are supposed to
negotiate on weges: the state does not figure as an actor in the
bargaining process. Wage drift occurs and is considered to be a danger for
the centralized system. Although profit and wage shares are certainly part
of the discussion on warranted wage growth, wage bargaining is not
considered to be a macro-economic instrument, as it is for example in
Austria (see above). 'Counter-cyclical policies' or analogous policies are
not common.
This 'model' of centralized wage bargaining came under great
pressure in the years 1969-1970. At grassroot level, labour militancy rose
and wildcat strikes were frequent: wage drift became increasingly
important. Firms affiliated to associations of the SAF were willing to
settle plant agreements with strikers, implying higher than the 'official'
wage increases. The SAF was unable to punish these members, which proved
to be a major weakness of the centralized bargaining system (Flanagan et
al. (1983). PP- 330-332). Although the national organizations continued to
bargaín centrally in the seventies, the federations of trade unions in
particular had to take the growing expectations of their members into
account. Signals that the system was about to breakdown are partly
reflected in strike figures. In 1980 industrial conflict jumped37. In
1983, the employers' association representing firms in the metal industry
aettled a separate agreement with the (sectoral) trade unions defending
the interests of the workers in this sector. This agreement settled wage
rises that were in line with productivity developments in the metal
induatry but above the guidelines of the central actora, the LO and the
SAF. These guidelines were established on the basis of the 'solidaristic
wage policy'. Many observers (e.g. Ahlèn (1989), Lash (1985)) considered
this development as the final breakdown of Swedish centralized bargaining,
although during 1985 and 1986 central agreements were again settled
between SAF, LO and TCO. The eighties have also been characterized by the
process of 'leap-frog bargaining'. Workers in the metal sector seemed
especially to consider themselves as underpaid compared to white collar
public sector workers. The decentralized agreements with the metal
employers implied considerable wage increases, at any rate higher than the
recommendations of the federation. In reaction to this, the other trade
unions demanded wage increases of at least the same order as in the metal
sector. If these unions succeeded (and often they did), wage differentials
would remain the same, as would the incentive for the metal workers to
demand even higher wage increases in the next bargaining rounda.
Swedish atate actors do not directly interfere with the wage
bargaining process. Still, the role of the state in the total structure,
in which the bargaining processes take place, is prominent. First of all,
the Swedish public sector has grown rapidly over the last forty years and
has become the largest in the OECD-area (Esping-Andersen~Korpi (1984)).
This means that the state is itself a large employer and thus faces the
trade unions as such. It also means, that a growing part of the union
membershíp is part of the (semi-) public sector, and that this sector has
therefore obtained a larger voice in the trade union organizations.
Second, the Swedish state is femous for its active labour market policy
(see e.g. Scharpf (1984) and Meidner (1988)). A large part of this policy
ia labour-supply oriented: it tries to (re-)train workers for the
available jobs and promotes migration to the regions with (extra) tight
labour markets. In this way, the labour-market policies counteract the
collective action problems of trade unions, as they train (unemployed)
workers to become more effective competers on the labour market. In the
eighties, the volume of all labour market programs eteadily increased;
consequently a substantial demand for labour-power has come about via this




Relative number of persona in different manpower programs, Swedena
1960 1963 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
0.4 0.8 1.9 2.3 2.9 2.8 3.4 3.9 4.1
a Figures are number of persons in different manpower programs as
percentage of the labour force. Source: Meidner (1988), p. 150.
Critical commentators af the 'Swedish model' frequently pointed to the
'hidden unemployment' that these figures represent. Be it as it may,
people working in these programs temporarily do not compete on the labour
market. A third important aspect of state interference is its currency
policy. Sweden has known several substantial devaluations which have had
important consequences for the wage setting process (see below). Finally,
one may point to the frequent 'tax deals' proposed by the Swedish
government to the central organizations of labour and employers during the
seventies (Flanagan (1983). PP. 349-356). Both cuts in direct and indirect
tax rates are proposed, if wages increase moderately.
As figure 6.3 shows, unemployment has been very low in Sweden for the past
thirty years. Only during the crisis at the beginning of the eighties did
the unemployment rate increase above the three percent level. Rowever,
current unemployment is again below the two percent line. During the
fifties, the wage share was fairly stable. From 1959 to 1977 the wage
share rose continuously, except for 1973. In particular during the period
from 1974 to 1977 the wage share jumped. This development was reversed
from 1978 to 1985 when the wage share dropped again to its mid-sixties
level. Recent years show a slightly upward trend.
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Especislly from 1956 to 1980, the Swedish relations between
capital and labour can be considered as a class compromise as defined in
previous chapters. The origin of this class compromiae fits the
theoretical notions better than in the cases of the Netherlands and
Austria. The Swedish socio-economic situation in the twenties and in the
beginning of the thirties was characterized by relatively centralized
actors on the employers and workers side, a considerable level of
unemployment and a high level of industrial conflict. The 'SaltajtSbaden'
agreement in 1938 between the LO and the SAF was, therefore, plausible in
view of the prospective benefits for both actors. The state, politically
dominated by the social-democratic party since 193238, tried to support
these centralized agreements not only by providing bargaining platforms
and frequent information on economic affairs, but also by lowering profit
tax rates in order to stimulate accumulation (see Lundberg (1985). PP- 5-
12 for a description of the developments in the thirties). Neverthelesa,
it took almost twenty years before a system of centralized bargaining
became firmly established, although the federations of trade unions and
employers associations were already trying to coordinate the wage setting
behaviour of their affiliates. One of the reasons behind this long
intermediate 'gestation' period might have been the outbreak of World War
II, but it definitely also shows the difficulties centralized actors face
if they want to coordinate or direct the wage setting procesa effectively.
The highdays of the Swedish class compromise exposes some
characteristics which are in line with our theory. Unemployment remained
very low during this period, despite the growing share of labour in the
gross domestic product. For four years (1974-1977) the wage share grew
rapidly, despite centralized wage agreements. An explanation for this may
be that Swedish labour productivity growth was very low during this period
(even compared to other OECD countries). Real wage growth should therefore
be low too, in order to stabilize the level of the wage share. However.
anticipating industrial unrest at grassroot level, the centralized
representatives did not dare to risk too low wage growth. In effect, thia
can already be considered as a sign of nearing the breakdown. Needless to
say, the rising wage share had its adverse consequences for private
accumulation and employment.
The government, however, tried to 'save' the model by expanding
public sector employment and reducing unemployment rates. The costs of the
public sector expansion were borne by increasing profit-, wage- and value
added taxes. In this perspective, it was not unreasonable that the state
tried to settle 'tax deala' with the centralized actors. During the
aeventies, several attempts were made but in general they failed (Ahlèn
(1989). PP.339-340), Flanagan et al (1983). PP- 349-356). An important
reason for this failure was that tax reductions were unconditional: the
centralized actors were not bound to moderate wage increases in response
to tax reductiona. Other policies of the state must be considered more
successful. The active labour market policies are important in keeping the
labour market flexible and competitive despite the low unemployment rates.
An absence of auch policies would probably increase the 'mismatch' on the
labour market and thus an increasing inclination for wages to riae. They
therefore imply e partial solution to the collective action problem of the
trade unions (see ~ 5.2 and ~ 5.3). The policy of frequent devaluations
mitigated some of the effecte of rising wage costs. Consequently, aome
inflation has been imported as result of the worsening terms of trade.
Swedish political actors certainly have some 'preference' for low
unemployment vis-à-vis low inflation.
A final comment concerns the increasing calls on the labour side
for more decision rights, with respect to investment policies of the firm
during the seventies. A very lively debate was held between the SAF and
the representatives of labour and the political parties on the
introduction of wage-earner Funds, according to which, a part of the
equity stock should pass into the hands of workers and be controlled by
the trade unions39. This would have enabled the latter to direct the
policies of the firma. As the emergence of these funds would imply an
attack on the fundaments of the capitalist system, employers protested
vigorously. However, the existence of such funds would probably eolve some
of the collective action problems mentioned above, as uniona would be the
co-ownera of the firms and thus more sensitive to calls for wage
moderation if needed. In 1983, the socisl-democratic government installed
a law that would make the emergence of the funds poasible, despite the
criticisms of employers and the right wing parties. As Lundberg (1985, p.
30) reports, this policy will be evaluated in 1990. At this moment, no
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judgements can be made on its efectiveness, but it seems that collective
action problems of the Swedish labour organizations have not been solved.
The breakdown of centralized bargaining was already heralded by
the frequent wage drift of the previous period and was the result of its
own success. As reported, the increase of public sector employment and the
rising share of highly trained personnel in the private aector, gave more
weight to unions affiliated to the TCO and the SACO~SR. This
deconcentration process meant that unions had to compete for their
members. In the metal sector this was one of the main motives for the
blue-collar union to break away from the centralized agreements and to
deal on sectoral level with the metal employers (Lash (1985), pp. 218-
224). As unemployment is very low and trained labour power extra short in
supply, it is not too difficult for trade unions to secure wage increments
above labour productivity growth. But the high density rates in all
sectors alike makes these sectors also sensitive to equally high wage
growth, which leads to leap-frog wage bargaining. Given the cleavages
between the unions, the low unemployment rate and the high density rate,
this process is likely to go on. Until 1986 decentralized wage bargaining
had not led to increasing wage shares, on the contrary. The devaluation
policies of the Swedish state, and the ability of domestic Swedish firms
to pass on higher labour costs to higher product prices have neutralized
the wage developments. Hence, inflation has been higher than in the
Netherlands and Austria since the mid seventies as figure 6.8 shows.
One severely doubts whether this state of affairs of low
unemployment, decentralized wage bargaining, increasing public sector
employment (plus labour demand via labour market policy) and relatively
high inflation can continue. The state tried to re-establish centralized
wage bargaining by threatening to impose rigorous incomes policies in 1985
and 1986. This may work temporarily, but the wage drift process could
again start at the company level and then may be even less subject to
control. A continuous devaluation policy may not be feasible as it will
institutionalize inflationary expectations. Chances for a reappearance of
centralized agreements are not high, given the cleavages between the trade
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as there is hardly any unemployment now, it is probably very difficult for
trade unions leaders to convince their rank and file of the necessity of
wage moderation. To conclude, the probability of a new centralized class
compromise in Sweden seems very low.
6.3 Concluding remarks
The material displayed in this chapter providea a very diverse picture of
the origin, nature and consequences of class compromises. Naturally, a
atylized theory as analyzed in chapters 4 and 5 neither can nor is it
meant to explain the whole social reality. However, i t appears that the
theory can only provide a fairly general account of relevant developments
and that it cannot explain the rich diverslty of experiences with respect
to the class compromises. In order to make these remarks more precise,
some of the major theoretical points will be confronted with the empirical
facts.
There is some, but not overwhelming, evidence that nation-wide
class compromises lead to lower unemployment. The theoretical part puts
forward that the most important goal of centralized bargaining is to
decrease unemployment in order to improve the 'pay-offs' for both class
actors. The comparative research showed (recall all the caveats made in ~
6.1) a weak negative relation between the existence of corporatist
institutions (among which centralized wage bargaining is primary) and
unemployment. The relations assessed are too weak to assert firmly that
class compromises unambigously result in lower unemployment. The country
studies provided other, but equally mixed pieces of evidence. The
breakdowns of centralized bargaining in the Netherlands and Sweden have
not resulted in a downward movement of the unemployment rate, at least not
within a period of five years. The Austrian class compromise was not able
to prevent an unemployment rate of five percent. However, the country
atudies can also be interpreted in a way that gives more support to the
theory. In all three countries, the unemployment rates were very low
during the periods of explicit class compromises. The breakdown of the
Dutch system of centralized bargaining occurred during a period of rapid
economic growth in the world, preventing direct consequences for
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employment. The decline of the Swedish class compromiae was accompenied by
a quickly increasing labour demand of the government, either directly or
via labour market policy. It can be argued that the possibilities of
mitigating employment effects are worn out in the Swedish case.
In two countries, Austria and the Netherlands, the wage rate
served as an explicit instrument in order to steer other economic
variables. This is what the theory 'predicts' given class compromises.
However, the variations of goals is higher than analyzed in chapter 4.
Rebuilding war damage, precluding deterioration of the balance of
payments, and effectuating counter-cyclical policies are goals that are
neglected by the theoretical analysis. None of the actual class
compromises contain the accumulation share (or something similar) as a
policy instrument for reaching socio-economic goals. The discussion on
wage-earner funds in Sweden can be considered as an attempt of the
representatives of labour to add investment decisíons to the macroeconomic
tool-box. As was noted above, all representatives of capital fiercely
resisted such policy advises. In Sweden the wage rate may not have been an
explicit instrument for attaining macroeconomic goals during the period of
centralized wage bargaining, but the effects of the wage rate for economic
development certainly were in the minds of the bargainers as the 'EFO'-
model makes clear.
The theory did not establish a straightforward relationship
between class compromises and long-run economic growth (g 4.1 and ~ 4.2)
and the rate of unionization (g 5.1). This character of indeterminacy
aeems to be maintained by the available material. No correlation was found
in the comparative studies concerning the relationship between economic
growth and corporatism. If the economic growth figures of Netherlands and
Sweden are conaidered, there does not seem a significant change of
economic growth after the breakdown of centralized bargaining. For
example, very low growth rates of the Swedish economy already exiated
during the seventiea when the class compromise was still relatively
unimpaired. Comparative analysis on unionization showed some evidence
(although disputed) for a favourable influence of corporatism on denaity
ratea. The country studies, however, do not support such influence. In the
Netherlanda, it took fifteen years after the breakdown of centralized
bargaining before the unionization degree dropped. In Sweden, unionization
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kept on rising after 1983. We have to conclude that no really convincing
empirical data are present to bring to an end the debate introduced in ~
5.1.
Direct state interference with respect to centralized wage
bargaining did not appear to be necessary, as the cases of Austris and
Sweden show. In all three countries, some state policies were employed to
stabilize the class compromise. But the national divergences have been
large. In the Netherlands, the state directly intervened by giving a law-
like character to the central agreements between federations of trade
unions and employers' associations. As a result the primary actors causing
wage drift were firms paying 'illegally' higher wages to attract scarce
labour power. The Austrian state supported the already strongly
centralized power of the representatives of labour and capital. Although
these actors could not control the behaviour of lower level members
completely, a comparatively high level of discipline is present. The most
important policies of the Swedish state are both ex ante and ex post
fighting collective action problems. The ex ante strategy consists of the
extensive labour market policies, which are meant to make the tight labour
market more flexible. Ex-post the Swedish state supported the class
compromise by the devaluation policies to mitigate the effects of
excessive wage increases.
In all three countries, especially in the Netherlands and Sweden,
the welfare state expanded during the period 1950-1980. The (non-
)existence of concertational institutions is considered to be a partíal
explanation for this rise. Comparative analysis did not support such an
explanation. The cases of Sweden and the Netherlands showed that
concertational institutions did not cease to exist after the breakdown of
the class compromise. The precise reasons behind the rise of concertation
in several European countries remain hard to find. Although it may be
expected that organizations of workers pressure for a higher level of
welfare state measures, and thus, try to use concertational structures,
employers' associations 'should' resist such a rise: the existence of
concertation does not necessarily imply a higher level of the welfare
atate in this respect.
The theory (see esp. ~ 4.2) hardly explains the specific origins
of the class compromises in the three countries under consideration. The
184
major occasion (although maybe not the major cause) behind the Dutch and
Austrian class compromises is the damage the World War II caused to these
countries. The Swedish class compromise does seem more in line with the
theory, but from purely economic reasoning the afore mentioned period of
eighteen years, between the first nation-wide agreement and actual
centralized bargaining, remains hard to understand. Specific historical
and cultural arguments are likely to be much more important.
The final remarks of this chapter and the study will be quite
cautious. The theory is not fitted to predict future developments with
reapect to clase compromises. At the end of the diacussion about each
country, some remarks were made concerning the likelihood of a change in
the near future. Firmer judgments do not seem to be warranted.
Instability, and thereby, change of wage setting institutions runs like a
continuous thread throughout the study. To point to instability and
possibilities of changes is one thing: to predict the timing of change is
quite something else. This question however, remains open.
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APPENDIX CHAPTER 6
Sources of levels and changes in wage share, inflation, unionization and
unemployment rates of Austria, Netherlands and Sweden
Wage share: Changes in wage share are adapted from OECD figures on
"Compensation of employees; current prices" and "Grosa domestic Product
current prices". These figures appear in National accounts, main
aggregates, different issues and Statistical annex of OECD Economic
Surveys, Austria, Netherlands and Sweden, different issues. The wage share
is here defined as the fraction of 'compensation of employees' and 'gross
domestic product'. Changes are percentage points with respect to previous
year.
Unemployment: Sources of unemployment rates are Reference Statiatics,
OECD-Economic Outlook, different issues and manpower statistics ( GECD),
different issues. Changes are percentage points with respect to previous
year.
Unionization: Source is Visser (1989)
Inflation: Source is OECD, Economic outlook (i989)
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Tne[,E 6.4
CORPORATISM AND GROWfR RATES GDP, OECD AREA
Ranking Dependent X-coefficient r2
variablea
i (c~D (c)) '60-'80 0.033 (0.579) o.oz
2 (C~D (h)) o.oió (0.254) 0.00
3 (cam) 0.070 (1.14) 0.09
4 (B~s) 0.034 (0.540) 0.02
i '60-'73 0.068 (0.986) 0.06
2 (I) 0.043 (0.558) 0.02
3 o.io5 (i.438) o.i3
4 0.045 (0.584) 0.02
1 '74-'80 -0.026 (0.464) 0.02
2 (ii) -0.040 (0.667) 0.03
3 0.007 (o.ii5) o.oo









a The dependent variables are the average growth rates of the
countries considered in the period indicated in the column. Source: OECD




Ranking Dependent X-coefficient r2
variablea
1 C~D c Unionization -2.37 (4.39) 0.58
2 C~D h average -1.05 (1.21) 0.10
3 B~s '65-'82 -1.33 (1.58) 0.15
4 Cam -2.60 (4.41) 0.58
a Source: Cameron (1984, p.165)
TABLE 6.6
CORPORATISM AND LEVELS PUBLIC EXPENDITURE ~ GDP, SOCIAL SECURITY OUTLAYS ~
GDPa
Ranking Dependent X-coefficient r2
variable
Gov~GDP -0.073 (0.32) 0.008
1950 0.057 (0.21) 0.0057
-O.oo65 (0.03) o.ooo
0.021 (0.08) 0.0006
Gov~GDP -0.6 (1.94) 0.24
1975 0.33 (0.80) 0.05
-0.33 (0.85) 0.06
-0.40 (1.05) 0.08
SocS~GDP -0.19 (1.12) 0.10
1962 0.07 (0.39) o.ol
-0.09 (0.5) 0.02
-0.30 (1.88) 0.23
SocS~GDP -0.29 (1.81) 0.22
1972 -0.02 (o.il) 0.001
-0.22 (1.22) 0.11
-0.4z (3.23) 0.45
a Source: Korpi (1980), p. 312. The sample of 16 countries is
used, except for Japan. The first two regression blocks also exclude
Australia, while the second block excludes Switzerland.
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TaBC.E 6.7
CORPORATISM AND STRIKE FIGURES40
Ranking Dependent X-coefficient r2
variable
1 Cameron 27.2 (2.47) 0.30
2 10.9 (0.77) 0.04
3 31.0 (2.61) 0.334 43.24 (4.97) 0.64
1 Korpi~ 37.6 (1.15) 0.09
2 Shalev I 76.0 (2.44) 0.30
3 82.4 (2.73) 0.354 80.7 (2.65) 0.33
1 Korpi~ 37.4 (1.39) o.i2
2 Shalev II 66.6 (2.56) 0.32
3 76.0 (3.15) 0.42
4 71.6 (2.85) 0.37
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Notes
1 I advise the reader who did not study the theoretical part to consult
the summary and ~ 5.4 first, in order to get some provisionary idea what
the theory is all about.
2 In the sequel to this section this ranking (Calmfors~Driffill (1988))
will be compared with others and commented. It is only used here as an
example.
3 Their study contains a large amount of different influences on the
inter-country differences in unemployment rate. Except for the 'rate of
corporatism' all hypothesized relations are correlated. As they did not
use a'ranking' of corporatism, it was not possible to obtain a
correlation coefficient here.
4 Except for the 'U-index' of Calmfors, Driffill (the four lowest rows
of table 6.3). Comments on this ranking will be made below.
5 An extra point of criticism concerns the lack of topicality of the
institutional data used. For example, part of the data used by Bruno and
Sachs to constitute their ranking is adapted from Crouch (1985b). Crouch
in turn used data from an article by Romanis (196~). She establishes her
results on research dating from the beginning of the sixties. I think this
is a major reason for the high place the Netherlands occupy in the ranking
of Bruno and Sachs. However, an important inference from the theory
analyzed in chapters 4 and 5 is, that institutions like centralized
bargaining do not have to live forever.
6 The procedure by which both authors derive their 'U-shaped' ranking
struck me as rather arbitrary, especially in the light of the usually
highly sophisticated analyses (with respect to the use of mathematics) of
Driffill.
~ The Japanese statistics hide unemployed figures, like uaually defined
in the OECD-area. Only fully unemployed people are registered as such.
Even working only one hour a week means that a Japanese worker is
considered as employed.
8 Of course, the theory does not establish the amount of time that is
needed for such adjustment processes.
9 Korpi does not use explicitly the concept corporatism as explanans but
rather a ranking of countries based on the political and economic strength
of the working-class. However, to establish the latter he uses criteria
that strongly resembles the criteria of the 'corporatism rankings', namely
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concentration and centralization of working-clasa representatives and the
unionization degree (see further, g 3.2).
SO Political economic analyses of the welfare atate are ubiquitous.
Introductory references include Alber (1988), Gough (1975) and Ringen
(1987).
11 An important reaearcher in the relevant field (Shalev (1978)) uaed the
paraphrase, 'there are lies, damned lies and strike stetistics' (as the
title of a paper to indicate the unreliability of strike data).
12 It ia not my intention to downgrade cultural backgrounds as auch, on
the contrary, but they are not the primary subject of discussion here.
13 In the international literature, which is strongly Anglo-Saxion
dominated, socio-economic developmenta are much more familiar (popular7)
among researchers in Sweden than those of Austria and the Netherlands. I
will not dwell on exposing arguments behind the Swedish popularity, but it
is a matter of fact there is much more material available on Sweden than
on the other countries. With respect to the Netherlanda, this can only be
an advantage, as I already have disproportionally more knowledge about
wage-setting and political institutions of this country than about the
other two. And, consequently, the case of Auatria may be relatively badly
documented in my account.
14 A good comprehensive overview on the development of Dutch industrial
relations is Windmuller et al. (1985). The original version was publiahed
in English (1969). Other sources used are Akkermans (1978), Flanagen et
al. (1983), OECD, The Netherlands (various issues), Reynaerts (1982), v.
Riel (1988), Smith (1988), and v. Voorden (1984).
15 For an introduction to the background of the Dutch 'pillara', see
Lijphart (1968).
16 It is atill increasing. At the time of writing this etudy, a debate is
going on between the two most important national federationa of employers'
easociationa ("Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen" (VNO) and
"Nederlands Chriatelijk Werkgeversverbond" (NCW)) to merge into one
organization. Many firms are presently a member of both federationa,
either dírectly or via their sectoral organization.
17 This can be illuatrated by the fact that the umbrelle federation of
these uniona ("Rsad van Overleg voor Middelbear en Hoger Peraoneel"
(ROMHP)) has occupied a seat in an important Dutch national consultancy
institute, the 'Social Economic Council' ("Socieal Economiache Rasd"
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(SER)) since 1976. Formerly, only general labour federations were
represented in this council.
18 See further Smith (1988) for a discussion on pre-World War II
corporatist institutions in the Netherlands.
19 Instead of 'independent experts' one would expect to find state
representatives in this body. But, as is typical of the Dutch political-
economic culture, independence from politics is highly ranked: disputes
'should' be settled using purely 'scientific' arguments. A similar
cultural phenomenon can be observed during election timea: all major
political parties send their programs to the Central Economic Planning
Agency in order to compute the financial and economic effecta of their
specific proposals. The media consider the 'winning' of these computations
as a major political success, as this political program is the obviously
beat, being based on 'undisputed, hard economic facts'.
20 In the Netherlands, the wage share is commonly measured by the
"Arbeidsinkomensquote" (Labour income share). The numerator of this ahare
not only contains wages proper but also an imputed wage to self-employed
people. The development of this labour income share shows a constancy in
the fifties as compared with a rising wage share (see: Centraal Economiach
Plan, different issues). The rise of the latter in this period may be due
to the decline of the number of self-employed people during thia period.
21 Unemployment rates of 1 or 2 percent of the active labour force are
well below any current estimate of 'natural unemployment'. This at least
is an empirical objection against the adjective 'natural'.
22 The following references have been used: Czada (1983), Esping-
Andersen, Korpi (1984), Flanagan et al (1983), Katzenstein (1984), (1985).
Marin (1985), Nowotny (1982), OECD, economic surveys, Austria (various
issues), Pollan (1982), Scharpf (1984) and Windmuller (1981).
23 Besides these two chambers there is the chamber of agriculture, a
similar organization for farmers' interests.
24 Windmuller (1981) provides a comparison of a number of OECD-countries
with respect to the concentration of union structure and the developments
of this concentration. Austria stands out as having a uniquely
concentrated union organization.
25 Nowotny (1982, p. 122) provides some (1979) figures showing the share
of the state in industrial production. 31 percent of the net income is
generated by state-owned enterprises and 18 percent of the Auatrian labour
force is employed by these enterprises. Katzenstein (1984, pp. 49-59)
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gives an overview on the structure of the nationalized sector and notes
that state-owned enterprises are particularly repreaented in the basic
industries and the sectors manufacturing semí-finished products.
26 This political atructure has led to the emergence of the so-called
"Proporz-system" (cf. Nowotny (1982). P. 122) which means that both
partiea proportionally divide all public posts among persona affiliated to
these parties. If an (SVP-candidate is appointed on a particular level, the
next candidate for a similar function must come from the SP~-camp.
27 This policy can be compared with Switzerlanda'; although the measurea
of the latter were more severe. See for a comparison: Katzenatein (1984),
pp. 80, 81. Austria 'exports' its unemployment in a different way too: a
conaiderable number of the Austrian labour force is seasonally employed
and works in other countries (especially in Germany and Switzerland)
outside the season.
28 The same term is used in Germany and in the Netherlands. However, in
Austria the term is accepted by agents of ell major political streams,
which oppose the conservative flavour of the term, particularly Germany.
29 Pollan (1982, pp. 169-171) provides alternative figures on the
development of the wage share during the period 1955-1982. These figurea
ahow that the global rise of the wage share is due to the relative riae of
the number of employees and the decline of the number of self-employed.
However, as with the development of the similar 'labour income share' in
the Netherlands, these recomputed figures do not lead to different
conclusions with respect to the development of the wage share. Pollan
(ibid, p. 167) also gives an explanation for the sharp increase of the
wage share in 1975: a11 centralized actors overestimated economic growth
and the rate of inflation for 1975 during the bargaining rounds in the
fall of 1974. Consequently, the negotiated wage increases only appeared to
be 'too' high in retrospect.
30 Naturally, one must take into account that there has not been much
reason for state agents to interfere, as the representativea of both
classes have shown that they are capable to cope with these problems
themaelves.
31 Eaping-Andersen and Korpi (1984) obtain this concluaion from e
comparison with respect to the Scandinavian countries and Germany. Fiscal
redistribution and labour-market expenditures in particular are relatively
low in Auatria (ibid, p. 199).
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32 The industrial sector of Austria was, up to the beginning of the
aeventies, fairly well protected (see Katzenstein (1984)).
33 The following references have been used: Ahlen (1989). Andersson
(1988), Elder (1988), Esping-Andersen, Korpi (1984), Flanagan et al
(1983), Fulcher (1987), Korpi (1983), Lash (1985), Lash, Urry (1987),
Lundberg (1985), Meidner (1988), Newell, Symona (1987), OECD (various
issues), Scharpf (1984), Windmuller (1981).
34 Figures are from Visser (1989). PP. 196-197 and refer to 'gross'
membership (incl. retired workers who are still trade union members). The
density rate dropped in 1963, but this was due to another computing method
(ibid, p. 191).
35 This type of agreement is probably the kind Przeworski (1986) had in
mind when he talked about "class compromises": workers acknowledge the
capitalists' prerogative with respect to the management of firms while
capitalists consent to economic and political working-class organization.
36 See Lundberg (1985, p. 21). 'EFO' contains the first letters of the
surnames of the economists involved in publishing the model; GtSSta Edgren,
Karl-Olof Faxén and Clas-Erik Odhner.
37 The numbers of working-days (thousands) lost in the Swedish economy as
a result of industrisl conflicts in the period 1978 to 1987 were: 1978:
37.13. 1979: 28.66, 1980: 4478.5. 1981: 209.14, 1982: 1.76, 1983: 36.92,
1984: 31.29. 1985: 504.21, 1986: 682.65, 1987: 14.73. Source: ILO (1988).
To compare these figures with the levels of industrial conflict in Austria
and the Netherlands, I computed an index based of the average number of
working-days lost in the period 1978-1987, corrected for employment
levels. If the Netherlands is set at 100, Austria has an index value of 11
while Sweden scores 752. The latter value however, becomes 214 if the year
1980 is dropped (Source, ILO (1988)).
38 From 1932 to 1976, the social-democratic party was incumbent, among
which several periods in a coalition cabinet. In such cabinets, the social
democrats were the dominant political power. After the conservative
'interlude', from 1976 to 1982, the social democrats regained political
power.
39 The original proposals of the LO are introduced and commented by
Meidner (1978).
40 Cameron figures measure the yearly average of the number of days loat
in industrial disputes per 1000 members of the total labour force for the
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period 1965-1981. The figurea are adapted from the ILO, Yearbook of Labour
Statiatice.
Korpi and Shalev (1979) Measure the yearly average of the arithmetic (I)
and the geometric ( II) mean of the number of workers involved in atrikea
per 10.000 persona in the nonagricultural labor force for the period 1946-
1976.
List of used symbols
In sections 2.2 and 5.1, and appendix 4.5.II, a different notation is
used. If suffixes or superfixes are used, the definition of the variable
below is adjusted. Specific meanings are indicated in the text.
K Capital stock a Wage share
Y Income g Employment rate











n Number of trade unions
j Deviating trade unions
U Goal level trade unions
u Value control variable trade unions
x Output-capital coefficient P [xa]
a parameter accumulation quote
K Parameter growth rate of labour productivity
~ Parameter growth rate wages
y Parameter growth rate labour supply
b Discount factor
~ Tax rate
~ Relative level unemployment benefits
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SUMMARY
This dissertation treats a problem which originally stema from
Marxist political economic thinking: why do representativea of the
working-class compromise with representatives of the capitalist class on
major socio-economic topics on a national level in capitalist societies,
and what do such compromises look like? The problem is addresaed by
assuming that both classes have a real atake in these compromiaes. This
dces not imply that each class prefers the outcome of the compromise to be
optimal: agreements are studied that may not bear a societal consensus
towards the agreements. Although the problem has a Marxist background, the
theories and methods which are used are not necessarily of a Marxist
nature. In order to derive meaningful conclusions, aeveral typea of
(political) economic approaches are used.
Chapter two treats the background of the problem. As a capitalist
society is by nature a system where an important number of interests of
workers and capitalists oppose, arguments have to be provided as to why
expected conflicts often stay below the aurface: capitalists and workera
(or their representatives) are surprisingly often inclined to preserve
relatively peacefully industrial and political relations. In the economic
literature, the argument behind such relations is elaborated in models
that view upon classes as more or less organized actors on the national
level. The interaction of the classes is studied as a dynamic non-
cooperative game. One of the more recent contributiona to this debate
(Mehrling (1986)) concludes, that purely non-cooperative behaviour of
organized classes leads to sub-optimal economic outcomes. Inter alia, such
outcomes are characterized by a particular level of unemployment which is
higher than in the case of explicit agreements between organized classes.
Several critical remarks on this paper, as well as on its predecessors,
form the basis of the major theoretical part of the analysis at hand.
The tackling of this problem, using game-theoretical methods, is a
rather recent development: up to the end of the sixties, Marxist theoriats
mainly attempted to address the original problem by arguing that workers
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did not perceive their 'real' interests. The state and the media were
thought to legitimíze capitalist society successfully: workera' perception
of capitaliam as a system based on exploitation of labour power, was
effectively distorted by agents of the capitalist class. In chapter two
this broadly interpreted view is specified using notions of power which
were put forward by Lukes (1974). In the sequence, several arguments are
provided as to why I do not pursue this line of reasoning and, instead,
try to derive arguments behind class compromises assuming that the
perception of both classes of society is not (systematically) diatorted.
The type of Marxist theoriea discussed in chapter 2 do not (or
hardly) specify what 'organized classes' are. Moreover, the introduction
of the state as an actor, interfering with compromisea between both
classes, ís often only functionally argued. Chapter 3 tries to deal with
some of the problems resulting from these relatively 'blank spots'. I
atart with an account of the goals of national representatives of classes
in developed capitaliat democracies, the federationa of trade unions and
employers' associations, following several streams in industrial relations
literature. This account leads to major criticism on the dynamic game
theoretic modele discussed in the previous chapter: here it was easerted
that organized capitalists are able to manipulate the macro-accumulation
quote (that part of profits which is invested) as a control variable in
order to reach their goals. In chapter 3 it is concluded that no
macrceconomic variable is subject to control of any one class: national
federations of trade unions and employers' associations only bargain on
variables concerning (general) labour conditions.
The chapter continues with an examination of the relevant
literature concerning the conaequences of bargaining on a more centralized
level. The debate is summarized and criticized following the contribution
of Olson (1982) who assumes a'U-shaped' relation between the level of
bargaining and macroeconomic performance: if the bargaining level is
highly decentralized, economic performance is relatively high, as it ia
when bargaining takes place on a highly centralized (national) level;
intermediate cases result in the worst performances. Again the literature
in this section dces not treat the role of the atate satisfactorily.
Therefore, a section is devoted to the concept 'corporatism' which ia
frequently discusaed in political science literature. First, a definition
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of corporatism is provided which tries to capture the moat important
characteristics of this concept. I then confront it with the relevant
literature on the subject. The most important espect of the concept
corporatism, as it is used here, is the strict macro-character of it and
the occurrence of several types of centralized interaction between state
agenta, federations of trade unions and federationa of employers'
associations.
Chapter 4 begins with a formulation of a dynamic macroeconomic
model which analyzes a capitalist economy where workers and firms bargain
on the growth rate of wages on decentralized level. The only endogenous
variable which determines wages is the employment rate. If thía rate (the
fraction of labour supply and demand) Falls, the relative power of workera
declines and possibilities for wage growth diminish. M elaboration of the
model leads to the conclusion, that enduring stable unemployment is likely
to result, given the type of wage formation. If centralized
representatives of workers and firms acknowledge such a stable rate of
unemployment, they might both conclude that such unemployment is aub-
optimal, as both would benefit from a higher employment rate. That is,
within certain restrictions, which are violated if the institution of
decentralized wage formation does not change. It is only poasible to
increase the employment rate if this institutional feature changes, i.e.
if the centralized federations bargain on a national level. M example is
elaborated which shows the dynamics of such an institutional change.
The analyses of the first two sections of this chapter ahowed that
explicit class compromises are possible without the interference of state
agents. However, in numerous contributions in the literature, the
importance of state interference, with respect to such compromises, is
emphasized. Thus, in the last two sections of chapter 4 the state is
introduced in the model. First, the efficiency of several types of
economic policy, with regard to a permanent reductíon of the unemployment
rate, is analyzed in cese of decentralized wage formation. It is concluded
that the efficiency of such types of economic policy is low. Then,
different types of arguments are put forward which ground motivations for
state agents to stimulate class compromises as analyzed above, with
resulting lower unemployment. Examples are provided which ahow how the
atate is able to interfere in the agreements between centralized
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representatives of workers and firms, and which ahow the effecta oP such
types of interferences.
1~o appendices close this chapter. Appendix I elaboratea a
complication of the basic model. The second appendix provides a brief
overview on a number of the main themes of formal bargaining theory, in
order to argue the non-use of this type of theory in the main text of the
chapter. In a atatic analysis, the argument behind the switch from
decentralized bargaining to centralized bargaining could very well be
complemented by formal bargaining theory. The dynamics of the approach
show however, at least in my view, otherwise.
Chapter 4 provides an argument on why central representatives of
firms and workers are motivated to settle compromises and stick to these
compromisea. However, in many developed capitalist countriea, centralized
wage bargaining does not occur, or seems susceptible to breaking down.
Chapter 5 addresses this problem. First, the theory of collective action
is introduced including the recent contributions to this debate. It ia
concluded, that this theory does not support any assertion about the
ínfluence of corporatist structures on the individual choice of e worker
or a fírm, with regard to the contribution to the collective action of his
class organization. But this 'collective action theory' can be used to
ahow that the outcome of the explicit class compromise, as analyzed in the
previous chapter, can be characterized as a collective good. Lower level
trade unions and employers' associations (as well as individual firms and
workers) are inclined to utilize the high employment rate in order to
obtain (temporarily) high benefits. There exists a major stimulus for the
process of wage drift to occur, especielly if lower level class
organizations have a short time horizon and if they diacount future
benefita strongly.
As was argued before, state agents are motivated to support
explicit class compromises. Thus, it might be expected that they will try
to counteract the diaposition to instability. In fact, this appears to be
a major explanation for 'corporatist institutions' to emerge. A number of
these institutions are dealt with and it is concluded that they are only
noderately effective; they cannot remove the background of the collective
action problem.
2i5
Up to chapter 6, the discussion is overwhelmingly theoretical. The
last chapter attempts to tie this theoretical discuaeion to political
economic developments in a number of developed capitalist democraciea.
First, the existing empirical literature with respect to the influence of
corporatism or centralized bargaining on macrceconomic performance ia
aeverely criticized. Often, 'rankings' of countries are constructed which
aerve as explanatory variables in regression equations that try to
determine variables measuring economic performance. As there are major
differences between the rankings and as they are very sensitive to the
specific sample of countries and the period under consideration, thia type
of research dces not seem to be very satisfactory. On the other hand, the
model that is introduced in chapters 4 and 5, is too abstract in order to
function as a basis for regression analyais. Therefore, the developments
with respect to the wage setting institutions in three developed
capitalist democracies (Netherlands, Austrie and Sweden) in the past forty
to sixty years are analyzed, together with the developments of the wage
share and the employment rate. It can be concluded, that the theoretical
arguments that have been constructed are useful in explaining part of the
relevant experiences of the countries that function as examples, although
an important number of differences in the country-specific experiences can
be distinguished.
DYNAMISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSTHEORIE
herausgegeben von Peter Flaschel und Michael KrBger
Band 1 Reiner Franke: Production Prices and Dynamical Processes of the Gravitation of Market
Prioss. 1987.
Band 2 Peter FlasdieVMichael Kruger (eds.): Recent Approaches to Economic Dynamics.
Conference Volume (Bielefeki: 7-91h October,1987). 1988.
Band 3 Richard M. Goodwin: Essays in Nonlinear Ecoramic Dynamics. Collected Papers 19tt0-
1987. 1988.
Band 4 Peter Skott: Kaldor's Gmwth And Distribution Theory. 1989.
Band 5 Jobst H. Thalenhorst: Die Zeitstruldur der Produktion als Ursache bkonomischer
Dynamik.1989.
Band 6 Volker Bieta: Strategische Mbglichkeiten fOr die Gestallung von ZentralbankpoliUken. Eine
spieltheoretische Analyse.1990.
Band 7 DimiVios Malliaropubs: Eurorr~rkte und nadonale FinanzmarMe. Geldmenge, Zins und
Wechselkurs einer EurowAhrung. Eine theoretische und empirische Analyse des Euro-
DM-Marktes. 1990.
Band 8 Thomas Lux: Keynesianische Stabilisierungspoli6k in Neokeynesianischen Modellen.
1990.
Band 9 Torsten Vogt: Technischer Fortschritt und PreisenMricklung. 1991.
Band 10 Marco Wilke: Corporatism and the Stability of Capitalist Democracies. 1991.
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SAMENVATTING
De probleemstelling van het proefschrift komt voort uit het
Marxiatisch politiek-economische gedachtengoed: Waerom zijn
vertegenwoordigers ven de arbeidersklasse bereid om compromisaen te
aluiten met vertegenwoordigers van ondernemingen over belangrijke socieal-
economische onderwerpen, en welke vorm nemen dergelijke compromisaen aan?
We veronderstellen dat beide klassen daedwerkelijk belang hebben bij
compromisvorming. Dat betekent niet dat elk specifiek compromis optimaal
is voor beide actoren: een compromis impliceert niet noodzekelijkerwijze
een mastschappelijke consensus ten opzichte van de uitkomst van het
compromis. Hcewel de probleemstelling een Marxistische achtergrond heeft,
zullen theorieën en methodes uit allerlei stromingen van de sociale
wetenschappen gebruikt worden om de argumenten te ondersteunen.
De achtergrond van de probleemstelling wordt verder behandeld in
hoofdstuk twee. Een kapitalistische economie berust per definitie op
belangentegenstellingen tussen ondernemingen en arbeidera. Aangezien
openlijke conflicten veak uitblijven, vertegenwoordigers van ondernemingen
en werknemers zijn vaak geneigd tot 'vreedzame' relaties binnen arbeids-
en politieke verhoudingen, mcet een politiek-economische analyse uitwijzen
waarom. De economische literatuur behendelt relaties tussen
vertegenwoordigers van ondernemingen en werknemers op macro-economiach
niveau in een niet-cotlperatief dynamisch apeltheoretiach model. Een
recente bijdrage op dit terrein (Mehrling, 1986) concludeert dat niet-
cot3peratief gedrag van ondernemingen en werknemers leidt tot sub-optimale
economische uitkomsten. Met name de werkloosheid is, gegeven dergelijk
gedrag, hoger dan het geval zou zijn indien georgeniseerde klasaen
expliciete overeenkomsten zouden sluiten. Een kritische atudie van deze
benadering vormt de basis van de rest van het proefschrift.
Het gebruik van speltheoretische technieken om bovenateand probleem
te analyseren is relatief jong: tot het eind van de jaren zeatig hebben
Marxistische theoretici met name geprobeerd om te wijzen op het vermeende
verschil tussen de 'werkelijke' belangen van de arbeidersklasse en de
218
geYnterpreteerde of 'subjectieve' belangen van de arbeidersklasse. De
atsat werd geacht een succesvol instrument te zijn in dienst van de
kapitalistische klasse om het kapitalistisch systeem te legitimeren zodat
werknemers niet in staat zouden zijn om de onderliggende
uitbuitingsrelaties te herkennen. Deze opvatting wordt gepreciseerd met
behulp van de machtstheorie van Lukes (1974). Vervolgens wordt ze
bekritiseerd waarna ik beargumenteer dat een analyse betreffende
compromisvorming tussen klassen die gebaseerd ia op de veronderstelling
dat klassen hun belangen juist inschatten, zinvoller is.
Bijna alle theorievorming in het tweede hoofdstuk is op hoog
abstract niveau. Zo worden ondermeer de dcelstellingen van
klassenorganisaties en de staat niet volledig geëexpliciteerd. Hoofdstuk
drie is -mede- gewijd aan een poging om deze leemte te vullen. Korte
typologiegn over de doelstellingen van nationale federaties van
werknemers- en werkgeversverenigingen worden verstrekt op basis van de
relevante literatuur. Deze typologieën leiden tot een belangrijke kritiek
op de speltheoretische benadering, zoals geYntroduceerd in het vorige
hoofdstuk: het blijkt dat er, op macro-economisch niveau, geen werkelijke
'contr8le-variabelen' zijn. Zo veronderstellen de speltheoretici dat de
'accumulatiequote' - het gedeelte van de winsten dat geYnvesteerd wordt -
door vertegenwoordigers van de kapitalistische klasse gemanipuleerd kan
worden om hun doelstellingen te bereiken. Deze, en hieraan gerelateerde
veronderstellingen blijken onhoudbaar: de nationale federaties
onderhandelen slechts over arbeidsvoorwasrden in een beperkt eantal
kapitalistische landen.
Vervolgens wordt de literatuur becommentarieerd die de macro-
economische gevolgen van dergelijke centralistische onderhandelingen
onderzoekt, naar aanleiding van een stelling van Mancur Olson (1982). Deze
auteur beweert dat onderhandelingen tussen werknemers en werkgevers op
extreem decentraal niveau (de onderneming) alsmede op extreem centrasl
niveau (de totale economie) leiden tot de beste economische uitkomsten.
Aangezien met name tussenliggende onderhandelingsniveaus leiden tot
slechte economische uitkomsten kan gesproken worden van een 'U-vormige'
hypothese. De literatuur rondom deze hypothese is gefixeerd op het
onderhandelingsniveau en schenkt slechts weinig aandacht aan de rol van de
ataat. Dit staat in schril contrast met de politicologische analyses die
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juist de rol van de staat met betrekking tot de relaties tussen werkgevera
en werknemera beklemtonen. Met name het concept 'corporatiame' speelt hier
een centrale rol. Ik verstrek een eigen definiering van dit concept en
confronteer deze opvatting met de relevante literatuur.
In hoofdstuk vier worden voorgaande diacuasies en aspecten
behandeld in een dynamisch macro-economisch model. Verondersteld wordt
dat, indien werkgevers en werknemers op decentraal nivo onderhandelen, de
werkloosheidsgraad de enige endogene variabele is die de uitkomsten van de
onderhandelingen - de groeivoet van de lonen - bepaald. Een hoge
werkloosheidsgraad verzwakt de machtspositie van vakbonden en daarmee hun
capaciteit om (hoge) looneisen af te dwingen. Uit het model volgt een
stabiel tijdspad van de belangrijkste economische variabelen wearin aprake
is van een structurele werkloosheidsvoet. De centrale vertegenwoordigers
van werkgevers en werknemers, de federaties van vakbonden en
werkgeversverenigingen, beschouwen deze werkloosheid als verlies van
potentiële productiefactoren en zouden derhalve een hoger niveau van
werkgelegenheid willen bereiken. Dit is echter enkel mogelijk indien de
institutionele omgeving waarin loononderhandelingen plastsvinden wordt
veranderd. Het compromis tussen klassen bestaat juist uit een dergelijke
verandering: indien de federaties op centraal niveau over
arbeidsvoorwaarden onderhandelen is een vermindering van de
werkloosheidsgraad mogelijk. Een voorbeeld van een dergelijk compromis,
met het bijbehorende dynamische pad van de economie, wordt uitgewerkt.
Uit dit gedeelte van de analyse blijkt dat in principe compromissen
tussen klassen mogelijk zijn, zonder ingrijpen van de steat. Veel
bijdragen uit de literatuur benadrukken echter het belang van
staatsbemoeienis bij dergelijke afspraken. Om deze reden wordt het
basismodel uitgebreid met een 'publieke sector'. Vervolgens wordt de
effectiviteit van verschillende beleidsinstrumenten van de staat
geanalyseerd met betrekking tot het bestrijden van werkloosheid, gegeven
decentrale onderhandelingen. Het blijkt dat op korte termijn verschillende
opties mogelijk en effectief zijn, maar dat op lange termijn de
werkloosheid op haar structurele niveau terugvalt. Het is derhalve
voorstelbaar dat de staat centrale onderhandelingen tussen werkgevers en
werknemers zal ondersteunen, aangezien dergelijke onderhandelingen wèl dit
structurele niveau kunnen beYnvloeden. Voorbeelden van een dergelijk
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stastsingrijpen worden geschetst. Bovendien worden, vanuit verschillende
politiek-economische invalshceken, de motivaties van politieke actoren
geschetst om werklooaheid te beatríjden en centrale onderhandelingen te
onderateunen.
Met twee appendices wordt het hoofdstuk afgesloten. Eén dasrvan
analyseert de gevolgen van een complicatie in het basiamodel. De tweede
appendix geeft een overzicht van enkele belangrijke resultaten van de
formele onderhandelstheorieën. Aangezien ik deze reaultaten niet verwerk
in mijn analyse, geef ik met dit overzicht, en de hierop eanaluitende
kritiek, aen waarom.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt de 'logica' van compromissen tussen klassen
eangegeven en daarmee de instabiliteit ven een aysteem wasr op decentraal
niveau onderhandeld wordt. Toch lijkt het er op dat in de meeste
ontwikkelde kapitalistische economieën centrale onderhandelingen over
arbeidsvoorwasrden geen belangrijke rol apelen. Blijkbaar zíjn dergelijke
onderhandelingen ook instabiel. Hoofdstuk 5 gsat verder op dit probleem
in. Allereerst wordt de theorie van de 'logica van collectieve actie'
kritisch beaproken. De invlced van corporatistische structuren op de
individuele keuze om bij te dragen aan de collectieve actie van de klasse
wordt onderzocht en er wordt geconcludeerd dat er geen positieve of
negatieve effecten zijn te verwachten. Vervolgens worden de effecten en de
motivatiea van vakbonden en werkgeversverenigingen om bij te dragen aan de
centrale onderhandelingen geanalyseerd. Het blijkt dat (de uitkomat van)
de centrale onderhandelingen beschouwd kunnen worden als een collectief
gced, en dat de decentrale actoren geneigd zijn om zich ala een soort
'free-rider'op te stellen.
Aangezien eerder betoogd i s dat politieke actoren hun eigen redenen
hebben om compromissen tussen kleasen te ondersteunen, ia het te
verwachten dat deze actoren de instabiliteit van dergelijke compromissen
zullen proberen te bestrijden. De middelen die hun hier ter beschikking
staan blijken juiat de corporatistische structuren te zijn: corporatisme
en klassencompromis worden zo ale concepten met elkaer vervlochten.
Overigens kan de steat niet de achtergrond van de instabiliteit ven het
klassencompromis wegnemen.
De diacussie is tot en met hoofdatuk vijf hoofdzakelijk van
theoretisch karakter. In hoofdstuk zes wordt geprobeerd om deze
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theoretische discussie enigzins te koppelen aan een aantal empirische
bevindingen. In de eerste plaats worden vergelijkende landenatudiea, die
de effecten van corporatisme en~of centrale onderhandelingen tussen
werknemers en werkgevers op een aantal economische variabelen - wsaronder
werkloosheid - meten, besproken en grondig bekritiseerd. De methodea die
gehanteerd worden zijn te gevoelig voor manipulaties van onderzoekers om
zinvolle resultaten op te leveren. Geconcludeerd wordt dat het zinvoller
is om een aantal 'landenstudies' op te stellen wearin ontwikkelingen met
betrekking tot klassencompromissen centraal staan. Nederland, Oostenrijk
en Zweden zijn gekozen als 'cases'. Uit de empirische bevindingen blijkt
dat de conclusies van de theoretische analyse voor een belangrijk deel
bevestigd kunnen worden, alhoewel de realiteit van de land-apecifieke
ervaring natuurlijk altijd veel rijker is dan dat een theorie doet
vermoeden.
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eoonqmic thin~ng: wny ao n3presen~atroes or me wonang-aass compromise
with n3presentatives of the capitalist class on major socio-ec~nomic topics on ~
a national level, and what do such compromises look like? The author
establishes the claim that macro-economic compromises between organized
classes are both likely to result and unstable in their nature. It is shown how
the state may act as an actor supporting the establishmeM of an institutional-
ized class compromise and how it may try to preveM the breakdown of it.
After elaborating these claims in a dynamic macro-economic model, the
author describes developments of dass oompromises in post Wor1d War II
Sweden, Austria and the Netherlands to illustrate the theory.
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